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CMF.rnRI
INTRODUCTION

The past seTeral decades, more than any others, haTe witnessed the fruitful and rapid grewth of experimental psychology.

To strengthen many of the established metaphysical

concepts of theoretical psychology, we now haTe objectiTe
laboratory data.

Within a comparatiTely short time, experi-

mentalists have made innumerable and invaluable contributions
to the field of psychology.

For a time, these investigators

confined their researches to the realm of sensory phenomena,
and for various reasons.

On the one hand, were the modern

sensists who denied the very existence of any but sensory
processes.

On the other hand, the dualists, moderate and

otherwise, were dubious as to the possibility of any experimental procedures with the ratienal processes.

It is true

that our immaterial powers defy any attempt of direct measurement.

These powers, infinite in potentialities, cannot be

reduced to any quantitative units or subjected to materialistic confines.

However, in their attempt to observe the dif-

ferentiations between sensory and nan-sensory phenomena, a
1

2

particular group of experimentalists, the Wurzburg School,
took the initial step in the experiment at ion o.f higher thought
processes.
Oswald Kulpe, as a. result of his experiments, arrived a.t
conclusions diametrically opposed to the dogmatic sensism of
the Wundtian School.

When his discoveries were corroborated

by those of Marbe, Watt,
ment was initiated.

Messe~and

others, a reactionary move-

Experimental investigations had proved to

K"ulpe and his followers that something above and beyond sensationa and images existed in the thought processes.

The pure

awareness found in the intro·specti one of the thought processes
was not identifiable with the image.
That this distinction must be made
in much the same sense that we distinguish between physical phenomena
and our consciousness of them; that,
in other words, the old doctrine of
an inner sense with the involved
idea. of a distinction between the
reality of consciousness and objectivity must now have its opportune
renewal. in the domain of psychology-this is the principal result tbft I
would dr-aw from my experiments.
lversuche uber Abstraktion. Leipzig: 1904, P• 67. ~uoted bf
Thomas v. Moore in •The Process of Abstraction". The Univer~ of California Publications la Psychology, Vol:-!
{November, 1910), P• 92.

With these discoveries originated the first formal experimentation of the higher thought processes.

Previous to Kiilpe,

Ebbinghaus had given the famous pioneer experiments on memory.
But most cammentators think that he did not designate memory
as a higher thought process in Kulpe's sense.

The moTement

received further impetus from the performance, elsewhere, of
similar experiments which led to like conclusions.

Woodworth,

Binet, and Thomas V. Moore had offered plausible convictions
deduced from results in accord with those of the Wurzburg
School.
Dr. Moore's work on abstraction has become a classic
among experiments on the higher thought processes.

It was one

of the first of its kind and gave evidence that psychology
would profit much by further research in this field.

The

experiment is remarkab1e, not only because it established a
precedent, but also because it shows considerable ingenuity in
presenting objective data which so clearly represent the stages
involved in intellectual abstraction. 2
Foll.owing the example of these pioneers, experimentalists
produced an abundance of data obtained in research work on
sensation, perception, memory, and intelligence.
2

"The Process of Abstraction", pp. 73-197.

But amid all

4

this progress, there has been a noticeable void, namely, a
great lack of experimentation and research in the domain of
rational appetition.

The writers of will-psychology have pre-

faced their writings with this complaint together with a plea
to others for further participation in their work.

The para-

mount importance and vital significance of the will has always
been recognized by scholastic writers, and many others as well.
Great philosophical battles have been waged over the problems
of the will.

An adequate solution of all these problems may

have to await the beatific vision.
One of the foremost reasons for neglect in this type of
research is theerroneous interpretation which is so frequently
attached to volitional activities.
in materia1ism.

Modern dynamism is steeped

The will is confused or identified with

instinctive tendencies, drives, or biological urges.

No dis-

tinction is made between rational and sensory appetition;
appetition is rooted in man's physical nature.

a.~l

Thus, a. wealth

of psychological research has been devoted to instincts a.nd
the various other types of sensory appetite.

Will, in the

status of its true capacity and nature, is ignored or denied.
Wundt's psychology of volition is typical of the many prevalent
materialistic theories.

5

Feeling is not independent of
volition, as alleged; impulse
is not a process which can be
distinguished from will, still
less opposed to it; and desire
is not the antecedent of will,
but rather a process which only
appears in consciousness when
some inhibition of voluntary
activity prevents the realization of volition preper.
Finally to define will as the
capacity of choice is to render
any explanation gf it impossible
from the outset.
Confusion, dissension, and faulty conclusions have resulted
from such psychological theories; and consequently progress
oftentimes has been greatly impeded.
For others, the will, because of its dynamic and imm&terrial nature, seemed too much of an enigma to warrant any positi"f.'e results from experimental attempts.

Other faculties, even

among the rational processes, seemed more promising to the
experimentalist.

Analyses of volitional activities, which are

so complex and evasive, seemed beyond the reach or capability
of most psychologists.

•Many men were attracted to other

fields of research through natural preferen9e, or because they
were hopeful of more tangible results, or because they were
unwilling to cop.e with the specific difficulties inherent in
3Lectures .m Human !!!!9.. Animal Psychology. Trans. frem 2d
Ger.m •. Edition by J. E. Creighton and E. B. Titchener. Londonr
Swan Sonnenschein and Company, Ltd., 1896, p. 225.

6

the task of investigating the Will.•

4

In more recent times,

however, these same volitional characteristics have proffered
a challenge to research workers; encouraging results obtained
from their works have set an example to others.
In their attempts to study instincts and drives, materialists themselves have been confronted by their inability to
categorize the truly volitional powers of man.

Avoiding the

term will in its full connotation, they have resorted to the
use of force, energy, or deterministic impulse.
in~estigations

Their very

have led them to the inevitable discovery of a

power capable of opposing these bodily urges, if man se pro•
poses.

They offer no acceptable explanation of these supra-

instinctive manifestations, and merely speak of will in terms
of some dominant instinct or tendency.
One outgrowth of the materialistic interpretation of
volitional activities is the existing c.onfusion and controversy regarding terminology.

As in the case of most disputed

subjects, clarification of terms will greatly simplify the
problem of solution.

Ambiguity of meanings has oftentimes

4Ra.phae 1 C • McCarthy • IS! lleasuremen t of Cona. t i em: An
Enquiry lB1! Velitional Processes. Chicago: Loyolalcrni~er
sity Press, 1926, P• 6.

7

been the source of prolonged philosophical.and psychological
dissensions.

Perhaps the same might be true in will-psychol-

ogy.
Recently, the term cona.t'io-n has come into popular use and
is a common source of confusion.

The meanings of conation are

almost as varied as the authors who have used the word.

For

this reason we will attempt to establish a few clarificatiens
and to distinguish between volition and conaticm.
For the materialist, volition means conation.

Urges,

impulse-s, drives, and instinctive tendencies constitute the
various forms of conation.

Volitio.n Climceived in any other

sense is unknown to materialists, since they admit of no higher
appetitive level.

Foremost among this group are the mechanists

and determinists who hold that man is primarily a creature
composed either of conditioned reflexes or of instincts and
desires.

Conatien, in this sense, signified any form of

biological energy; volition is a specific type of impulse or
energy.

•Will, in principle, is organized energy.

Van's

will differs from the energy of a gravitational system only
in a phenomenological sense.•

5

KcDeugall places volition

alongside of instinctive forces and defines it as •the
5

Raymond H. Wheeler. The L&ws of Human Nature.
D. Appleton and Co., 1932-;-p:" 93.

New York:

8

supporting or re-enforcing of a desire or conation by the
cooperation of an impulse excited within the system of the
self-regarding sentiment.• 6 Conation and volition differ in
degree, not in kind.

•rt may be fairly claimed, I think, that

we can vaguely understand the way in which all volition may be
accounted for as a special case of conation, differing f·rom
other conations, not in kind, but only in complexity.• 7
E. H. Wild, in his otherwise excellent experiment on
conation and cognition, falls into the common error of mistaken identity of terms.

A comprehensive study was made of

the influences of conation on cognition in muscular work, in
efficiency of motor-performance, in learning, in reproducing
processes of memory, and in performances on intelligence tests.
By way of explanation, the author explicitly states that conation is attention; and in so doing, changes the entire significance of his experiment.
Attention then is conation; it
changes the intensity of cognition and a change in determinateness follows on this. These
two changes then constitute the
T&riation in clearness of cognition of the sentient produced by
6An Introduction to Social Psychology.
7and co., 1928, p:-255.
~.,

P• 243.

Boston:

John

w.

Luce

9

.

.

8

variation 1n attentlon.
• • •
sometimes such attending is sustained by an effort of will, which
derives from the intricately organized system of conative impulses
comprising the whole personality. 9
Attention is neither conation nor volition, though it .is
perhaps the process most frequently identified with both.
However, analysis reveals the close relationship existing between volition and attention.

Attention is an act itself which

directs our cognitive processes toward some object or activity.
When attention is voluntary,the object in question is also the
object of will.

The nearest approach which St.

Tho~as

makes

to this present-day concept of attention is in his discussion
of intentio.

"The end, considered as a thing, and the means

to that end are distinct objects of the will.

But in so far

as the end is the reason for willing the means, they are one
10
and the same object."
This not ion is similarly applicable
to the object of voluntary attention.

However, at other times,

attention is drawn by external stimuli without any volitional
direction.

"Neither is attention merely a volition, or act of

8 "Influences of Conation on Cognition", The British Journal of
Psychology. General Section. Vol. XVI~(l927-28} Oct., -91927, P• 150.
Ibid., P• 149.
10~
SUIIJma Theologica .!.!!_:Basic Wri tinss o.f Saint Thomas
Aquinas edited by Anton c. Pegis. New Yorks Random House,
1944, I-II, xii, a.4, ad 2um.

10

will.

On the contrary it is that upon which the conative act

is exerted.- It is a cognitive energy directed by the will to
. t"J.ng exp.erJ.ence.
.
.11
a.n ex1.s

Some

scho~la.stics

have strongly opposed the use of the

word conation in any sense.

They have branded the term as a

tautology, and therefore as superfluous for use in scientific:
studies.
Modern psychologists speak of
conation, conative impulses,
conative urges, conative tendencies, and so forth, as conscious data distinguishable from
cognitive states, on the one hand,
and from feeling states, on the
other • • • Th& division is • • •
wrong on two scoresr first, because it is redundant; second,
because it is unbalanced. The
redundancy arises from a violation of the principle of the
minimum, since feelings and
conations are both appetitive
phenomena. The lack of balance
arises from the fact that, even
on the assumption that feeling
here means sensitive appetition
and conation means rational appetition, there should be a correspending dichotomy of cognition
i~t? sej~itive and rational cognJ.tJ.on.
1

~ichael Maher. Psychology: Empirical and Rational. London:

12Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911, p. 346.
Robert E •. Brennan. Thomistic Psychology.
Macmillan Co., 1942, p. 165.

New York:

The

11

Others have used conation in the same sense as appetition, admitting of a further subdivision.
be either, rational or sensory.

Conation would then

Thus, conation refers to any

of the affective processes as distinguished from the cognitive
processes.
Dr. Aveling, Stevanovic, and other British experimentalists of King's College, London, have used conation in this
sense, but have carefully distinguished between conation and
volition.
In general, conation is the striving
by which we seek to satisfy our
wants, to attain the ends at which
our natiTe and acquired dispositions
a.im, to carry out the purposes of
our will. Such striving may be
pursued upo,n different levels, high
or law, of activityt it may be persistent and sustained or fitful and
easily abandoned.l3
Dr. Aveling describes volition as a particular type of conation, as conation of a higher level.

Referring to volition,

he says,
In general, it may be laid down
as a principle that the human
organism tends to strive towards
any end desired. Strivings of
this sort presupposes previous
1

~rancis Aveling. Personal.it;y and Will. New York: D.
Appleton and Company, 1931, P• 159.

12
experience of such ends, or a
knowledge of it reached by way
of the principle of correlateeduction; and such conation as
is involved in the process differs
from that exhibited in instinctive
reactions precisely in this, that
it is a conation guided by conscious reinstatement or mental
fabrication, of an end, together
with a tendency towards it. In
either case, however, the determination of the organism to the
end desired consists radically
in a connate relation between the
organism and the end, as is also
the case in instinctive actions. 14
Experimental studies carried out by others have affirmed
the distinctions as defined by Dr. Aveling.

In canducting a

research on frustration of will-acts and conation, one author
found that introspective reports revealed that such differences exist.
Aveling has by experimental work
revealed that there is a clear-cut
distinction 'between conation and
volition--between striving and
willing. This distinction is supported by the data obtained in our
work. The introspective reports
• • • show that there is a real
phenomenological diffe·rence be14

"The Psychology of Conation and Volition", ~ British
Journal of Psychology. General Section, Vol. XVI-XVII
(1925-192?) April, 1926, P• 348.

13
tween the experience of conation
and that of volition.l 5
An experimental study on judgment has also produced evidence that there are distinct and essential differences which
must be considered when referring to volition and to conation.
Conation of a. physical kind was evident in cognitions on the
sensory level, while it was noticeably absent during the tasks
requiring abstrcl.ction and eduction of relations •
• • • the educing of relations
and correlates, abstract.ing and
universalizing, as long as the
fundaments are given, tend to be
permeated with less intensive or
very little conation if any. All
conation, with regard to cognitional processes, appears to be
connected with the reproduction
of items and their clarification
rather than with educing relations
and correlates, in other words,
with operations on the lower,
rathe: than thl higher level of
conscJ.ousness. 6
For these writers conation is a ter.m used to indicate
general feelings of striving, seeking, and affective activities; while volition is the movement towards a definite goal
15Howard L. Philp. "An Experimental Study of the Frustration
of Will-Acts and Conation", The British Journal of Psychol.!2&•
:Monograph Supplements,Vol. m (1936) P• 35.
16Borislav
P. Stevanovic. "An Experimental Study of the
Mental Processes Invol.ved in Judgment", The British Journal
of Psychology. Monograph Supplements, V"'"i":- IV (1927) No. 12,
P• 119.

14

which has already been intellectually perceived.

Thus voli-

tion is a for.m of conation only in the sense that it is an
affective process rather than a cognitive process.

Conation

is never identified with volition.
In our work, the term conation is used in the same sense
as that ado;pted by Dr. Aveling, Father McCarthy, and others in
their experiments on volition and conation.

Thus conation

refers to the strivings of the organism in a broad extent of
the ter.m; volition refers, specifically, to the movements of a.
rational nature, as we shall see more minutely in the following Chapter.

As Wyatt reminds us, •we must carefully avoid
confusing physical effort with psychic initiative. 1117 Cona18
tion then is the ttexperience of effort.w
That volition influences very many internal mental prccesses is a fact known to all from experience.

The light of

intellect becomes operative by means O·f volitional activity.
St •. Thomas Aquinas, and Aristotle before him, have always
recognized the impotence of cognitive powers without will.
"Intellect shows the way and will supplies the driving power.
19
Intellect is the light and will the force of life.w
Differ17 The Psycholos;y of Intellis;ence and Will. New Yorke Harcourt
Brace and Company, 1931, P• 156.
18 Ibid.
l9Boyd Barrett. Strength of Will. New York:: P. ;r. Kenedy
and Sons, 1915, p. 74.

15

ences between the logical thought as directed by will and the
revery of day dreams are commonly recognized.

Nevertheless,

by means of objective experiments, we can gain a more intimate
knowledge of the quality of these vo·li tional effects.

While

their existence is unquestionabUe, it is the purpose of experimental dat& to enhance the evidence already at hand.

Our

purpose then is not to reveal an undiscovered principle, but
merely to observe and to investigate the quality and nature
of certain volitional effects.

Since the higher processes

themselves are not quantifiable, the most valuable results of
experiments involving these activities are largely qualitative
ones.

However, by means of timing responses, temporal differ-

ences can also be observed.
Experimental procedures do .not constitute the sole purpose of this thesis.

Invaluable work has aiready been accom-

plished in will psychology.

In order to profit by the methods

of others and data already secured, we will att.empt to review
the classic experiments on volitional activities and the outstanding theories of will a.s well.

CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF VOLITION

Will is a dynamic source of many other mental processes.
Though it is true that a thing must first be perceived before
it is desired, it is also true that it must be possessed in
order to be actually enjoyed.
Whence also intellectual natures
have a like disposition to good
as apprehended through an intelligible form, so as to rest
therein when possessed and when
not possessed to seek to possess 1
it; bath of which pertain to will
• • • Will in us belongs to the
app,etitive part, which, although
named from appetite, has not far
its only act to seek what it does
not possess but also to love and 2
delight in what it does possess.
Intellect and will are cqmpl.ementary powers, the o:ne f'ructifying the other.

While intellect perceives the good, will

moves toward and possesses the good.

The act of will is in-

complete and barren without the aid of intellect.

st. Thomas

l.
St. Thomas Aquinas. ~Summa Theologica, I, xix, a..l, c.
trans. by Anton c. Pegis in Basic Writings of' Saint Thomas
Aquinas. New York: Random House, 1944.
2~·, I XIX, ad. 2um.
16
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frequently refers to the complementary interaction between
intellect and will.
The good co,nsidered under the
notion of good, i.e., as appetible,
pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But it
pertains to the reason considered
under the notion of the true before
pertaining to the will under the
notion of good; for the will cannot
desire a good that is ~ot previously
apprehended by reason.
·
The nature of will itself is c.l.o.sely related to the kind and
degree of knowledge from which it arises.

~us,

in man we

find that there are as many appetitive powers as there are
cognitive pomers.

The movements of sensitive appetite spring

from our sensory c.ogni tions, while voluntary acts follow
intellectual motives.

Human acts are the end results of this

complementary interaction of intellect and will; for such acts
are the outcome of voluntary decisions and choices which, in
turn, presupposed intellectual. p.erception and evaluation.
Will is active only because it has been stimulated toward an
object presented by the intellect.

Previous evaluations are

necessary before any desire is aroused on the pa.rt of will.
There can be no willing, no final possession of an object
3

Ibid., I-II, xix, a. 3ad. lum.; xi, a.l, ad. 2um, ad 3um.

18

without previous knowledge of the object, and there can be no
knowledge unless there is implicit willingness to know.
menting upon St. Thomas's affirmation of the inner

Com-

relation~

between intellect and will Rousselot says,
He iooked upon will as a tendency
towards the good in general, and
consequent1y he had to find in
knowledge the determining principle for each concrete human
action. Seeing that man's ideal
was to real.ize himself intellectually, it followed that the only
way he had of acting volunta.rily
was by recourse to intellectual
motives. Will is something derivative: it springs from mind and
acts for mind. And just as liberty
has its root and sourc~ in the
amplitude of inte1lect's proper
object (Ex hoc enim quod ratio
deliberans se habet ad opposita,
voluntas in utrumque potest), so;
each particular human act must be
traced to an intellectual perception and voluntary decisions take
their rise therein.4
Because intellect and will are fundamentally of the same
nature and rooted in the essence of the soul, their operations
are interdependent.
The will moves the intellect as
to the exercise of its acts since
even the true itself, which is
4
The Intellectualism of St. Thomas. Trans. by Rev. James E.
O'Mahony. New York:--Sheed and Ward, 1935, p. 200.

19

the perfection of the intellect,
is included in the universal
good as a particular good. But
as to the determination of the
act, which the act derives from
the object, the intellect moves
the will; for the good itself is
apprehended under a special aspect
as contained in the universal true.
It is therefore evident that the
same is not mgver and moved in the
save respect.
The cooperative relationship between intellect and will is
perhaps even more evident in an act of choice.

Evaluations

and counsel are made by intellectual cognition; and will
supplies approval and makes the final choice.

It is clear

that all such operations are ultimately dependent upon the
joint operation of both intellect and will.
While both of these faculties are rational and immaterial
and therefore essentially alike, they differ specifically fr&m
one another by their modus operandi.

The difference in oper- ·

ation arises from the diversity of aspects existing in all
objects.
intellect.

Thus, the proper object of will differs from that of
•What is apprehended and what is desired are the

same in reality, but differ in aspect; for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is
desired as suitable or good.
5

Now, it is diversity of aspect

!a! Summa Theologica, I-II, ix, a.l, ad. 3um.

20

in the objects, and not material diver-sity, which demands a.
6
diversity of p,owers. •
Will resembles instincts, drives, and impulses in so far
as all move towards an object.
ar~

Both will and sensible appetite

in the same genera of potencies, i.e., both are appetitive

in character and are aroused to action by some form of good.
But the differentiation between these two kinds of p.owers is
an unbridgable one, for it is a difference arising from the
essential nature of each.

In this distinction lies the crux.

of the dissensions and controversies which have existed since
the very beginnings of philosophical inquiries.

The everlast-

ing thirst of man :for satisfaction has never yet been quenched
by the possession of material goods or by indulgence in sensual
pleasures.

Above and beyond these tendencies, the supra-

sensuous power of wi11 seeks a higher good, an object proper
to its own nature.

In this very insatiability of man's

desires, there is ample proof that some power within him
strives for an infinite good.

Upon this necessary distinction

rests the whole of will psychology.

To understand anything

about will, we must necesaarily first consider its rational
6

Ibid., I, 1xxx, a.l, ad. 2um.

21

nature.

Materialists discuss will in the sense of a dominant

instinct or tendency, and in doing eo distort the whole purpose of human psychology.

st.

Th~as

explicitly sets forth

this distinction as an integral factor in the entire field of
psychology.
We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a distinct
power from the sensitive appetite.
For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally
moved by the thing apprehended.
Therefore !h! apprehended appetible
is a mover which is not moved, while
the-appetite ~ a:Moied mover • • •
Now things pa.ssi ve and movable are
differentiated according to the
distinction of the corresponding
active and motive principles, for
the motive must be proportienate
to the movable, and the active te
the passive. Indeed the passive
power itself has its very nature
from its relation to its active
principle. Therefore, since what
i~ apprehended by the intellect
and what is apprehended by sense
are generically different, consequently, the intellectual a.ppetfte
is distinct from the sensitive.
Concerning will itself there are further distinctions to
be made.

The term will designates the spiritual faculty which

tends toward some object intellectually perceived as good.
Some scholastics prefer to include in .their definition the
7

Ibid., I, 1xxx, a.2, c.
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twofold aspect of will.
involve

~

• • • • all internal acts of the will

conscious 'inclination' toward !a object intellec-

tually apprehended .!,! good, .2£ .! conscious •aversio·n' ~ .!:!!
object intellectually apprehended ~ evi1.• 8 st. Thomas
himself refers frequently to the negative aspect of will in
his various discussions on the object of volition and also in
his dissertations on the problem of evil.

"Accordingly, the

will is referred both to good and to evil, but to good by
desiring it, and to evil, by shunning it.

Therefore the

actual desire of good is called will ( voli ticm), meaning
thereby the act of will • • • the shunning of evil is better
described as nolition; and so just as volition is of good, so
no.lition is of evil. • 9
Evil is an absence of some geod; and therefere aversion
involves at least a negation of a potential attraction.

For

evil is the absence of a reality, a reality which is proper to
a thing and ought to be present in it.

Evil is none other

than a defect, a lack of something, a privation of a required
good.

If the reality which is lacking in the case of evil

were present, a. good would result towards which the will would
8Hubert Gruender. Experimental Psychology. New York and
9Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1932, p. 397.
~Summa Theologica, I-II, viii, a.l, ad. 1 um.
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strive. Aversion, then, implies attraction to the opposite
10
good.
To shun evil is definitely a movement of will and not
merely an attitude or state of mind, as is the case of certain sentiments.

One who is in sorrow is concerned with some

evil which has befallen him and which has caused his particular state of mind.

However, there may be no volitional

activity involved in sorrow, while an act of will which is
directed toward the avoidance of evil necessarily involves a
11
specific operation of wi1r.
Volition pertains to all appetitions on the rational
level.

Thus, desires of a rational kind are volitions; so

also are decisions, determinations, choice,and the like.

In

lO"Homo non prosequitur sibi nisi bonum; se non avertit n2s2 a
malo. ~uae aversio a malo tamquam sui rationem implicite
continet amorem boni oppositi. ~uamobrem bonum ab intellectu propositwn volunta.ti, est objectum formal.e voluntatis
• • • ~ui abhorret a privatione perfectionis, implicite
adhaeret perfectioni, eamque concupiscit." Gustavus
Lahousse. Praelectiones MetaphYaicae Specialis, Vol. II
Psychologia. Lovanii: Neo-Eboraci, Benziger et Fr., 1888,
p. 441.
11 ttin affectionibus quidem habetur oppositio qualitatum gra.-

tarum et ingratarum: contristatio enim est status positivus
aeque ac delectatio.. In appetitionibus autem non ha.betur
talis oppositio: nam aversio a malo nihil aliud est nisi
prosecutio boni oppositi, neque aversio est status positivus
animi sicut contristatio, sed est mere aspectus negativus
actus prosequendi bonum. Gerardo Esser, s.v.n. Psychologia.
Techny: Typis Domus Missionum ad St. Mariam, 1931, P• 350.
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brief, will refers to the rational appetitive faculty; and
volition, to the acts of this faculty.
Volitions differ according to their objects.

The will

tends toward universal good of necessity and because of its
nature, while the movement of will towards some particular
object may be free and deliberate.
Therefore if the will be offered
an object which is good universally and from every point of view,
the will tends to it of necessity,
if it wills anything at all; since
it cannot will the opposite. If,
on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good
from every point of view, it will
not tend to it of necessity. And
since the lack of any good whatever· is a non-good, consequently,
that good alone which is perfect
and lacking in nothing is such a
good that the will cannot not-will
·it; and this is happiness. But
any other particular goods, in so
far· as they are lacking in some
good can be regarded as non-goods;
and, from this point of view, they
can be set aside or approved by the
will, which can tend to one and the
same thing from various points of
view.l2
Thus, the will seeks and moves toward universal good by reason
of its very nature.

For will to seek universal good is not

~summa Theologica, I,

12

l.xxx, a.. 2, c.
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to act deliberately or specifically, but it is rather ta act
in a way which is essential to its very existence.

In the

presence of universal good, there is no alternative for will;
it is impelled towards it by an intrinsic necessity.

However,

even in regard to beatitude we must be careful to make distinctiona concerning the operations of will.

Necessity pertains

not to the exercise of the act,but only to the determination
of the act.

It is impossible to will the opposite of beat)

itude.

But the exercise of will,under special conditions, is

free in regard to any object; for man is able to will not to
think even of beatitude.

In respect to objects, then, the will

is always free; for no matter what the object may be it is
13
always within man's power not to think of it •
As for particular goods, will may or may not tend toward
them.

Man is master of his acts in the presence o.f particular

goods, since he is not impelled towards them naturally, either
in the determination or exercise of his will.

Only that which

13Ibid., I-II, x, a. 2, c.; also, ttcum aut em voluntas d icatur
libera inquantum necessitatem non habet; libertas voluntatis
in tribus considerabitur • • • Sed quantum ad primum horum
inest libertas voluntati in quolibet statu naturae respectu
cujuslibet objecti... Ordinis Praedicatorum Opera Omnia, Tom.
IX, quaestiones Di~utatae ~ Veritate, XXII, a.6. Parmae:
Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1859.
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is necessarily concerned with man's happiness commands his
will.

However, because of the deficiencies of the human

intellect, the Absolute Good is apprehended in this life only
in an imperfect manner. 14 At other times particular goods are
so presented by the intellect that they appear as a. universal
good.
The absolute norm of 'the good',
however, can be approached as
interpreted by reason in various
ways, prudently, or imprudently,
in accordance with the more or
less changeable and fallible
human judgment, and the formation
of the judgment itself is man's
responsibility, depending, as it
were, on his more or less adequate
realization of the nature of 'the
good' an~ 'the end' and on his more
or less developed intellectual
faculty of comparative evaluation.
Thus, reason may 'substitute'
pseudo values for the real Absolute, and it may present to the
will these surrogatel as acceptable
and desirable goods. 5
14

"Bonum autem perfectum, quod es~ Deus, necessarium quidem
connexionem habet cum beatitudine hominis, quia sine eo non
p.otest homo esse beatus; verumtamen necessi ta.s hujus connexionis non manifeste apparet homini in ha.c vita, quia Deum
per essentiam non videt; et ideo etiam voluntas hominis in
hac vita non ex necessitate Deo adhaeret; sed voluntas eorum
qui Deum per essentiam videntes, manifeste cognoscunt ipsum
esse essentiam bonita.tis et beatitudinem hominis, non poteet
Deo non inhaerere, sicut nee voluntas nostra poteet nunc
beatitudinem non velle.• ~., Tom. VIII, Quaestiones Dis15putatae De M!!!t III, a.3.
K. F. Reinhardt. ! Realistic Philosophy. Milwaukee: The
Bruce Publishing Company, 1944, P• 133.
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In order that any object move the will, it is necessary that
it first be apprehended by the intellect, for the will itself
is a blind faculty.

Because of man's imperfect intellectual

nature, an object may be erroneously represented to the will.
For man•·s intellect does not always perceive at once the good
or evil in all. their possible relationships.

"Now it is the

result of the imperfection of man's intellectua1 nature that
his intellect does not immediately possess all things capable
of being understood, but only a few things, from which he' is
16
moved in a measure to grasp other things.•
For this reason
man often errs in choosing means which are not directed toward
his ultimate goal; or, on the other hand, the will may actuaicy
avoid the greater good in its preference for the lesser good,
because of the same circumstances.

The intellect may even

represent good where none actually exists, or may so present
the lesser good as to make it apparently

the greater good.

In the same manner, evil is often made to be an apparent good.
Thus the will, in this life, may not adhere to object·s which
have a necessary connection with our ultimate end.
But there are some things which
have a necessary connection with
happiness, namely, those by means

16

~Summa

Theologica, I, lx, a. 2, c.
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of which man adheres to God, in
alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through
the certitude produced by seeing
God the necessity of such a connection be shown, the will does
not adhere to God of necessity,
nor 1~ those things which are of
God.
~Vhom

It is clear, then, that will tends necessarily only to
what is presented as absolute good.

The will desires, of

necessity, happiness; and whatever else it desires,it does so
freely.

Now only God, the Absolute Good, is without imperfec-

tion, and therefore the only thing the will cannot not-will.
Any other good, no matter how desirable it may actually be in
itself, contains imperfection which is a non-good, and therefore not necessarily desirable by manta will.
And since the lack of any good
whatever is a non-good, consequently, t.hat good alone which
is perfect and lacking in nothing
is such a good that the will cannot not-will it; and this is happiness. But any other particular
goods, in so far as they are lacking
in some good, can be regarded as
non-goods; and, from this point
of view, they can be set aside or
approved by the will, which can
tend to one and the same thin~
from various points of view.l

i~!B!£., I, lxxxii, a. 2, c.

lBi£.,

I-II, x, a. 2, c.
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Kan is not free to choose his ultimate goal, for he was
created for happiness and is necessarily destined by nature
for this .end.

But the means by which beatitude is finally

attained is left to the free choice of man.

If perfect hap-

piness is not reached on the day of reckoning, failure to
reach the goal is inevitably the result of contrary means,
freely chosen.

-we are masters of our own actions by reason

of our being able to choose this or that.
not the end, but

~means

i! !h!

~,

But choice regards,

as the Philosopher says.

Consequently, the desire of the ultimate end is not among those
actions of which we are masters. •

19

Rational appetitive acts may also be distinguished either
as elicited acts of the will or as commanded acts of will.
This division clarifies the explanations for acts performed
contrary to will, i.e. acts performed through coercion.
Elicited acts of will are internal volitions, and proceed from
within the appetitive faculty itself.

Such acts are indepen-

dent of any force external to will, and may be performed
regardless of contrary extrinsic manifestations.

Commanded

acts of the will are those acts which are executed by the will
19 Ib1·d ... I .,~-·i
..
, ...~..A.AAJ. , a • 1 , ad •

oz
.JUin.
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itself or some other power.

Thus, the will might command an

action of the body which remains unperformed because of an
external obstacle.

In such a case, will itself is not inter-

nally impeded, and remains unchanged; only the attempt to
manifest itself externally in a particular w a.y is thwarted.
In endeavoring to shift an ambiguous figure, the subject may
fail to acquire the desired rate of oscillation, not because
will is lacking, but because obstacles are present.

On the

other hand, a man may be forced to give up his personal posses&ons to a robber, not because he wills it, but because
physical violence forces him to do so.

•As regards the com-

manded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence,

.

in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from
executing the will's command.

But as to the will's own proper
act, violence cannot be done to the wi11.• 20
The clarification between an immediate act of will and a
voluntary action is also necessary before complete understanding of will psychology can be attained.

An act of will pro-

ceeds directly from the rational faculty itself, while the
voluntary action results, in turn, from an act of will.

A

voluntary action proceeds from the will, indirectly, in so far
20 Ib.

~.,

. a. 4 , c.
I-II, v1,
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as other means are necessary for its performance.

For the

execution of an act of will, rational appetite, preceded by
intellectual apprehension alone suffices; for a voluntary
action, there may be any number of other faculties or powers,
either of mind or body, needed for the fulfillment of the
will-act.

Time may elapse between the act of will and the

voluntary action commanded.

"The act of the will is twofoldJ

one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely,

1Q will; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and
put into execution by means of some other power:

e.g., i!

walk and to speak, which are commanded by the will to be
. 21
executed by means of the power of locomotion."
Many of the
reaction-time experiments have centered around this precise
difference, and have sought to investigate the time element
between decision and actual performance.
We must take care, in these explanations of

will~tiv-

ities, not to imply any disunity either of the volitional
faculty itself or of the human person.

Whatever action is

volitional in character, proceeds from and is a manifestation
of the rational appetite.

Likewise,. it is the whole man who

wills and the whole man who performs voluntary actions.
21

~.,

I-II, vi, a.4, c.

Though
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at one time will dominates the pattern of human activity and
at another time does not, there are no actions which can be
attributed solely to one part of man.

Distinct powers do not

operate in complete independence of each other in man, for the
one is influenced by the very existence of the other.

All

powers and actions in man manifest various aspects of the same
hylomorphic unity.

Man

is essentially a unified whole; and

consequently any one of his actions whatsoever proceeds from
a unified self.

Man wills and man performs voluntary actions.

In the first case, will alone dominates the picture; in the
second, will together with the powers needed for the requested
operation dominates the pattern of activity.

Whatever the

action, it is the same unified self, the same personality who
is agent.
Scholastic philosophy has always emphasized the significant distinction between human acta (actus humani) and acta crf
man (actus hominis), because of the moral implications inYolved.
An inadvertent act (often termed
an act of man) is an act which,
though per~ed by a human being,
does not depend on his free will.
Man has, or exercises, no dominion
over such actions. For example,
man has no control of the beating
of the heart or of talking in his
sleep. He does not exercise
dominion over thoughts indulged

33

in during a moment of distraction;
nor over actions performed in
walking, eating, etc., without
reflection •••
A human act is an act that
is deliberately performed by one
possessed of the use of reason.
Deliberately performed means
that it is freely and knowingly
placed. It is deliberately elicited
by the will. Man has dominion
over such actions as thinking with
deliberation; eatin2~ drinking,
etc., deliberately.
Acts of man, though indeliberate, are volitional in the sense
that :man's nature is rational and free.
will exercises its freedom.

In human acts the

The phrase, actus hominis, refers

to the impulsive and indeliberate or even unconscious acts of
man.

They are voluntary only in a wider sense, in so far as

they are preceded by an apprehension of an end, but are the
outcorne·of an internal principle, i.e., they are indeliberate.
11

.Tust as natural tendency springs from nature and is in accord

with it, so does the tendency which corresponds to senstive
and intellectual nature follow from knowledge."

23

At times,

acts of man are simply spontaneous ones without any previous
choosing or rejecting.

Again, they may not be wholly instinc-

tive, but because the higher faculties of the soul play a
2

~dwin Hea1y, Moral Guidance.

Chicago:
P:ess,
1943,
pp.
6-?.
23
P~erre Rousselot.
opus cit., P•

Loyola University
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minor part, they cannot be considered as truly human acts.
The term, actus humani, refers to actions in which there is
both apprehension of the end sought and knowledge and consent
to the desire or acquisition of the apprehended goal.
acts are both free and deliberate.

Human

Hence, the will exercises

its prerogative only when requisite conditions are fulfilled.
First of all, will is free when it is at liberty to choose or
not to choose; to act or not to act; furthermore, the will is
free when it is capable of selecting one or the other means of
24
obtaining its goal.
This point again brings us to the explanation of universal good as compared with a par-ticular good.
freedom lies in the nature of intellect.

The source of

Because of natural

imperfections, the intellect in our present life is unable
24

•cum autem voluntas dicatur libera inquantum necessitatem
non habet; libertae volunta.tis in tribua considerabitur;
scilicet quantum ad actum, inquantum poteet velle vel non
vel1e· et quantum ad objectum, inquantum poteet velle hoc
v.el iilud, et ejue opp·oei tum; et quantum ad ordinem finis,
in quantum poteet velle bonum vel malum. Sed quantum ad
primum horum ineet libertas voluntati in quolibet statu
naturae respectu cujuslibet objecti. Secundum vero horum
est reepectu quorundam objectorum; scilicet respectu eorum
quae sunt ad finem, et non ipsius finis, et etiam secundum
quemlibet statum naturae. Tertium vero non est respectu
omnium objectorum, sed quorundam eorum, scilicet quae sunt
ad finem; nee respectu cujuslibet status naturae, sed illiue
tantum in quo natura deficere poteet. Nam ubi non est
defectus in apprehendendo et conferendo, non poteet esse
voluntas mali in his quae aunt ad finem sicut patet in
beatis. Et pro tanto dicitur, quod velie malum nee est
libert:as nee pars libertatis, quamvie sit quoddam libertatis
signum.• Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, XXII, a.6.
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to apprehend Absolute Good, towards which will would be
impelled.

Intellect apprehends only limited good, or Absolute

. a 1.~m~. t e d manner. 25
Goo d ~n

For this reason, will may accept

or reject an object, under proper conditions.
Some scholastics have made further differentiations of
voluntary actions.

These distinctions are helpful especially

when considering lower levels of responses.

The latter are

often confused with one or the other kinds of voluntary action.
For example, habits are interpreted by some psychologists,
merely

as types of conditioned reflexes.

Father Gruender tells us that an action may be actually
voluntary when its performance is 'Willed directly; or it may
be virtually voluntary \'lhen the action results from a volition
made at some previous time; or it may be habitually voluntary,
i.e., an action initiated by the will, but through repetition
is now performed mechanically.
A movement is actually voluntarl
when the internal act of the vlill
guiding it is'here and now present. A movement is virtually
voluntary v1hen it is a component
part of a series of movements and
the internal act to perfor.m this
particular movement is implied in
the intention to perform th~ whole
25

See above pp. 24 ff •
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series of movements. A movement
is habituall~ voluntary when it is
so entirely given over to the neuromuscular system that it is performed
without any attention of any kind
and can be called voluntary only,
because sometime in the past I have
voluntarily ~5eated this physiological habit.
So far we have confined our discussion to a description
of voluntary actions.

The bulk of psychological experimen-

tations already performed have been confined to reactions on
other levels of.response.

In many cases, experimenters have

interpreted their results in such a way as to indicate their
belief that mechanical or instinctive responses constitute the
highest level of both human and

aniL~l

activity.

The

Behaviorists ha..ve vigorously contended that their experimental
results prove the all importance of conditioned reflexes in
human as \,ell as in animal behavior.

All the complexities of

the human or animal organism are explained in terms of

re~es.

Followers of the Freudian and Hormic Schools have refuted the
conditioned reflex theories,and claim that instincts are the
driving forces of all life.

As a contrast to the subsequent

investigation of will experiments and to the previous discussion of

volitio~

it will be beneficial to review briefly some

26 Hubert Gruender, Problems£! Psychology. Milwaukee:
Bruce Publishing Company, 193?, pp. 6?-68.
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of the outstanding experiments on reflex and instinctive
behavior, and also to study the nature of these non-volitional
responses.

Non-Volitional Responses
The experiments of Pavlov, Bechterev, Thorndike,and
Watson, gave much impetus to the study of reflexes.

Through

the influence of Watson and Thorndike in America, the stimulusresponse bond v;as upheld by many as the inevitable answer to
the intricacies of human behavior.

Man was, accordingly,

reduced to a mass of physical connections, and the human
personality, to the sum total of biological genes.

Volition,

as wel1 as thought, sensation, and all mental processes, was
explained in t erma of reflexes.

Will, as an immaterial faculty,

was discarded as an imaginary power, a remnant of medieval
metaphysics.

Terms referring specifically to any of the

rational processes were rated as unnecessary appendages in
scientific studies.

The extremists even considered instincts

but another name for a series of conditioned reflexes.
minism was riding on the crest of the wave.

The mechanists

claimed that all the complexities of human behavior were
ultimately reducible to reflexes.

Deter-
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The animal experiments of Pavlov constituted one of the
first great studies of the conditioned reflex.

The universal

popularity of these experiments, along with those of Watson,
gave birth to modern behaviorism, and the conditioned reflex
formed the very core of behavioristic mechanism.

By means of

the conditioned reflex technique, attempts were made to investigate the whole of human behavior, and also to determine its
very nature and character.
The much quoted experiment,and the standard example given
by behavioriste, is that of Pavlov's conditioning of dogs.

A

conditioned reflex refers to a response aroused by a stimulus
other than the original one.

Thus the

original~imulus

for a

salivary response in dogs is the presence of food on the
tongue.

Pavlov rang a bell every time food was presented to

the dogs, and this procedure was continued for a number o·f
times.

Afterwards, the bell alone, without the presence of

the food, was found to cause the flow of saliva in the dogs. 27
The materialists were quick to generalize on such a principle, and applied their generalizations to human as well as
animal behavior.

The behaviorists soon established the

stimulus-response bond as the unit of activity; complex activ27

Ivan P. Pavlov. Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes, Vol. II,
trans. by w. Horsley Gantt:-New York: International Publishers, 1941, Chapter LVII.
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ities were but combinations and integrations of S-R units.

By

means of conditioning, it was mow thought that the whole process of behavior could be studied.

One could build up or tear

down any phase of human activity.

Conditiening provided a

method that was completely objective.

As Watson states, the

aim o.f all psychology is to predict and control behavior, and
by studying the responses .occasioned by stimuli it is pos28
The inefsible to achieve this goal with great accuracy.
ficiency of introspection, the accepted method of the
Structuralists, could at last be eliminated and replaced by a
thoroughly scientific and objective technique•
John Watson, after the example of Pavlov, attempted to
discover further facts about conditioned reflexes.

He did not

restrict his experiments to animals, but endeavored to eubstantiate the application of the reflex theory to human behavior
by perfor.ming experiments on children.

He began this study a.n

the premise that there was nothing of a subjective nature in
the child itself which contributed to its own development.
The outcome of the individual, his position in life, his
personality, his character--all were the result of conditioning and environment.

Watson's most famous experiments were

28
John B. Watson. Psychology F.!:!!! 1!!!, Standpoint Slf ~
Behaviorist. Philadelphia and Londonr J. B. Lippincott
Company, 1929, Chapter I.
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those which dealt with the emotions of children.

Through a

series of tests, Watson presented a rabbit to the young child
under prescribed conditions.

On his first experience with the

furry animal the infant showed no fear whatsoever, but when
the animal was repeatedly

pre~ented

at the same time a loud

noise was sounded,the child was soon •conditioned" to fear the
rabbit.

Like experiments were performed to test the child's

responses to fire, large dogs, snakes, white rats,etc.

From

the results obtained, Watson concluded that all types of
learning

and all behavior patterns proceed in the same way by
.
29 His famous proclamation sums up the
means of cond ~. t.1on~ng.
extreme view of behaviorism.
Give me a dozen healthy infante,
well formed, and my own specified
world to bring them up in and I'll
guarantee to take any one at random
and train him to become any type of
specialist I might select--a doctor,
lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and
yes, even into begga.r-man and thief,
regardless of his talents, penchants,
tendencies, abilit~es, vocations, and
raoe of ancestors. 0
29

Ibid., Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton and Company
Inc., 1925, Cha~ters VII and VIII.
30carl. Murchison ted.). Psychologies of 1925. Worcester:
Clark Univer~ity Press, 1928, p. 10.
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Conditioning, reconditioning, unconditioning--all are
methods dependent upon environment.

In his many experiments

on new born infants, Watson found few unlearned responses.
Consequently, he concluded that all patterned responses
develop after birth through the influence of environment only.
Pre-natal environment as well was thought to be an important
factor in later development of responses.

Besides these con-

ditions there was little else, if anything, to account for
man's behavior.
Such extreme mechanism reduces man to a state of "protoplasmic plasticity".

What is really an integral part of the

individual himself is interpreted as some phase of environment.
The individuality of the human person, the contributions of
self, the influence of innate tendencies, and above all, man's
prerogative to exercise free will, are all entirely disregarded
in the behavioristic explanations of human activities.

Expla-

nations of human actions in terms of reflexes reduce these
actions to an unconscious level.
Reflexes are localized bodily reactions:;; a.nq thus are
not even reactions of the organism as a whole.

A reflex

stimulus need not be a conscious one, though it may be.
Reflexes are specifically confined to the biological level and
can, therefore, be stimulated independently of will.

In

42
reducing human behavior to this level of response, materialism
reached its nadir.

Man was deprived not only of free will

but also of consciousness.

"The conditioned reflex instead ef

banishing introspection and explaining consciousness in
voluntary action, itself demands an explanatien.• 31 The
attemp.t to explain all human behavior, even the higher processes of thought and volition, in terms of reflex responses
only increased the confusion existing in psychological circles.
Repercussions to the reflex theory occurred in the subsequent over-emphasis on sensory dynamics.

Mechanism had

deviated too far from a common sense psychology of behavior.
Rejection of consciousness and the failure to account for
dynamic tendencies in both human and animal life were the two
most obnoxious features of behaviorism.

Reactionary theories,

accordingly, sought to emphasize the importance of instincts,
impulses, drives, and urges.
not to its rightful place.

Consciousness was restored, but
Freudians designated the uncon-

scious level as the harbor of all man's urges and drives, and as
the source of all human dynamism.

Other theories concentrated

on instincts striving toward purposive goals.
31
Thomas v. Moore. Dynamic Psychology. Philadelphia and
London: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1924, p. ?2.
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Instinctive responses are common both to man and to
animal; these tendencies are unlearned dispositions which
activate the organism to respond in a particular way in a
given situation.

In contrast to the reflex, an instinctive

response is not a localized one, but rather an activity in
which the organism as an individual whole is involved.
modern concept of instincts includes three aspects:
appetitive, and motor.

The

cognitive,

Thus, sensory perception of an object

or activity, as desirable or undesirable, precedes the impulse
towards or away from it, and is subsequently followed by a
corresponding motor· activity.

st. Thomas speaks only of the

vis aestimativa which corresponds to the cognitive element in
the modern notion of instinct, though he refers to natural
inclinations common to both man and animal.

"• •• there is

in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more
specially, according to that nature which he has in common
with other animals; and in virture of this inclination, those
things are said to belong to the natural law which nature

~

taught 1£ all animals, such as sexual intercourse, the educa32
tion of offspring and so forth."
st. Thomas, however, distinguishes between the estimative power in man and that of
animal prudence.
32

~Summa

Theologica.

I-II, lxciv, a. 3, c.
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For the apprehension of intentions
which are not received through the
senses, the estimative power is appointed • • •
Now, we must observe that as
to sensible forme there is no difference between man and animals;
for they are similarly immuted by
external sensibles. But there is
a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some
sort of natural instinct, while man
perceives them also by means of a
certain comparison. Therefore the
power which in other animals is
called the natural estimative in
man is called the cogitative, which
by some sort of cg!parison discoYers
these intentions.
The response level of instinct lies midway between reflex
and rational appetition.

ImpulsiYe reactions are higher than

reflex activities since they require consciousness and
sensory perception of a goal, but lower than volitional
activities since they are primarily of a material and sensory
nature.

Instinct in man is essentially the same in itself

as instinct in animals, but human instinctiye activities differ from those of the animal because of the ever-present
influence of man's rational powers.

The animal lives and

moves solely by instinct, while in man instincts and impulses
are always capable of being made subservient to volition.
33 Ibl"d., I , , __ ...
~111,
a. 4 , c.
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Modern theories have sometimes over-emphasized the role
of instincts in psychological phenomena.

While instincts

became all important in comparative psychology, they constitute only a part of man's sensory nature.

'Vhat is true for

the animal in regard to instincts is not equally applicable
to man.

The animal is a creature of instincts; man is endowed

with an intellect and will which redirect and modify these
impulsive tendencies.
Prominent among psychological theories which uphold
instincts as the source of human dynamics is the Hormic theory.
William McDougall studied the habitat and development of the
solitary wasps and also of various types of birds.

He care-

fully observed their periods of maturation and the instinctive
34
tendencies manifested in all phases of their life-cycle.
Fro.m his experiments on insects and animals, McDougall formulated a theory of instincts which he applied equally to man.
Greater variabilities in behavior patterns of the latter were
said to be due to the more complicated organism of human
beings.

The influence of :McDougall's Hormic theory is still

prevalent in modern psychology, and appears in various
34
outline of Psycholo~y. New York and Chicago:
Scribner's sons, 19 3, Chapters II-VII.

Charles
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modified forms.

Instinct adequately explains, for the

materialist, the problems of human dynamics.

Volition is

defined as a higher type of instinct, or as a distinct power
which is subservient to instincts and drives.

As McDougall

says,
The instinctive impulses determine
the ends of all activities and
supply the driving power by .which
all mental activities are sustained;
and all the camplex intellectua~
apparatus of the most highly
developed mind is but a means
towards these ends, is but the
instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfactions. 35
In theories of will and in experiments on volitional
processes, the erroneous concept of' instinct or of other lower
types of response have vitiated otherwise valuable results.
For the most part reflex activities are no longer considered
the predominant factor in human behavior, and because of their
mechanical nature, psychologists usually refer to them as ·
physiological responses only.

But modern dynamism is almost

entirely centered upon the sensory level of appetition.
in its capacity of a rational
~drded.

Will

dominating faculty is disre-

Or if will is referred to as a rational power, ra-

tional is understood in the sense of requiring greater
35

An Introduction to Social Psychology.
and Company, 1928, P• 45.

Boston:

John

w.

Luce
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complexity of response.

No essential distinction between

sensory and rational appetition is made by the modern nonscholastic psychologist, and instinct and volition are differentiated only on the basis of grea.ter or less variability
in response patterns.

CHAPTER III
THEORIES OF WILL

The preceding chapter on the nature of volition has presented the theory of will generally upheld by the Scholastics.
Differentiations of opinion concerning secondary points have
resulted in interpretations other than that of St. Thomas.
However, whatever the variations may be, all Scholastics maintain the same fundamental principles concerning will, i.e.,
that will is the rational., appetitive faculty in man and is
rooted in the very essence of his being.
The voluntarism of Dune Scotus is strongly opposed to the
intellectualism of st. Thomas, but the opposition seems to result from emphasis on one or other faculty and the kind of distinction that is to be found between them.

For st. Thomas the

volitional process includes both reason and appetite, while in
Duns Scotus' doctrine we find a definite line of demarcation
drawn between will as nature and will as the source of free or
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elective acts. 1

Reason is never the total cause of a free act,

for liber arbitrium is not predetermined by the judgments of
reason in any way.

Whatever criticisms are presented by reason

previous to the fiat, will itself remains entirely free to do
this or that.

Thus for Scotus,opposition existed between will

as a natural tendency and the elicited act of will.

St. Thomas,

as we have already seen, maintains that reason and knowledge
form an intimate part of the vo-litional process, and that will
is ultimately derived from intellect.

However, both Duns

Sc~

and st. Thomas were careful to preserve at all timw the imma.terial and rational nature of will.
The early Greeks, long befo,re the med ievaJL philosophers,
oftentimes had been vigorously engaged in polemical discussions
on problems of the will.

Controversies aro:se among them in

their attempt to study and develop a system of ethics.

The

ancient philosophers, as well as the early Christian Fathers,
1 "Loquendi de appetitu naturali, voluntas quidquid appetit, appetit pr·opter beatitudinem; quia secundum appetitum naturalem
appetit secundum quod est perfectio ejus: sed quaecumque perfectio appetitus naturalis est ejus perfectio in ordine ad ultimum ejus perfectionem •••Si quaestio· aut em quaerat de a.ppetitu
voluntatis, prout est actus elicitus, sic dico quod non cportet
quod voluntas appetat quicquid appetit propter finem ultimum."
Q.uaestiones Q,uatuor Voluminum Scripti Oxoniensis Super Senten~' & Suodlibeta.
Tom. IV ?ist. 49, ~. IX, no. 18.
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and the medievalists who followed them, emphasized the intellectual nature of will.

The lower passions and faculties were

described as subservient powers.

The ancient philosophers were

chiefly concerned with the will as the inseparable associate of
morality.

Among the medievalists, problems of will centered

around the aspect of freedom as opposed to a deterministic
theory of will.

In modern times great impetus has been given

to the study of will from a psychological standpoint as well as
from the philosophical aspect.
Each theory of will is characteristic of some one system
of philosophy.

In other words, a theory of will is an essential.

constituent of any philosophy of man.

The nature of man, his

course of action, his purpose of existence, the means by which
he attains his ultimate goal--all are problems intimately related to will.

The various modern schoals of thought have been

formed upon some basic explanation of man, and in each of these
schools is found a corresponding interpretation or theory of
Wille
Modern schools of psychology have been greatly influenced
by the philosoj)hy of Locke and Hume.

The empirical and induc-

tive methods used by these philosophers gave rise to the present
day "psychology of behavior" and a new concept of will.
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.Tohn Locke
According to Locke, "disquietude" or "uneasiness" constitutes the primary feature of will.

Will and freedom, though

not identical, co-exist in

fashion, and both refer to

pa~dllel

••a power to begin or forbear action, continue or end several
actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies barely by a
2
thought or preference of the mind."
Will is distinguished
from freedom in so far as it is a power of

preference,~hile

freedom is the power of acting once the preference has been
made.

Thus, there can be will without freedom, but no freedom

without will.

While man is free to act he is not free to will.

It is this "uneasiness" which determines manta will or preference.

ttThe motive for continuing in the same state or action

is only the present satisfaction in it; the motive to change is
always some uneasiness; nothing setting us upon the change of
state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness.tt 3 And again
Locke says, that the most urgent uneasiness we at any time feel
is ttthat which ordinarily determines the will successively, in
2

"An Essay Concerning Human Understanding." Philoso.Phical
Works, Vol. 1, London: George Bell and Sons, 18?5, Book II,
xxi, section 5, 8, 71.
3Chapter
Ibid., section 29.
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that train of voluntary actions which make up our lives ••• but
that which immediately determines the will, from time to time,
to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of desire, fixed
on some absent good:

either negative, as indolence to one in

pain; or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure."

4

Will runs

counter to desire only when that desire is weaker than some
other.

Action thus is always determined by the strongest desire

or motive.

Locke describes the strongest motive as the most

urgent uneasiness.

His idealistic system of philosophy forbade

him to adnit that an object could be the source of a

thou~ht.

For Locke, mind has no other object except its own ideas; and
ideas, he claims,

~riginate

only from sensations and reflection.

Therefore, neither can motives of will proceed from reason.
Such would be the only consistent corollary to his fundamental
idealism.

The only possible object of reason is the simple

idea which proceeds from sensation and is inevitably accompanied
by the feeling states.

~elight

or uneasiness, one or other of

them, join themselves to almost all our ideas both of sensation
and reflection; and there is scarce any affection of our senses
from without, any retired thought

~., section 40, 33.

4

~f

our mind within, which is
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not able to produce in us pleasure or pain."
sense of Locke's doctrine, the only proper
will are appetite

5

In the strict

motives~

action or

and desire, as produced by the imagination.

Only happiness is capable of moving desire,and happiness
consists in the acquisition of pleasure and avoidance of pain.
Good and evil are nothing but pleasure and pain, and happiness
in its full extent is the utmost pleasure we are capable of.

6

Thus man does not err in his pursuit of happiness,for he never
fails to realize that which is pleasurable.

Every one "knows
7
what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers."
Locke,
however, avoids pure Hedonism by resorting to the future good
as a r:J.otive of will.

Though will without exception is deter-

mined by the strongest desire,and the&rongest desire is none
other than the strife for the greatest pleasure, man has the
power to suspend his desires and stop them from determining his
will to any action until, "he has examined whether it be really
of a nature in itself and consequences to make him happy or
no."

8

In ather words, man can suspend actions in preference

for a future pleasure which he deems greater than the present
5

.

Chapter vii, aection 2.
6~.,
Ibid.,
Chapter XXI, section 42, Chapter x:x:viii, section 5.
7
Ibid., Chapter xxi, section 58.
8Ibid., section 56.
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one.

In these comparisons, judgment may err and in doing so

man becomes responsible for his own actions and preferences.
'Even in his admission of a possible greater pleasure obtainable in the future,as compared to a present pleasurable
good, Locke's doctrine reveals an inherent weakness.

Since all

action is determined by impulse to remove the "'uneasiness"
created by the desire for the greatest pleasure, which is in
turn derived from the senses, how may we account for the actual
desires and objects of will which in reality cannot be found in
the sensible world?

Above all, Locke's doctrine of will, though

it proposes to offer.a basis for morality, is inconsistent with
true morality when it attempts to explain good and evil in
terms of pleasure and pain.

David Hume
Hume follows closely the theory held by Locke,and defines
will as "the internal impression we feel and are conscious of
when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or
new perception of our mind."' 9
9

A Treatise

Volition is enumerated in the

~ Human Nature and Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion. London and New York; Longmans, Green and Company,
1898, Vol. II, P• 181.

55

category of passions along with desire and aversion, grief and
jay, hope and fear.

The passions·a.r·ise fro:in good and evil;a..nd

the internal. impression we feel when we consciously give rise
to motion is w.ill•

Feeling, therefore, becomes an integral

part of every volition.

In Htllllle's philosophy, will is reduced

to the sensory level and is deprived of its dignity as a ·
rational power.

Along with the "other passions" it is fo,unded

upon pleasure and pain, and may even arise from impulse or
_instinct.

There is no question of will as an intellectual

faculty to which passions and impulses must be subservient.
Hume's notion of will is based on his particular concept of
intellect and reason.

"Reason is, and ought only to be the

slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office
than to serve and obey them.• 1

.

° Following the tenets of ide-

alism, Hume spoke of ideas in terms of unrealities, and reason,
merely as a concept of mind.

InHume's theory, reason could

neither constitute objects·nor provide motives because he maintains that all motives arise from the desire for pleasure.
Acco,rding to Hume, the only. check to any passion is a mo1tive
of greater pleasure or a countermotive; therefore there is no
10

Ibid., P• 195.
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such thing as conflict between reason and passion.

Far, •A

passion mus.t be &ccompanied with same f&lse judgment, in order
to its being unreasonable; and even then is not the passion,
properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment.•

11

InHume's doctrine, the good as proper object of will refers
only to pleasure; thus the influencing motives o·f will are always contained in some form of pleasure.

Even as regards moi&l

good, pleasure remains the dominating factor; for the moral
good itself is considered a mode of pleasure, and only as.such
does it ever become· a. motiTe to the will.
The eensism and hedonism of Locke and Hume are among the
principle sources of modern materialistic

psycho~o.gy.

Asse:eia-

tiamism in the realm o.f ideas and an emo.tienal er senseey
concept of will formed the chief tenets of many schools o!
thought which succeeded these philosophers.

Locke's empiri-

cism with its denial of the immaterial and spiritual has been
the primary source of modern scientism.

Jahann Friedrich Herbart
On the continent Herbart may well be considered an outstanding forerunner of modern psychologism.
11

Ibid., P• 196.

The mind in

5'7

Herbartian philosophy constitutes an aggregate of faculties;
more definitively, mind is the sum of sense-perceptions, and
among these is will.
many units.

Mind is not a unit but an aggregation of

The concept of mind is derived from the fundamental

tenet that all knowledge is based on experience guided by metaphysical and mathematical principles.

Thus psychology is de-

rived from a threefold source; metaphysics, mathematics, and
experience.
Ideas themselves are dynamic entities and struggle with
one another for self-preservation, i.e., for existence in consciousness.

Ideas, considered

per~·

are merely passive states

of mind, but in their relations with one another and in their
consequent attempts to reach consciousness they become dynamic
forces.

Oftentimes two ideas fuse and form a continuity of

thought, while at other times they remain antagonistic and repel
one another·.
The distinction between ideas and will, or between cognition and appetition is not well-defined •••• "all concepts without exception may be expressed as desires and feelings.• 12
Herbart's concept of will is merely the struggle of ideas to
12! Textbook _!a Psychology.

K. Smith.

New Yorks

Trans. from the German by :Margaret
D. Appleton and Company, 1896 1 p. 140.
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attain consciousness or to strive for self-preservation.

The

interaction, fusion, and reproduction which constantly take
place in the world of idea.e form the basis of will activity.
The response of the mind to outward physical stimuli is primarily a volitional process.

The idea which is of greatest

worth becomes the motive value of will, since it is this ide&
which reaches consciousness by means of its overpowering
dynamic strength.

In brief, the first activity of mind

i~

its

response to external sense stimuli is a will activity, and the
worth of each idea determined by its predominance oTer others in
consciousness is said to be the motive T&lue.
Will is desire accompanied with
the presupposition of the attainment of that which is desired. 3
Actual self-control and the possibility that a man may carry .ut
that which he demands and should
demand of himself depends upon
the cooperation of several concept-masses. In this, that
general will is manifested, if
such has already been formed,
and in that ease it is alw~ys
located in some kind of c«nceptmaes, a great power which may be
recognized in elery activity that
has a purpose.l
The more cumplicated such an activity is, the

~:Ibid., P• 1?5.
Ibid., P• 181.
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more manifest is the power of
that dominating concept-mass in
which the will of the chief design has its seat over all the
others which are subordii~ted to
it in different degrees.
Thus the will, whether it be considered •will in general,"
or "voluntary acts which deal with details,• has its origin in
these •concept-masses.•

The latter are the ideas which have

succeeded in their attempts at self preservation and have attained existence in consciousness.

These concepts, assembled

together, constitute the sum-total of consciousness.
Herbart's associationism greatly emphasized the unconscious also.

For the most important dynamic activities were

those in which ideas struggled with one another· for dominance,
and this process of fusing, blending, repelling, reproducing
takes place in the realm of the unconscious.

Franz Brentano
Between the idealism of Locke and Hume and the objective
experimentalism of the Leipzig school lies the significant and
influential group of •act psychologists• under the leadership
of Franz Brentano.
15.D.!!·, p. 182.

The important aspect in regard to the
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development of ::Brentano's theory was its extreme contrast to
the prevailing theory of the day.
generation.

::Brentano was of Wundt's

The traditional theory, the psychology with which

other views and systems were compared and contrasted, was the
content psychology of the

Leip~ig

School.

Act psychology dared

to introduce and to emp,b.asize the place of dynamic concepts,

&

measure contrary to all the precepts of the established
Wundtian orthodoxy.
::Brentano's empiricism afforded a unique interpretation of
appetition in general.

Within the thr·eefold classification o·f

mental acts (ideating, judging, feeling) feelings were thought
to be analogous to judgments and in this way:

in judgment

there is either the decision that a thing is true or that it is
false; likewise, feeling is either pleasant or unpleasant.
the division of the mental processes called feelings,
the phenomena of love and hate.

In

functi~

Will itself is nothing more

than the complete functioning of the love-hate activity.

The

third class of mental phenomena contains all the various forms
of appetition that are listed ordinarily under the names of
feelings, emotions, instinct, desires, and will.

Within this

third category, all of these appetitive activities form more or
less of a concatenation according to the degrees of noticeable
differentiation; so that one may pass from one member of the
series to the next quite easily and perhaps almost imperceptibly.
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Herein lies the difference between feeling and will.

At one
.
16
end of the series stands feeling and at the other end, w111.
Brentano, like many of the evolutionists and other materi-

alists, considers the higher faculties of man, s·uch as willing
and understanding, different from sensory knowledge and appetition only in degree.

No matter how pronounced the differentia-

tion may be between a feeling of sadness and an act of will,
the two functions are separable only in degree of intensity and
not by any intrinsic distinction of kind.
In Brentano' s system of values, the phenomenological concept of will is developed more fully.

Values in act psychology

are not external entities existing in the objective world, but
are derived from the mental activities· of the third class of
psychic phenomena, namely, feelings.

An analogous relationship

exists between judgment and the love-hate process.

Ideating

consists only in the presentation of objects or contents; but
in judging and feeling, a movement takes place under the form

l6"Betra.chten wir als Beispiel die folgende Reihe: Traurigkeit--Sehnsucht nach dem vermissten Gute--Hoffnung, dass es
uns zuteil werde--Verlangen, es uns zu verscbaffen--Mut, den
Versuch zu unternehmen--Willensentschluss zur Tat. Das eine
Extrem ist ein GefUhl, das andere ein Willen; und sie
scheinen weit voneinander abzustehen: Wenn man aber auf die
Zwischenglieder achtet und immer nur die nachetstehenden
miteinander vergleicht, zeigt sich da nicht uberall der
innigste Anschluss und ein fast unmer.kl.icher Ubergang?•
Psycholo~ie .!Q!! Empirischen Standpunkt, Zwei ter· Band,
Leipzig: Verlag Von Felix Keiner, 1925, P• 84-85.
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of selection.

It is the third class of love-hate which pro-

duces values; the second class, judgment, produces only intended truth or falsehood.

The fundamental norms of vallue,

nameiy, the true, the good, and the beautiful, instead of becoming basic themselves, are rather superimposed upon the already established categories of ideas, judgments, and feelings•
Thus, the beautiful is the norm of the subject-object relationship which exists in the realm of ideas; it is the result of
the highest functioning of the ideating process.

The true re-

sults from the highest functioning of judgment, while the good
results from that of feelings or the love-hate faculty.
Will and sense appetites are grouped together as forms of
judgment.

Neither is judgment restricted to a rational proc-

ess, nor are instinctive impulses confined to the sensory
realm.

Both are but members of a mental series in which the

various forms progress from the lower to the higher degrees of
intensity in an unnoticeable transition.
Brentano reveals his hedonistic tendencies especially in
his theory of values and in his explanation of the good.

One
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of the essentials of good is its pleasing nature or quality;
17
if there is no pleasing quality, there is no good.
Brentano's notion of good is clearly steeped in hedonism
and is ultimately baaed upon the pleasure principle.

Because

he makes no essential distinction between rational and sensory
appetition, it logically follows that, for him, a good, in
to be so, would conform to both forma of processes.

ord~

Since

there is no subjection of one to the other·, both would be
capable of determining good.

When an essential difference is

recognized between the will and sense appetite, a good in order
to be a true good must be conformable to man's rational nature.
An apparent good, such as bodily pleasure,may be an evil because

of its effect on man's rational nature; and a

senso~

displea-

sure may be a true good because it is advantageous for man's
rational nature.
17

~amit ein Akt der Gemntstatigkeit in sich selbst rein gut zu
nennen sei, dazu gehortr 1. dass er richtig sei, 2. dass
er ein Akt des Gef&llens, nicht ein Akt des Kissf&llens sei.
Fehlt ibm das eine oder andere, so ist er bereits in gewisser
Beziehung in sich selbst schlecht; die Schadenfreude ist
schlecht aus dem ersten, der Schmerz beim Anblick der
Ungerechtigkeit aus dem zweiten Grunde. Fehlt ibm beides, so
ist er noch schlechter, entsprechend dem Prinzip der
Summierung •••~ Ursprung Sittlicher Erkenntnis, Nebst
Kleineren Abhandlungen ~ Ethischen Erkenntnistheorie ~
Lebensweisheit~Herausgegeben ~ Eingeleitet ~ Osk&r Kraus.
leipzig: Verlag Von Felix Keiner, 1921, P• 60, n. 37.
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In the explanations of the good and of values,Brentano is
not entirely consistent.

Pleasure is not considered as the

only actual good.

However, he maintains,at the same time,that
18
feeling is the criterion for degrees of goodness.
Here again
the essential distinction is missing.

Intellect and sense do

not apprehend good in the same manner,and therefore feeling
cannot be- the criterion for a universal notion of good.

To

establish the criterion for good in man's sensitive nature
would be to subject the higher power to the lower.

"Now, the

sensitive appetite is not related to the common notion of good,
because neither do the senses apprehend the universal---But the
will is related to the good according to the common notion of
go od • • •

ltl9

But if feeling increases or decreases the goodness

of a thing in itself, as Brentano says, feeling would be the
criterion of goodness and thus surpass the higher powers which
would then be dependent upon the lower.

Brentano does not

actually distinguish between real and apparent good; a thing is
good only if it contains his requisites for good.

Actually,

18
-nemselben Princip entsprechend wichst in dem Falle, wo die
GemUtstatigkeit gut 1st, die Giite des Aktes mit seiner
Steigerung, wihrend in analoger Weise in den Fallen, in
welchen der Akt rein schleeht ist oder wenigstens in
irgendweleher Beziehung an dem Sehleehten teil hat, die
Sehleehtigkeit des Aktes mit seiner Intensitit zunimmt.•
Ibid., p. 60.
l9st. Thomas Aquinas. !!!! Summa Theologiea. (ed. Pegis) I,
lxxxii, a. 5, c.
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the goodness of a thing is independent of feeling because the
goodness of a thing
intellect.

~ ~

can be ascertained only by the

Feelings are oftentimes moved toward an object

which the intellect knows to be bad; on the other hand, they
often repel objects which the intellect knows are good.

It is

precisely this antagonism between the will and lower powers
j

which constitutes man's perpetual strife with himself.

Cer-

tainly, his feelings alone are no criterion for the goodness or
badness of a thing.
Brentano's

~nfluence

in the field of dynamics was far

reaching as well as immediate.

In the interpretation of will

and the appetitive processes in general, the effects of act
psychology appeared in the theories of Ward, Stout, the
Wurzburg School, the Gestaltists, Spearman, and others, as well
as in the Austrian School which adopted act psychology almost
in its entirety.

Wilhelm Wundt
Though a close adherent to Herbartian associationism in
many respects, Wundt did not adopt Herbart's concept of will
without modification.

He rejected the notion that will is

merely a simple unconscious quality, a definition upheld by
some of his predecessors, nor did he agree entirely with
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Herbart that will was the reaction of ideas to external
stimuli.

Will as defined by Wundt is more closely allied to

that postulated by Hums--feelings and will are essentially
interrelated.

Will and feelings are not identical, but all

volitions necessarily include a feeling content; will is a
composite of feeling and "Affekt•.

Characteristic of content

psychology, will is described •ore as an end product than as
a process.

While feelings are the initial elements, will is

the final result of the same process.
two aspects of the same process.

Feeling and will are but

•In a. concrete voluntary

action the two are not different processes, but part-phenomena.
of one and the same process, which begins with an affective
excitation, and passes over into an a.et of will.• 20

Both feel-

ing and will are intimately connected with ideas and apperception.

In fact, the separation between ideas and will is a.n

a.bstra.ctio.n only.

lttfhe separation between these processes is

one that exists only in psychological abstraction, and has no
basis in reality.• 21 In the same way impulse and will are not
two different processes, but the same process under differing
condi tiona:
20

• ••• impulse is not a. process which can be

Lectures .2!! Human !!!2_ Animal Psychology, Trans. from 2A
edition by J. E. Creighton and E. B. Titchener.
London: Swan Sonnenschein and Company Lt.d., 1896, P• 224.
21Ibid., P• 210.
Ge~

6'1

distinguished from will, still less opposed to it.•

22

Actually, idea and feeling are a unity; they become separated
into objective and subjective phenomenon only by abstraction.
In the same way, will and feeling are considered as two forms
of experience and actually for.m a. •psychical compound."

Fee1-

ings constitute the internal accompaniment of concrete willing.
According to the Wundtian theory, will is the original
energy of consciousness; in its primordial form it is a simple
impulse derived from a previous sensation accompanied by some
specific feeling tone.

Every sensation whether simple or com- .

plex is characterized by a. corresponding content of feeling
which is followed by increased intensity and consequent movement.

This series of actions or sequence of elemental states

is an act of will.

From a. series of sensation-feeling-action

contents results the unity of will activity.

Volition :for.ms

the sum total product of these elemental states.
In contrast to the associationiste,WUndt reduces will to
a sequence of feeling states or emotional processes.

Herbaxt,

as we recall, had conceived of volition as a particular series
or arrangement of cognitive phenomena.
22 Ibid., P• 225.

Consciousness of an end
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or goal wa.s not essential to volition in Vlundt's psychol.ogy of
will.

Many voluntary activities occur without previous cogni-

.aance of an end.
AllL those attributes of sensation
which endow it with a vivid affective
tone serve also to make the impression effective as a motive to will.
In this case it generally happens
that the impression, with its strong
affective tone, is the only motiTe
present in consciousness: the voluntary action is a simple, or, as it is
or-dinarily expressed, an impulsive
action. All sense impulses are
simply tendencies to will connected
with definite sensations, i.e., they
are feelings which have a strong
tendency to pass over into actual
volition.
But in course of time mind acquires various disposi tiona towards
the renewal of previous ideas which
are themselves connected with definite voluntary tendencies. An axterna.J. stimulus w,ill not any longer
simply call out the impulse corresponding to it; but this impulse will
increasingly tend to influence and
be influenced by the dispositions
already existing in the mind. These,
again, may be transformed into conscious motives to will either· by
the external imp~gssion or by secondary influences.'
The process of Tolition consists in the fusion of the essential constituents, and these are further divided into the
23

Ibid., P• 232 •
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three complementary pairs of elementary feelings.

Pleasantness

and unpleasantness, excitement and depression, tension and
relaxation are the elemental contents which fuse in any number
of different ways in order to form, ultimately, a will activity.
Without this particular concomitant fusion of feelings, no
volition can result.

These feeling compounds, according to

Wundt. are essential to any and every act of will.
A voluntary action without feeling,
one that follows from purely intellectual moti~es, as many philosophers
presuppose, does not exist at all.
On the other hand, the volitional
pr·ocesses are marked out from the
ordinary emotions by characteristics
which give volition its peculiar ·
character ••• the end stage consists
of characteristic feelings,- which
always occur in essentially the same
manner in all volitional processes •••
They are very probably compounded
of :feelings of excitation, of strain
and of relaxation, as a closer subjective analysis and the concomitant
objective expression-symptoms, especially the movements of breathing,
sh0111. Excitation and strain precede
the conclusive act, relaxation and
excitation accompany the act, and
continue for a short time afterward.s. It is obvious that the
numbers and the reciprocal action
of the motives are of decisive moment for the constitution of the
voli tiona.l process.24
24An Introduction !2 Psychology, ~rans. from the 2d German
edition by Rudo1f Pintner, New Yorkr ~be Macmillan Company,
1912, PP• 64-65.
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Wundt maintained that voluntary acts differ from impulsive
ones by reason of their degrees of complexity.

An impulsive

act is simple and consists of only one objective content together with its concomitant feeling; voluntary acts always
contain several of these objectiv.e contents or

~motives~

with

perhaps one predominating in the focus of consciousness.

Choice

is always a voluntary act because of the complexity of motives
which necessarily precede it.

A conflict arises from the con-

currence of several antagonistic contents which appear with
clearness in consciousness.

A process of selection follows,

and this is the act of choice.
Wundt seriously endeavors to maintain some semblance of
unity amid the evolutional series of elements, the formation of
compounded feeling sta.tes, and the essential association of all
these with app.eJrCeptian.

All are said to be, first, intercon-

nected among themselves; and

finall~

fuse with the ego to form a

unitary state of self-consciousness.

The unification of con-

tents which constitute the volitional

p~ocess

is the self:

FUrther.more, this unity of volition
enables us to explain directly another
fact to which we have already referred-the fact that the feelings of each
mament unite in a single total feeling, whatever oppositions may exist
between them. This total feeling
is the :tresultant volitional tendency. 25
25 Lectures ..2!! Human ~ Animal Psychology, p. 2M.
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Wundt's theory of will reveals original and characteristic
adaptations of principles established by associationism.

He

has built his system of content psychology up.on a foundation
which is thoroughly materialistic,and consequently will is defined solely in terms of sensory elements.

Will as the ter.mi-

nation of an emotional evolution became the orthodox definition
of the Leipzig School, and was likewise accepted by the great
majority of experimentalists who succeeded these pioneer investigators.

Oswald Kulpe
Oswald Kiilpe stresses the subjective nature of will and
distinguishes between the external and internal activities involved.

Internal activities pertain to volitions which aim to

affect the inner processes of ideation; will in its external
capa~ity

is concerned with bodily movements.
It is usual to describe .the
activity of will as external or
internal, according as its aim
or result is a bodily movement
or a change in the course of
ideation. Will, i.e., is regarded as a subjective power or
capacity to exercise a determining influence upon conscious
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proce~ges

body.

or movements of the

Though consciousness is usually involved in the process of
will, it need not be, necessarily.

The end product of will is

conscious to the self, but the process of willing may or may not
be conscious.

The only difference between reflex movement and

voluntary action is the consciousness of the end result.

How-

ever, whether the movements be reflex or voluntary, consciousness is not a constituent of the process itself.

•It is plain

that a capacity of this kind need not be consciouso

At the

same time we do not ordinarily speak of 'will' except when we
may assume th&t there is consciousness at least of the result
of its activity.•27
Unlike his theory of ideas and imageless thought, Kulpe's
explanation of will does not contain any irreducible element.
Kulpe and hie Wurzburg School, in their comprehensive studies
and experiments on the thought processes, had concluded that
ideas contained an element which was irreducible to feelings or
images.

Knipe's description of •imageless thought• had estab-

lished a precedent among the Ger.man psychologists.
26

Contr&ry to

outlines of Psychology. Trans. from the German (1895) by
W. B. Pillsbury and E. B. Titchener. London: George Allen
Unwin Ltd., 192?, P• 445.
27 and
Ibid., PP• 445-46.
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the

long-standing orthodox doctrine of Wundt, Kulpe and the

Wurzburg School

c~aimed

that introspections offered conclusive

proof that ideas contained an element which differed essentially
from images and feelings.

Ideas could not be reduced to these

sensory elements, for the process of ideation contained an
intangible quality not found in any of the elementary image and
feeling states •
••• the discussion of the will is
rendered still more complicated
by the question of whether the
process of internal or external
voluntary action anywhere contains
a third qualitatively irreducible
element, a specific voluntary act
in addition to the familiar contents of sensation and feeling,
the elementary nature of ·which is
universally admit ted. This last
question may be ruled out of our
p:esent ~nquiry without hesitatJ.on ••• 2
In his previous considerations of will, Kiilpe had pointed
out that such an elementary activity, even if it were found in
volition, could not possibly be a distinguishing cha.ra.cterietic.
Kulpe thus reveals his confusion concerning will as an appetiti ve po-wer and will as

a

rational power.

He considers the

dynamic nature of will to be its distinguishing qua.lity;and
whether or not the dynamic nature contains an irreducible ra28 Ibid.,

P• 446.

'14

tional element does not seem to be of great importance.

Effort,

spontaneity, and dynamism are the outstanding features;and
these, in turn, can be reduced to sensations and feelings •
••• the relative intensity of effort
rune parallel to the relative intensity of the organic sensations; and
wherever we find effort we find
motor innervations; actual or ideal..
Moreover, effort can be voluntarily
aroused by the thought of a pleasant
ehange of locality. The pleasantness in this instance simply acts
as an effective stimulus to the
origination of ideas of movement,
and the sensations occasioned by
the imagined movement of the limbs.
The elementary will quality, therefore would seem to reduce §o definite sensation qualities. 2
Like Wundt, Kulpe describes will as a derivative factor of
apperception.

Wundt had made apperception the source of all

mental life; this was true of the higher thought processes as
well as of primary images and feelings.

While Kulpe perceived

a more universal and immaterial quality in ideas, he did not
perceive the same rational attribute in will.

He followed the

traditional theory of Wundt and the Leipzig School who defined
volition as a particular form of the feeling states and of
apperception.
29

Ibid., P• 267.
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Hence we shall prefer to
adopt Wundt's view, which considers
apperception and will as ultimately
one and the same function. For the
characteristic energy which we attribute to will, theenergy which makes
it the supreme power in our conscious
life, would seem to flow from one
single source, in ~pperception. All
the peculiar attriputes of perc.eption
are also pred.icable of will; so that
will we ~Y ;ee, is only a special
mode of ma.nif'estation of appercep·tion, The phenamena of will are
thus seen to be referable partly to
the laws of reprgguction, and partly
to apperception.
, In general, there is little difference between Kulpa's
theory of will and that of Wundt.

However, others of the

Wurzburg School through experimental procedures arrived at
conclusions which revealed a more thorough study of the volitional processes.

As we shall see later,

~h

found that will

contains a factor which cannot be explained entire1y either in
terms of feelings or of sensations.

Theodule A. Ribot
Ribot's physiological theory of will may well represent
the extreme position of materialistic determinism.

The source

of volitional activities is found either in the physiological
30

Ibid., P• 450.
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networks of the human organism or in the instincts, appetites,
and passions.

Operations of will are the responses of the

physiological mechanisms to outer st.imuli.

Like the Behavior-

ists, Ribot actually identified -will with the· sum total of
responses evoked from the human organism by its environment.
Every voluntary act consists of two separate elements:
(1) the consciousness of self as a willing self; (2) a psychophysiological mechanism which is the source and seat of all
volitional power.

Vo1untary acts are the natural outcome of

will acts which are either impulsive or inhibitive.

Thus, the

state of consciousness represented by the •1 will• always tends
to express itself in a physiological mechanism or by means of a
physiological act. 31
or unconscious.

These responses may be either conscious

Volitional responses follow the fundamental

law of physiology, which states that reflex action is the source
of &11 human activity.
Ribot divides appetition into higher and lower states.
Both elementary and higher forms of affective movements are
physiologically the
31

sam~~

they differ only in regard to the

• ••• dans toute a.cte voluntaire, il y a deux ~lemente bien
dietincte: l'eta.t de conscience, le •Je veux•, qui constate
une situation, maie qui nra par lui-m€me aucune efficacit';
et un m'canisme psychophyeiologique tree complexe, en qui,
seul r'side le pouvoir d'&gir au d 'emp~cher.• Lee Maladies
de la Volont' Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer:Bailli~re et
Cle~l893. P• 3.
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state of consciousness involved in each.

Desire is an affec-

tive state which is physiologically a degree higher than that
of a reflex state because of a more intelligent degree of consciouenesa which a.ccompa.niee it.
higher in the series of

v~litiona.l

Ideomotor activities are still
movements and indicate a

more marked degree of individuality in the organism.

These

activities are movements which result from ideas or t-houghts.
Ribot characteristically explains all from a. physiological
standpoint.

Thoughts are referred to as mental states which

are comprised of both motor and sensorial elements.

Some ele-

mente, especially those involving sight and touch, are inevitably accompanied by physical movements.

This is true to some

extent for all mental phenomena, so that movement is always an
32
integral part of images and ideas.
Ribot believes that some
physiological movement is always necessary in order t.o perceive
an object in reality.

The same process occurs when -we see an

object ideally. •
Ribot does not restrict the mot or a.cti vi ty solely to the
performances or movements which follow perception and thought.
32 ••• que nos perceptions, en part iculier lee importantee, celles
de la. we et du toucher, impliquent
titre d'elements
int~grants des mouvements de l'oeil ou des membres; et que
si, lorsque noue voyons ~ellement un objet le mouvement est
un ~l~ment eesentiel il doit jouer le mame r&le, quand nous
voyons l'objet id~a.l~ment. Lea images et lea idees, m~me
a.bstra.i tee, eupp.osent un substratum anatomique dane lequel
l~eAmouvem~nte sont representee en une mesure quelconque.

a

~.,

P• 7.
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Perceptions and ideas contain within them a motor element
distinct from that which is involved in the fulfillment of
volition as such.

In order to have an idea of an object, mus-

cular activities are required.

These activities form the

intrinsic motor element which, in turn, is a constituent of
every state of consciousness.

Movements which result from p·er-

ceptions or ideas are called the extrinsic motor elements, and
the purpose of these elements is to express outwardly the existing state of consciousness.
Though affective movements proceed from an idea, it is
really not the idea which produces the movement; it is rather
the physiological accompaniment which is responsible for every
volitional activity.
into an act.•

The physiological state is "transformed

Volitional acts can be defined only as movements

which occur in some sta.ge of the progressive evolution of physiologie~l

activities.

The series originates in the most prim-

itive movements, pure reflexes, and extends to abstract thought
when the "tendency to action is at the minimum."

It may at

times be impossible to know which is volitional activity and
which is purely physiological response, for the evolutional
progression is oftentimes almost imperceptible. 33
33 • ••• 1• act'ivite voluntaire nous apparait comme un moment dans
cette ~volution ascendante qui va du reflexe simple, dont 1&
tendence a.u mouvement est irresistible,
l'idee abstraite,
ou la tendence
l'&cte est 4 son minimum. On n'en peut
fixer regoureusement ni le commencement ni la fin, la
transition d'une forme
l'autre etant presque insensible.•
Ibid., PP• 12-13.

a
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Ribot's theory of will is little else than a discriptive
interpretation of the physiological movements which he associates with perception and thought.

The ultimate source of

will is a reflex mechanism; and therefore, will, like all other
mental phenomena,is essentially physiological in nature. 34
Even the materialistic psychologists did not accept the
extreme views proffered by Ribot.

The psychological aspect of

will were minimized to such an extent as to reveal a lack of
consideration for psychic factors and an exaggerated emphasis
on the physiological groundwork of mental life.

Over and above

the anatomical basis of cerebral physiology, introspection and
experience give evidence of immaterial mental phenomena both in
the cognitive and appetitive orders.

:Furthermore, the gener-

alizations of Ribot's theory are for the mo.st part unauthenticated.

Volition is purely a rational process, and there is no

definite evidence that physiological correlations exist.

Alexander Bain
The hedonistic theory of will is best represented by
Bain's interpretation based on the pleasure-pain principle
which is the core of his entire philosophy of man.
34 •Les reflexes c'rebraux, surtout lee plus ~lev~s, consistent
en une reaction adaptee a des conditions tr~s c~plexes, tree
variables, tr~s instables, different d'un individu
l'autre,
et d'un instant
l'autre dans le meme individu. Ce sont les
reactions ideo~otrices, lee volitions.• Ibid., P• 25.

a
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Bain begins his explanation of will by describing its twa
components:

•nese are, first, the existence of a spontaneous

tendency to execute movements independent of the stimulus of
sensations or feelings; and, secondly, the link between a present action and a. present :feeling, whereby the one comes under
the control of the other. • 35

Bain gives great stress t c the

influence and impo:rtance of the dynamic element which exists in·
every form of mental life.

All sensations contain an active

component which makes them independent of external stimuli.
The basis for this assumption is neurological, •such as the
physiological fact of a central discharge of nervous energy
where no stimulus from without is present as a cause.• 36
T'he remotest beginnings of voluntary actions are found
among these many and diverse spontaneous movements:

the loco-

motive apparatus including &11 the various movements of muscles
and limbs; the voice, tcmgue, and mouth which involve many

minute communications with brain and nerve centers.

In &11

these interrelated but isolated movements are found the
origins of voluntary actions.
then, is spontaneous movement.
35
36

The Emot.ione and the Will.
CGmPany, 1888::P.~3.

lli!•,

P• 304.

The prime source of volition,
Circwnstances peculiar te each

London:

Longmane, Green, and
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individual increase or diminish the discharge of the inherent
spontaneity.

For examp.le, natural vigor of constitution,

stimulants, such as excitement, pleasure, a.nd pain, are all
contributory factors to the amount of spontaneous action discharged by the organism.

From these sources is derived the

mode of operation peculiar to volition.
Bain maintains that, besides the element of spontaneity
which characterizes the volitional process itself, there is
another integral component, namely the purpose or aim towards
which the will strives.

It is this consideration which reveals

the intimate relationship between feeling and action.

Pleasure

•

and pain in general, whether deriYed from organic sensations,
the five senses, or any of the emotions, are the motive powers
of all volitional activities.

These motives in any of their

various forms determine us by their existence whether the
latter be actual, real, present, or whether their existence be
only ideal.
in terms of

An ideal motive of pleasure or pain is explained
•pro~ision.•

Precaution against causes of illness,

attacks upon our person or possessions, may well exemplify the
•ideal" actions of these motives.

Retentiveness and repetition

strengthen whichever motive exists.
It may oftentimes happen that a conflict arises amid a
concurrence or complication of motives, and in such a. case, the
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form af voluntary action called deliberation results.

Closely

linked to deliberation is the consciousness of effort manifested only in maturity.

Bain, however, attaches great impor-

tance to the feeling of effort.
We know from experience that
movement of some kind is the
bringer of pleasure and the dispeller of pain; we are therefore
urged to begin moving, although
quite at randam: if the movement
succeeds, it is kept up without
conscious effort, although it may
also be aided by conscious effort.
If it fails or makes bad worse,
there is the same double influence to stop it; the primordial
feeling, and the conscious exertion.
.
This conscious effort is no
doubt the prominent fact of the
will in mature life ••• We are
said to make a.. great effo·rt to
exert ourselves, to show great
resolution, determination, or
strength of will, all of which
means that the motA;e is matched
by its opposition.
Conscious effort, however, is not the cause of voluntary
motion; it is rather the phenomena of pleasure and of pain
which are the sources of volitional power.

Pleasure and pain

are the motive forces of all voluntary action and are derived
from the nervous and muscular systems of the organism.
37

1lli.. '

p.. 320.
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A voluntary act (as well as
some acts not voluntary) is accompanied with a consciousness or
feeling of which there may be
several so·rts. The original motive
is some pleasure or pain, experienced or conceived. The active
exertion is accompanied with the
muscular consciousness, agreeable
in states of vigor, painful under
exhaustion or fatigue, and often
as regards p~~asure or pain,
indifferent.
All the various aspects of volition which Bain discusses
in his lengthy dissertation on will are essentially related to
tlle feeling states.

Deliberation, resolution, consciousness of

effort, desire are all ultimately rooted in the pleasure-pain
principle.

Whatever the form of volition in question, either

pleasure or pain constitutes its mental antecedent and its primary source of power.
The pleasure or pain, th&t
is, the mental antecedent of a
voluntary act, is embodied in the
nervous and other organs, and rises
or fails with their physical condition. When a feeling of either
sort pr~pts the voluntary executive, a. new kind of consciousness
arises, that amounting to the expenditure of motive power; but in
a way, if possible still more
decided, does this consciousness
38

1.1212.. ,

p. 421 •
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rep.ose upon material processes.
The nervous centers are drained
of their energy, the muscles part
with theirs, and in a very short
time the whole system is run down
like a steam engine with its fire
burnt out.39
An interesting feature of Baints theory is tke distinction
made between reflex and voluntary actions.

Here again we note

the great predominance and significance of the feeling states
in all motor activities.

It is the intervention of feeling

which gives to an action its volitional character.

Feelings

are not indispensable to reflex movements,for they are purely
mechanical and devoid of conscious effort.

"VoluntaryLactions

are distinguished from reflex and spontaneous activity by a
directive intervention of a feeling in their production. 40
llodern psychologists have been greatly influenced by the
pleasure-pain principle of Bain.
in the study of will.

This is the case especially

Activities, both executive and inhibi-

tory, are on many occasions prompted by pleasure and pain, respectively.

At times, such actions are spontaneous, or at

other times ·Pleasure and pain may be concomitants; but volition
itself is a power over and above all
tors.

physica~

and material fac-

Modern psychologists, inspired by predecessors such as
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Bain and others,

identi~y

the spontaneous physical movements

the body with the immaterial dynamism of will.
common one and the basis

o~

o~

The error is a

much antagonistic controversy bet-

ween materialists and scholastics.

William J'ames
The psychology of William .Tames is oftentimes summed up in
the single descriptive phrase, a stream of consciousness.

Op-

posed to the elementarism of Wundt, .Tames emphasized the process, the flux, the stream of consciousness which he established
as the underlying substrata

o~

mental life.

Wundt's theory had

divided and subdivided the whole of consciousness until all
mental activities had come to be static elements, interrelated
but never entirely amalgamated by a common bond into a substantial unity.

Wundt stressed the unity of self, but against the

oneness of the ego, each mental element stood as a separate
entity in bold-faced
ized by sterility.

relie~.

Elementarism bad been character-

.Tames, on the other hand, maintained that

any attempt to split consciousness into series
ments was bound to distort the realities

o~

o~

mental ele-

mental life.

Therefore, he emphasized the activism of mind, and in his treatment of will, the opposition to elementarism is particularly
noticeable.
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Jam~s

classical theory of volition is characterized by

two outstanding factors; •the feeling of effort,• and "ideomotor action.•

Many of the leading authorities, such as Wundt

and Bain, had upheld the •principle of innervation•, namely
that effort was effected by the movement of different sensationa.

Besides the necessity for imagery, the innervation

theory held that voluntary acts only required an outgoing current of energy from the brain to the muscles for the perfor.mance of these acts.
specific feeling.

Each outgoing current was charged by a
James rejected this principle of innervation

because he found that all feelings were sensory and therefore
afferent.
But in spite of the authority
which such writers deservedly
wield, I cannot help thinking
that they are in this ins'tance
wrong,--tha.t the discharge into
the motor nerves is insentient,
and that all our ideas of movement, incl'Uding those oft~
effOrt which it requires, as well
as those of its direction, its
extent, its strength, and its
velocity, .!!:!. images of ;eeripheral sensations, either "remote,•
~resident ~ the movins parts,
or in other parts which sympathetically act with them in con4
sequence of the diffusive wave. 1
4 lrhe Principles of Psychology, 2 Vole. New York:
and Company, 1931, Vol. II, PP• 493-494.

Henry Holt
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According to James, primary functions of the organism
include reflexes, instincts, and emotions; volitional activities are secondary ones.

Before volition can take place, other

requisites must be fulfilled.

A movement of will follows only

when kinaesthetic images, i.e., revived memory images of acts
already experienced, have preceded.

• ••• Whether or not there

be anything else in the mind at the moment when we consciously
will a certain act, a mental conception made up of memoryimage.s of these sensations, defining which special act it is,
must be there.•

42

James refuted the principle of innervation

and substituted his own •:reeling of effort•; as a result of his
personal introspective studies.

Introspection, as far as he

was concerned, revealed no basis for the innervation of energy,
but definitely gave evidence that kinaesthetic images always
precede voluntary movements.

!E- anticipating ims.ge, then, of

sensorial consequences ~ ~
movement , ;plus ..2a certain ocea..si ons
the fiat that these consequences
Siii11"'"bec""Oiiieactual, ..U .!h! only
psychic state which introspection
lets .!:!§ discern A§ .t.h§ forerunner
.9.i. ..Q!!!: voluntary !&.U·, There is
no introspective evidence ever o~
any still later or concomitant
feeling att!ched to the efferent
discharge.
~

4 ;Ibid • , p. 492.
4
ll!9_., P• 501.
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Fundamentally, .Tames 'e •feeling of effort • corresponds to
the views of these associationists.

Though disagreements arose

as to the direction pursued by the current of energy, the
origin of stimuli (whether they be central or peripheral), and
other matters of detail, both the theory of innervation,as upheld by Wundt, Bain, and others, and the theory proposed by
.Tames affirm that voluntary action results from involunta'ry
movements.

All that is actually required for voluntary act!ons

are mental conceptions composed of various sensorial images.
Unless ra.tiana.l thought p,lays a part in the establishment of
the images of movement,the intellectual source of volitional
activities is completely wanting in both the "principle O'f
innervation" and .Tames's "feeling of effort. •
According to .Tames, ideo-motor action is the real response
which follows, ttunhesi tatingly and immediately", the preconceived kinaesthetic image.

In such voluntary actions there is

no preceding confl.:tct of notions.
about by an idea of the •ct.

Thus, an a..ct is brought

To imagine a particular action is

to arouse a strong tendency to perform the same action.

As

attention to the action increases eo does the idea tend
increasingly to express itself outwardly.

effort of
attention is thus the essential phenomenon of wi11.• 44 If
44rug_.' p. 562.

~e
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action is to follow the idea, the idea must be held steadily
within the focus of attention.

Thoughts, images, mental con-

tents of varying kinds are constantly flowing through consciousness.

It is the function of attention to sustain the

idea, to hold it :firmly within the field of co:nsciousness, so
that it may be realized through the medium of motor activities.
And with his consciousness, his
action changes, for the new object, once stably in possession
of the field of his thoughts,
infallibly produces its own motor
effects. The difficulty lies in
the gaining possession of that
field. Though the spontaneous
drift of thought is all the other
way, the attention must be kept
strained on that one object until
at last it grows, so as to maintain itself before the mind with
ease. This strain of the attention
the fundamental act of
will.

1M

Ideo-motor activities are mostly spontaneous, and for this
reason are not dependent upon any underlying pleasure-pain
principle,a.s Bain ha.d insisted.

James found sources other, than

pleasure or pain which gave rise to voluntary actions •
•• ~I am far from denying the
exceeding prominence and importance of the part which pleasures
and pains, both felt and represented, play in the motivation of
45

Ibid., P• 564.
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our conduct. But I must insist
that it is no inclusive part, and
that co-ordinately with these
mental objects innumerable others
have an exactly similar impulsive
and inhibitive power.46
Nor does James identify volitional effort with muscular conation, as many others

ha~e

done.

It is the purpose of voli-

tional effort to represent to the mind whatever muscular
activities take.place, but volitional effort is clearly distinguished from visceral and muscular movements.

"This volitional

effort pure and simple must be carefully distinguished from the
muscular effort with which it is usually confounded.• 41
Previous to acts of decision, various kinds of voluntary
processes occur.

James designated five distinct types of deci-

sion which correspond to the several kinds of prel.iminary mental activities.

(l) The reasonable type, where the process is

mostly a ma.tter of rational balancing, resulting in favor of
one alternative.

(2} The decision is one of acquiescence to

pressure of circumstances.

(3) The individuai,

overc~e

by

internal conflict, commits himself to one or the other.
(4} Conscience enters in to regulate our decisions.

(5} Deci-

sion is deliberately made with the •reeling of effort•.
4

~Ibid., P• 558.
4 Ibid., P• 562.
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this division of voluntary decisions,

~ames

developed his

temperament types.
In general, the theory of will proposed by
acterized by two predominating notionss

~ames

is char-

(l) that voluntary

movements are aroused only by kinaesthetic images; (2) the idea
of movement inevitably tends to be realized by motor activities.
The universality of these principles is doubtful.

The emphasis

on kinaesthetic imagery, whatever may have been their source,
as the primary and necessary basis for voluntary movements is
indicative of
processes.

~ames'sattitude

concerning the higher intellectual

He was convinced that psychology had overly empha-

sized the importance of man's intellectual nature; and, accordingly, emphasized volitional activities, although these, in turn,
seem basically determin·ed by physiological processes.

Conse-

quently, will as a rational, immaterial faculty, intrinsically
independent of sense imagery and feeling, found no place in the
psychology of

~ames.

G. F. Stout

Stout's theory of will holds a central position and in
some respects is related to many of the prevailing schools of
thought.

His explanation of will is not characterized by any

unique interpretation nor is it derived from hypotheses
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specifically his own; it is notable rather for its eclecticism.
stout • s theory includes a number of viewpoints already expressed.
He has combined and incorporated into his own system of
thought, various principles adopted from his predecessors and
contemporaries--those principleswhich he judged to be best and
sui table for a c.ommon sense psychology.
Stout's psychological theory is established upon a philosophical groundwork--Kant's categorical imperatives.

The three

aspects of mind, namely cognition, affection, and conation,
formed the basic structure of Stout's concept of mind.

He was

the first to popularize the use and modern meaning of conation,
a notable precedent in the history of contemporary psychology.
Volition is defined as "the intention or determination to
act, not the mere production of movement; otherwise all reflex
action would be volition and we might regard the muscles themselves as the seats of the will. 1148 Stout emphasize!:? this
distinction throughout his discussion of voluntary movement,
but he describes intention and volition as inseparable.

There

can be no volition without a previous intention to act.
Conation is used as a general term including all forms of
appetition.

Stout speaks of higher and lower forms of conation,

48A Manual of fsychology.
Eldridge, 1915, p. ?7.

New York:
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and the distinction between them is based upon .the level o-f
cognition which precedes them.

Conation following sensory per-

ception is impulsive movement, while ideas induce "generalized
conative tendencies.•
•••we may distinguish different
of conative process as
connected with different levels
of general mental development.
On the p.lane o.f perception we
have the perceptual impulse;
this includes instinctive impulses. Its general characteristic is that the activity
involved in it finds immediate
expression in bodily movement
guided by external impressions •••
But we reach a distinctly higher
plane when ideas become sufficiently selfsustaining to form
trains l~t are not wholly
shaped.
leve~s

Stout is also careful to point out the significant differences
between conation and the feeling states.

Pleasure and pain are

dependent upon the success or failure of efforts exerted by
conative energy.

Feelings are either concomitants or resul-

tants of conation and cognition, but are not the determinants
of either.
The essential point in Stout's doctrine is the unitary
nature of conation and cognition.
49

Ibid., PP• 704-705.
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and the same process.
secondary to cognition.

There is no question of conation being
Such an assumption might imply two·

separate processes,which is contrary to the whole of Stout's
doctrine. -cognition gives the process its deter.minate character:

without conation there would be no process at all to have

a char&cter.• 50

Though it is true that the interrelationship

between cognition and appetition is such that both are mutually.
interdependent. in regard to the operation of each, there is
sufficient evidence th&t the two are distinct processes.

st.

Tha.mas is explicit on this point.

What is apprehended and what is
desired are the ~e in reality,
but differ in aspect; for a thing
is apprehended as something
sensible or intelligible, whereas
it is desired a.s witable or good.
Now, it is di verei ty of aspect in
the objects, and not material
diversity, 5 yhich demands a diversity
of powers.
In voluntary dicisione, Stout stresses the significance of
self-consciousness.

Deliberation intervenes in all voluntary

decisions, and deliberation involves referral to the self of
all po:ssible courses of action.

In voluntary decisions, it is

necessary that the action be realized by the self as the agent's

~~bid.,

P• 704.

-~Summa

'l'heologic& (ed. Pegis) I, lxxx, a.l, ad 2um.
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own action.

That the self become cognizant of the action a.t

hand as· an integral and per.manent part of its own unity, is
essential to every voluntary decision.
What is distinctive of voluntary
decision is the intervention of
self-consciousness as a cooperating factor ••• If a conation is
realized, the completed action
becomes part of the life history
of the agent. If in contemplating it beforehand the agent takes
this into account, if he asks
himself whether he really wants
this action and so to become
included in his own conception
of himself, he is on his way to
the forming of a voluntary
decis1on. 0 2
Throughout the process of deliberation various mo.tives are
weighed a.nd balanced; the value of each as well as the plausibility of incorporation with the self is carefully considered.
So far, these are merely the extrinsic motives for deciding.
Once the decision has been made the motive becomes an integral
part of self and now becomes a motive for action.

•The recog-

nized reasons for a decision can never constitute the entire
cause of_a decision.
52

---

Behind them there always lies the self as
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whole and what this involves can never be completely analyzed
53
. 1 mo t ~v.es.
.
tt
or stated in th e f orm OJ.4'- d e fi n1. t e reasons or epec~a

~

Stout, for the most part, has avoided many of the pitfalls
found in the doctrines of extremists.

He has endeavored ta

maintain a common sense viewpoint in hie explanation of will.
The most serious criticisms which we must offer against this
doctrine is the failure: (1) to distinguish conation from cognition; (2) to make an essential distinction between the "higher
and lower levels of conation.•

Though the influence of Stout

on contempora..ry psychologists is not as prevalent as that of
James, it is notable a:mong particular schools, especially the
Hormic School of thought under JlcDougall's leadership.

The

principle of self-consciousness as an essential will factor,
together with the basic identity of cognition and conation, was
adopted by JlcDougall in his psychology of instinct.

James R. Angell
The functionalism of Angell had for its particular task
the study of mental processes as contrasted to the study of
mental elements pursued by the structuralists.

The function-

a1iets made special attempts to discover the mode of operation,
53
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the ends achieved, and the attending circumstances of all our
mental processes.

Volition, as well as emotion and instinct,

because of its dynamic nature, was among the chief concerns of
the functionalists.

Wundt and Titchener had described mental

life in terms of contents, states, and apperceptions.

The

spontaneity and forceful energy of the appetitive faculties had
created many difficulties for the structuralists who could only·
offer inadequate explanations in terms of static elements.

Con-

sequently, emotions, instincts, and will had been relegated to
the background, and apperception had been established as the
source and primary content of all mental phenomena.
functionalists were interested in

menta~

But the

processes and in men-

tal activities as a part of a vital living organism.
Angell does not refer to will as a specific faculty but
rather to the volitional
~~

process£!~·

Will is the mind!!

acting in the capacity o·f a directive force.

As a reac-

tionary measure to structuralism, every attempt is made to
avoid a.ny notion of mind which implies a. division of powers or
a. separation of mental contents.

Hence, perception is mind

experiencing a. sensory synthesis; ideation is mind in the process of cognizing; volition is mind directing the mental forces
to some preconceived goal.

Mind is a whole, operating now in

one capacity, now in another, and is ne-v:er to be considered as
a. conglomeration of individualized elements.
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Scholastic psychology has likewise persistently endeavored
to preserve the unity of mind in all its ope rat ions.

But

instead of saying that mind is a whole, they say that the
person possessing a mind is and acts as a whole.

While the

whole man is involved in every vital act, there is ample evidence in our experiences to show that at times one or another
process predominates, and that mental processes dominate and
give direction to the whole person.

It is true that the whole

mind is involved in every mental operation, yet not all
acts are of the same kind.

menta~

The mind can act and be known to

act on various levels and in various capacities.

While the

Schcilastics refer to the faculties or powers of a unified
pe.rsan, Angell. ,Prefers to speak always of mind as will, or mind
as thought.

When he speaks of volition he is speaking of mind

in its totality, as engaged in the process of willing.
refers to

th~

Will

whole mind exercising one type of activity and

does not designate a specific faculty or operation of mind.
Wil~

is mind and mind is will.

It is necessary that we make

this clarification in Angell's theory, for this particular concept of will and of mind is the fundamental tenet of functionalism, and it stands in opposition to the principle that an act
is distinct from the agent.
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For Angell, will.ing is the mind engaged in the process of
organizing and assembling its forces for some set purpose.

In

order to direct itself towards a goal it is necessary for mind
"to attend•.

Willing is, in reality, attending to a. specific

object or goal.

"Choice, decision, will, in the fullest sense

of the word seems to arise out of such circumstances, and those
impulses and ideas which succeed in gaining our persistent
attention are forthwith translated into action.

Willing is

therefore in the last analysis a psychological process of
attending.• 54
Volition and attention are closely allied, but to identify
them as Angell. does is to increase the confusion already existing in dynamic psychology.

Attention is often invo.luntary; for

example, a sudden noise often attracts us without any directed
effort of attention on our part.
over and above attention.

Will, therefore, is a power

It is true that a complementary

relationship exists between attention and will, since attention
contains a cognitional element also.

In order to will we must

cognize; in order to cognize we must attend.
Angell's analysis of volition includes three elements;
namely, foresight, consent, and muscular movements (for
54An Introduction 1.2. Psychology.
Company, 1.908, P• 23?.

New York:

Henry Holt and
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purposes o;f obtaining the desired end).

It is obvious that in

many voluntary acts bodily movements are required.

But Angell.

extends the necessity of muscular movements to will-acts as
well as to voluntary acts, and claims that thought itself
requires a •motor attitude.•
Inaamuch as certain decisions
seem primarily to concern our
trains of thought, rather than
our muscular activities, as when
we resolve to continue a course
of reflection, our for.mulation
may appear to emphasize unduly
the motor features of volition.
But it must be remembered that
voluntarily carrying on a process of thinking required the
securing of definite motor
attitudes, and further.more that
all such thinking has as its
purpose some future action, however long deferred ~e may expect
this action to be. 5
Whatever muscular movements take place in the performance of
voluntary actions, we must consider such movements only as concomi tants of volition, certainly not as a.n integral part of will
itself.
The functionalist theory of will pl.&ces specific emphasis
on the relationship between sensory ideational elements and
55
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voJ.itions.
occurs.

Some sort of knowledge must be had before vo-lition

•we may safely start, then, from the assumption that

every voluntary act involves the presence in the mind of
sensory or ideational material in some way anticipatory of the
act.• 56 This assumption definitely establishes a. differentiation between will and reflex, since the latter requires neither
consciousness nor cognizance of any kind.

But does this asst.m'.!P-

tion provide any well defined delineation between will an4
instinct?

Instincts, as commonly accepted by Scholastics,

involve consciousness of a. goal, but not abstract intellectual
knowledge of goals and motives, whereas reflexes do not even
require consciousness.

Will is essentially of an

intellectua~

nature, and sensory knowledge, alone, is inadequate to evoke
the volitional process.

It is necessary that &ll activities of

will be preceded by intellectual perception.

Angell's analysis

is vague on this point; he merely states that sensory-ideational
elements must precede voluntary movements.

Whether these ele-

mente be rational ideas or sensory images only

does not neces-

sarily have a bearing on the vol.itions which result.

n •• • in

certain cases the idea which apparently controlled the voluntary
act was an idea of the movement itself ••• in certain instances
kinaesthetic sensations .!:!!9,. ima.ges furnish us the material by
56

Ibid., P• 398.

102

means of which we practical1y anticipate, and so control, the
51
movement we wish to make.•
In keep.ing with the evolutional fundaments of functionalism, Angell speaks of controlled voluntary movements a.s an
outcome of gradual growth.

The spontaneous movements of the

infant, through maturation, develop into the controlled movemente of the adult.

It is not a. case of the predominance of

rational powers over the sensory which brings about vo,luntacy
control, but, rather, a case of physiological transition and
increased muscular coordination which accounts for volitional
power.

The impulsive, random movements of childhood constitute

the elementary stage of volition; voluntarily controlled movemente, those of mature life.
We may lay down two general propositions ••• {!) that all voluntary
control is built upon a foundation
of movements which are already
going on in an uncontrolled impulsive a.y; and (2) that the development of control, although from the
beginning it extends in a measure,
perhaps, to all the voluntary
muscles, proceeds more rapidly,
now in one group and now in
another ••• Volition must not, then,
be thought of as a process in which
consciousness somehow brings into
life movements which previously did
not exist. The problem of the
51 Ibid., P• 401.
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evolution of control is primarily
the problem connected with the
coordinating,in reference to certain ends,of movements already
58
occurring in an uncoordinated way.
Volition is important to the functionalist because it is
characterized by movements--it is a process, a. function.

The

singular importance of will as a psychological power is derived
from its dynamic nature, not from its immateriality.

All con-

sciousness is conative; all imagery tends to produce motor
changes; but, according to Angell, volitional processes, like
instincts and desires, are of special significance because of
the directive forces they possess, not because of their
supremacy.

Charles H. Judd
Functionalism represents the American expression of opposition to the domination of the Wundtian Schoo 1 and its offspring, structuralism.

However, among the functionalists are

those who have manifested individualistic tendencies and theoretical developments in their writings on many of the various
problemmat ical issues of psychology.

They have sought to;

develop a functional view of mental life in general, but have,
58 Ibid • , p. 405·.
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at times,clung to other trends and influences.

Consequently,

their wo.rks reveal interesting personal interpretations superimposed upon the fundamentals of functional psychology.
such followers of the functionalist school is

c.

Among

H. Judd.

Though he had received the greater part of his training at
Leipzig under Wundt, Judd wholeheartedly adopted the spirit of
f'unctiona.I.iem.

His psychological works were written from the

functionalist standpoint, but the influences of Wundt 1 s teachings as we 11 as tho:se of William James are everywhere evident.
According to Judd, the volitional processes like all other
mental phenomena are an outgrowth of a genetic process.

Thus,

in order to understand volition which is the highest and most
complex form of human dynamics, we must first know something
about impulse and reflex which represent appetition in its most
primitive stage.

Reflex activity is the simplest and most

direct form of behavior.

It is not accompanied by a high

degree of consciousness, and is devoid of any previous delibexatian whatsoever.

From the pure reflex just described, all the

way up the scale to volunt&ry choice, are innumerable degrees
and grades of impulsive activity.

Sensation-reflexes, percep-

tual-responses, volitional processes--all

conta~n

within their

own group an ascending order of complex movements, and these
groups themselves form an ascending series of categories among
all appetitive responses.
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In

~udd's

~

theory, an impulse proper differs from a reflex

in so far as it is a response, not to one sensation, but to
complexes of sensations or percepts.

The impulsive response

*

may be the same kind of muscul&r moTement as the reflex, but
its determining factor lies in the percept or sensations which
precede it.

The complexity of reflex, impulse, or volition is

dependent upon the nature of the perception which is the effective cause of ever.y movement.
Unlike many of his contemporaries,

~udd

makes special

efforts to clarify the relationship between attention and vo,lition.

Attention has oftentimes been identified with conation,

or defined as a form of vo,li tion.

~udd

pointe out that atten-

tion, of itself, ha.e no power to determine action, but ra.ther
is dependent upon

a.

higher directive organization.

Common

examples of life around us afford ample proof that this principle is true.

While food and enemies engross all of an ·

animal's attention, there is an endless variety of objects 'Which
attract man's attention.

The reason for this differentiation

is found in the organization of experience which is an integral
part of the self.

The animal is limited by his nature to a

narrower scope of experience; therefore the objects of his
attention will be so confined within limits as to conform with
the

or~anization

which precedes his attention.
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Neither attention nor bodily movement can be used to explain the
other factor of the situation,
because ••• attention is always
related to the organization of
behavior, and beha~ior is, as we
find in many cases, related in
some way to attention. The two
must be accounted for by some
more ultimate fact of organization,
which precedes both. If this more
u~timate explanation is neglected,
the who:le process may ta.~e on the
appearance of an event ~ithout
antecedent conditions. 5
According to JUdd, in man, deliberation frequently precedes attention, for we find ourselves attending to: an object
which we h.a.'Ve already decided upon as an object of our choice.
Attention is in"lolved in both deliberate and impulsive activities, and we see from these observaticms that some force other
than attention is responsible for dynamic movements.

JUdd,

however, in all these explanations, is emphasizing the importance of previous individual development from a genetic

ang~e

and not for the purpose of ele-vating volition because of its

rational nature.

The directive force, referred to by Judd a.s a.

prerequisite for attention,is the total organization of experiences, and is an outcome of the progressive evolutional de-velopments.

In man, therefore, the organization of behavior ·includes

59
Psychology: General Introduction.
Scribner's Sons, 1901, P• 324.

New York:

Charles

10'1

the more complex form of perception and responses, and has
provided him with a more extensiTe field of experiences; but
the animal, whose life is restricted to the sphere of instinct,
possesses a far more limited and circumscribed background.

In

both man and animal the organization of background experiences
is rooted in the physiological systems; thus beh&Tior, whether
it be primitive or complex, is ul tima.tely determined, fo·r the
most part, by the nervous and muscular systems.

• ••• in the

simplest impulsive activities and in the. highest forms of
voluntary choice, there are elements which can be explained
. t•1on. .60
on1y i n t er.ms of nervous organ1za
Volition is intimately concerned with the sum total of
relationships existing between the self and the external world.
When conflicting tendencies arise, ..-clition is the means of
expressi~n

used by the self in its endeavor to preserve the

internal unity which constitutes the essence of self.

Whatever

the object or event may be, the self, by comparison, judgments,
and reasonings, forms a relationship between itself and the
object concerned; and thus maintains an equilibrium and stability within its own organization.

Re&ctions, modes of behavior.

simple or complex responses are all controlled by the integrated system of ideas which constitute the self.

Conflicts
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which arise or impulses which have been suspended are also
results of the self, acting in behalf of its own unity.

In

these latter cases the relationship has proven to be negative;
the impulse is withheld because it does not compare favorably
with the hierarchy of ruling interests a.nd ideas of . the self.
Conflicts arise for the same reasons.

Impulses or tendencies

strive for fulfillment, but are counteracted by stronger
impulses or movements which are favorable to the individual
organism.
truth is that the explanation
of volition as a part of selfconsciousness can be given only
by a recognition of those processes of organization which have
entered into the elaborate construction of the concept of the
self. When one says that he has
decided not to perform a certain
act, he has, to be sure, given the
highest possible expression of his
own self-control, but self-control
in this instance cannot be explained
without some reference to the origin
and development of the se1f.6l
~e

Conforming closely to the functionalist school, Judd
exp,lains volition as the total self reacting to an object or
situation.

Will as a single faculty or power is only an

abstraction, not a reality.
61
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it reflex, impulse, or volition, in actuality it is the whole
organization of previous experiences, together with the entire
system of ideas, which is operating.

Since any activity affects

the behavior of the whole organism, the physiological system is
likewise intimately involved.

Reflex, impulse, voluntary move-

ment, and choice are developmenta.l forma of movement, and represent the various stages of maturation from the moat primitive
response to the more highly evolved and

comp~ex

reactions.

The tendency, therefore, as
development goes forward, is to
adjust thought processes to the
possibilities of behavior and to
the canons of criticism described
in the discussion of conceptual
thought with ever increa.sing
recognition of certain fixed modes
of procedure. Here again, we have
cle&r evidence that the processes
of development and the processes
of conscious choice are intima.tel.y
related, and we see again the
impossibility of explaining thought
and conduct, even at this highest
level, without direct reference to
the total deyelopment of the
individual.62
Judd's theory is particularly emphatic on the genetic
origin of will activities.

While Angell stresses the functional

importance of will, Judd is more concerned with its evolutional
history.

'!'hough Judd i a a devoted disc ip.le of functionalism,

62 Ibid., P• 332.
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his works reveal influences resulting from the principles of
sensism instilled in him during his ear1y training.

Charles Spearman
One of the most scientific app·roaches to the problems of
psychology has been made by the :Factor School of Charles
Spearman.

According to the theory proposed by this school,

intelligence contains a general factor of ability besides a
large number of specific abilities.

The •g• factor, or general

intelligence, is opera.ti ve in all the powers O·f an indiVidual,
while the "s 11 factar, o.r specific ability, varies from one
pQ!wer to the other.

bthema.tical formulas are used to deter-

mine the relationship between the various kinds of cognitive
performances.

These relationships are indicated by correlation

coefficients.

Whe.n two: compared abilities coincide, the coef-

ficients become a unity; when the relationship is a negative
one, the coefficients are zero.

By means of his statistical

analyses, Spearman concluded that the two factors, "g" and "s",
are the fundamental elements of intelligence.

Both factors

ultimately are based on physiological brain substrata.

~e

nature of the "g" factor corresponds to a general cerebral
power or energy, but the nature of "s 8 is characterized by its
special motor power operating in a more restricted and channeled area..
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The factor was taken, pending
further information, to consist
in something of the nature of an
'energy' or 'power' which serves
in common the whole cortex (or
passibly, even, the whole nervous
system.)
But if, thus, the totality
of cognitive op.erations is served
by some general factor in common,
then each different operation
must be further served by some
specific factor peculiar to it.
For this factor also, a physiological substrata has been suggested, namely, the particular
group of neurons sp.ecially serving
the particular kind of operation.
These neural groups would thus
function as alternative 'engines'
into which the common supply of
'energy' cout% be a.lternati.vely
distributed.·
Spearman's description of •distributed energy" based on physiological processes is similar t a JlcDougall 's •drainage theory."
However, Spearman constantly endeavors to establish the higher
cognitive processes on a level of their own.

In a..ll these sin-

cere attempts he never quite relinquishes the physiologica1
substrata, even in describing the nature of intellect and will.
Besides these fundamental factors, •g• a.nd "s", there are
others which play an important role in our life.
is the ""'" factor, or will.
63

Among these

The will factor is primarily
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concerned with character development and morality.
who possess a large percentage of

"w"

Individuals

are motivated by reason-

able principles, while those who possess

•w•

to a lesser degree

act more on impulse, and are motivated by the lower feeling
states.

As the basis for all these factors, Spearman sets

forth several laws, which, because of their generality and
ultimacy, are considered "irreducible minimums.•

Among the

five quantitative laws is the law of control in which volitional factors are concerned.
Though Spea.r.mants explanations of the faculties are on the
whole very conformable with Scho1astic teachings, one criticism
which must be mentioned in regard to his concept of volition is
his variable use of terms.

Conation, attention, volition, and

orexis are sometimes used interchangeably;·it is difficult, if
not impossible, to know precisely what is meant by e&ch.
tion is referred to as conation:

At ten-

"• •• the term attention could

be replaced by, or defined in terms of, others which had auffered less from ill usage.

In particular, it has been found to

indicate a mental constituent which could be described as a
seemingly forceful trying or striving, or 'conation'•" 64

Dis-

cussions of will and volition are included in the explanat-ion
64
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of the 1aw of control.
phases:

The latter is said to consist of three

•A person makes up his mind to listen {resolution); at

the chosen moment he accordingly tries to hear (conation); and
in consequence he actually :ms.y hear. •

65

From this description

it would seem that conation is a pa.rticular stage in the volitianal process.

Actually, conation, considered from the

stand~

point of physical effort, striving, or set, is merely a
concomitant of volition and is frequently entirely absent from
will acts.

In this particular explanation of the •Iaw of

.control,• Spearman refers to conation in its restricted meaning, that of physical effort.

In general, however, Spearman

defines conation as a term which •includes all impulses,
desires, or acts of will, and no less all consent, satisfaction,
66
or dissatisfaction.•
When conation is used as a. general term
for all forms of appetition, it is evident that it cannot be
identified with volition.

Nor can the terms be used inter-

changeably, as we have already seen in Chapter I.

6'1

The pre-

servation of careful distinctions between general and specific
terminalogy, and between rational and sensory levele of
65

Ibid., P• 72•
66The l!Tature ~ 'Intelligence' and the Principles of Cognition, P• 53.
6'see above P• 14 •
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appetition is of vital importance to the psychology of
will. 68
In spite of these criticisms there is much to be said in
favor of Spearman's exposition of volition.

In his evaluation

of volition as conceived by the associationists, it is clear
that Spearman rejects will as a purely sensory phenamenon.
Will is not merely a muscular tension as the physiologist,
Ribot. claims, nor is it a motion which follows an idea and is
motivated by the feeling of pleasure, as Hume and Hartley claim
it to be.

According to Spearman, the behaviorists, in their

attempts to destroy all motives, purpose, and goals,ha.ve
resarted to the most extreme form of radicalism in will psychology.

While the associationists reduced will tb impulse, there

was at least impulse

1e~t;

the behaviorists, in eliminating

goals and purpose,have eradicated all appetition from the cantent of psychology, sensory as well as rational.
The fate of p.sychology, if it
were really to be pursued on
this principle, baffles the
imagination. No account is
to be taken of whether any
movement is made intentionally
or not. B'o consideration is to
be taken of any motives. All
68
.
Spearman, at times, apparently uses conation and volition
interchangeably. See Psychology J2.2!!! ~ Ages. Vol. II,
P• 109, Vo~. I, P• 317.
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allusions to desire are to be
expurgated ••• What does this
leave behind? Bare c ogni t i o.n
(if such a thing is conceiv~ble)
and the motion of a muscle. 9
Spearman, contrary to these extremists, earnestly strives
to maintain a middle course and to explain volition in terms of
'

rea.lity,and with due respect for the dignity of the human
person.

Though he does not offer a clear-cut distinction bet-

ween rational and sensory appetition, he does not identify the
one with the other.

Spearman recognizes a gulf of separation

between an act of decision and the movement of impulse.

Both

contain an orectic element; yet in one there is the power of
control, in the other, only a natural response to a preconceived end.
following:

Spearman sums up his

noti~n

of volition in the

"Within the sphere of volition there can actually

.

be observed the two alleged events differing in kind, not only
from cognition and feeling, but even to some extent from
impulse.

One is the act of resolving. The other is the carrying of the resolution into a.ction.• 70 Spearman here acknowledges the difference of "kind• existing between volition and
impuise, though he is apparently unable to
•extent• of the separation.

c~arify

He is aiso careful to distinguish

~~Psychology~ !a! Ages, Vol. I., P• 310.
Ibid., P• 312.

further the

116
between a will-act and a voluntary movement which indicates a
grasp of the true nature of will seldom attained by the modern
psychologists.

In general, throughout the various discussions

on volition, law of control, orexis, and conation, Spearman,
more than most of his contemporaries, has attempted to avoid the
extreme positions maintained by the associationists and
sensists.

In his ca.mments and criticisms of materialistic

theories, as well as in the exposition of his own doctrine, he
has given frequent manifestations of adherence to scholastic
principles and acceptance of the Thomistic concept of man.
Spearman is significant
especially for his recognition
of the need of building up a
science of mind on a. basis of
sound philo~ophic principles •••
The f'a.ctori2illist, whether he
admits it or not, is really a
faculty ·psychologist. This is
true of every investigator in
the field of psychometrics. He
is working in the best Aristotelian
and Thomistic tradition, since the
ground he covers is concerned with
the acts and powers, or the perfo-rmances and abilities, of man. 7 1
Edward ToJma.n
The purposive behaviorism of Edward Tolman presents a

~

pourri of theories, systems, and influences amalgamated into a
71Robert E. Brennan. Thomistic Psychology.
ll'a.cmilla.n Company, 1942, PP• 344-345.

New Yorkt

The
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doctrine which may be readily recognized as the author's own
unique interpretation.

Fundamentally, Tolman's works are

behavioristic; they are based on the assumption that man is a
biological entity only and that human behavior is the sum total
of the organism's responses to environment.

Tolman, however,

has attempted to adop:t and fit into the behavioristic pattern
viewpoints gleaned from several other sources.

He has intro-

duced an objective and mechanical type of purposiveness; has
explained learning in terms of gesta].t formations; and has at
times emphasized the functional character of the stimulusresponse reflex.
Properly speaking, Tol.ma.n' s works deserve no place in the
discussion of volitional theories.

His approach to' psychologi-

cal problems is not only thoroughly materialistic, but even
devoid of any attempt to distinguish, actually, between human
and animal behavior.

~ere

is no reference to will or volition

as such; psychic elements which are subjective in nature are
either entirely disregarded or interpreted in terms of pure
objectivism.

However, since To:lman's theory represents a

dynamic form of behaviorism, because of the purposive element
he introduces, it may be well to investigate briefly his
descriptio·ns of human activities.
Tolman's acceptance of "purpo,se" and "goals• is based on
his experimental observations of animals.

Princfp.les deduced
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from these animal experiments are readily applied to human
behavior, for both man and animal are intrinsically dependent
upon their biological structures.

Even among animals it is

evident that some objects are sought for, while others are not;
the same objects may at one time be the aim of possession and
at another time may be the cause of repulsion.

The reasans for

such variable resp.onses are based on purposive object i vis:m.; the
causes are themselves rooted in environment and the physiolo&ical atatus of the organism.
The first initiating causes of
behavior are environmental s timuli and initiating physiological
states. These operate on or
through the behavior-determinants.
The behavior-determinants are, it
appears further, subdivisible into
three classes1 (a) immediately
'in-lying' objectively defined
purposes and cognitions--i.e.,
the 'immanent determinants';
(b) the purposive and cognitive
'capacities' of the given individual or sp~cies, which mediate
the specific immanent determinants
as a result of the given stimuli,
and the given initiating states;
(c) 'behavior-adjustments', which,
under certain special conditions,
are produced by the immanent determinants in place of actual overt
behavior and which serve to act
back upon such immanent determinants, to remould and 'correct'
the latter and thus finally t~
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produce a new and different overt
behavior from that which ~ould
otherwise have occurred. 7
Much attention is also given to appetites and aversions,
instinct and drives.

These psychological fact ore are s·igni-

ficant in purposive behavior, for they are the underlying
motivations of all actions.

Tolman repeatedly reminds us that

his theory is not a form of hormic psychology.

McDougall's

doctrine is also purposive and built upon the assumption that
all human as well as aDimal activities ultimately are guided
and directed by instincts.

McDougall's instinct theory, though

it attributes much import to the physiological basis and development of behavior, endeavors to explain purposiveness in ter.ms
of

ment~l

and psychic phenomena.

According to McDougall's

theo;ry, instinct is not merely a form of objective behavior; it
is a bodily reaction stimulated by a purpose preconceived by
mind.

Hor.mic psychology describes instinct as comprising two

equally important elements; the response of the bodily organism
and the mental perception of a goal.

Contrary to these prin-

ciples, Tolman's interpretation eliminates the mental aspect
and strictly adheres to a purely objective consideration of
purpose.
7

Nature is essentially monistic, and purposiveness in

~rRosive Behavior.!!! Animals and Men. New York and Londont
The Century Company, 1932, P• 2 1 . -
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behavior arises

the same kind of source as does the

~rom

physiological response.

'.rhere is no

twofold division of body

and mind; therefore the source of manta activities cannot be
partly "mental* and partly physiological.

For Tolman, goals

and purposiveness are a. part of the response situation, not a
mentalistic conception •.
••• for us, these same facts of
purpose and cognition are but
an expression of certain very
complex,~ctivities in organic
bodies. • •• In a word, the fact
of purpose, as we conceive it,
is an objective ~act. It is·the
fa.ct that behavior is docile
relative to objectively determined ends. Our psychology is
purposivism; but it is an objective, behavioristic pu?iosivis:m,
not a mentalistic one.
Appetites and aversions are the two general classes
motivations.

o~

An appetite is an innate demand to attain phy-

siological "quiescence,• while averl3ion is an innate demand to
escape physiological disturbances.
by these two kinds

o~

innate drives.

All behavior is activated
It is interesting to note

Tolman's ingenious ability to intersperse, here and there in
his own doctrine, psychological morsels obtained from other
schools of thought.
'73
'1

Ibid., P• 422.
4 Ibid., P• 423.

Hie explanations of appetites and drives
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include a revised feature of Gestaltism.

Besides the innate

demand to possess or repel, contained in appetite and aversion
respectively, there is another element comparable to the conative effort as accepted by most psychologists.

Tolman refers

to conation in terms, whose meaning can be conveyed adequately,
only by a direct quotation.

Describing appetites and aversions

in man, the author states the following:
FUrthermore he is provided
innately with certain more or
less vague sign-gestalt-readiness
as to how to get thus to or from.
In the ease of an appetite, he is
provided innately with some vague
final sign-gestalt-readiness as
to the type of consummatory object
and consummatory response which
will lead to the given quiescenee-a.nd also, it would seem, with some
vague subordinate sign-gestaltreadinesses as t~ how to explore
in order to get such consummatory
objects.'15
At other times, Tolman stresses the functional qualities
of

beha~ior.

The activities of man, and of animals as well,

form a continual goal-seeking process.

Behavior, in other

words, is an entity which is defined functionally as well &s
objectively; behavior is the sum total of all our activities
and is the biological organism functioning as a whole.
'1 5 Ibid., P• 287.

When he
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speaks r:L behavior, he is speaking of an organism functioning
in its capacity of getting to or from goal-objects, and of
selecting certain "means-objects-routes" towards the acquisition of these same goal-objects.
The basic
c~osely

princip~es

o'f Tolman's dynamic behav-iorism are

allied to those of Watson.

While the purposive feature

of Tolman's th.eory may apparently seem to be a serious deviation from the Watsonian tradition, actually it is not.

Object-

goals and purposiveness add no rational or even mental quality
to overt behavior.

They are merely objective variables

inserted for the purpose of explaining the diverse patterns of
responses occurring in the individual organism.

Volitions and

will do not exist in Tolman's theory; voluntary movements are
simply included in the category of mechanistic responses, and
are prompted by an innate demand towards certain goal-objects.
Though Tolman proposes to offer a behaviorism with the intent
to explain its purposive nature, he does little else than admit
that variabilities in responses occur and deserve explanation.
Behavior reactions are not stereotyped.

However, his theoret-

ica1 contribution is but a remodeled edition of the old
behavioristic doctrine.
In recent years, the pure reflex-behavior· theory, popularized by Watson, has receded to the background; and the trend
is definitely in favor of a modified form of mechanism, one
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which describes behavior in terms ·of motivation, purpose, and
goals.

Psychologists soon found the stereotyped reflex

responses inadequate to account for the variability of human
reactions.

Something more dynamic, more vital was needed to

explain the innumerable complexities arising in every day
living.

Yet the modern materialists were anything but willing

to forsake their monistic principles; and with camplete nonchalance attempted to describe motivation, purpose, and even
will, as physiological properties of a biological organism.

Paul T. Young
The above resum€ of Tolman's theory indicates the author's
tenacious adherence to the fundamentals of behaviorism.

At the

st.me time, he tries to incorporate into his own syetem prevailing notions concerning purposiveness in psychology.

Others

\

have relinquished the emphasis on stimulus-response bonds as
unite of behavior, and have concentrated on motivation as the
unitary force in the psychology of man.

A strong advocate of

motivational psychology is Paul T. Young.
The author is almost apologetic in his few paragraphs on
volition and refers to it as the •so-called 'will' factor.•

He

defines it in terms of sensory conations; "will is a postural
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adjustment or set of the subject towards his ta.sk."

76

From the

outset it is evident that will is looked upon as a •motivating
factor" rather than as a directive power itself.

Young de-

scribes experiments on learning and on specific determination
in great detail, and with many elaborations on the conscious
purpose of the subjects; yet at no time makes any attemp;t to
explain what is motivated.

The organism as a whole reacts in a.

great variety of modes to a certain stimulus at different
times, and under changed

conditions;~

or the organism reacts to

one stimulus and not to another--these are the generalizations
resulting from Young's investigations.

The causes for these

inconsistencies are found in the physio1ogical background or
perhaps in external objective circumstances.
cerned with the biol.ogical organism as

a.

Young is con-

whol.e and is not in-

terested, particularly, in the numerous individual powers with
which people are endow.ed.

The focus o1' Young's s.tudy is the

objective motive, whatever it may be, which brings about a reaction in the organism.

Needs, desires, wants, wishes, appe-

tities, aversions, and all forms of dynamic activities are
classed as motivation factors.
p.racesses.

They become objects rather than

For example, the "'will to learn" is a power-ful

76Kotiva.tion of Behavior.
1936, P• 21.3.

New York:

~ohn Wiley and sons, Inc.,
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motive in the learning process; the subject learns because he
has a specific determination motivating him.
The problem of will enters into tasks involving voluntary
attention.

Again, Young refers to •valuntary• a.s a type a:f

physical set.

"The essential. factor in voluntary attention is

postural set or adjustment • • • When an activity in which we
are interested goes al.ong by i teelf' without this sense of
effort we do not ordinarily speak of voluntary attention in
connection with it.•' 7 Even free will is explained as a conative set.

·~o!!!!

an action is to assume a determining set

which motivates behavior.

The problem of free will centers

around the conditions which bring a determining set into
. t ence.
eJOe

·'8

Among the very inclusive list o:f motivee,ranging from the
•will-factor• to drives and desires, the feeling states are not
to be found.

Pleasantness and unpleasantness are described as

conscious processes in the realm of' experience.

Young rejecte

the theory oi' peychol.ogical hedonism as it is usually understood and has adopted what he calls, "factual. hedonism.•
distinction is made upon empirical facts.

Hie

Everyday experi-

ences, he says, reveal that pleasantness and unpleasantness do

'1'1 Ibid., P• 214.
'18Ibid., p. 216.
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not always determine our conduct; they are only associated with
the

pur~uit

and attainment of a goal and the avoidance of an

undesirable object, respectively.

•Pleasantness and unpleas-

antness are thus the manifestations within conscious experience
of dynamic interpl.ay of motivating factors.

They are subjec-

tive signs of conflict, release, over--stimulation, and other
conditions existing within the physical mind.•~ 9
Young's interpretation of mind, and of all the factors
concerned in mental processes, such as motives, goals, drives,
and will, is substantially physiological.

First of all, his

basic hypothesis is the identity of mind and brain.
We hold to the theory that the
mind and the brain are one and
the same reality. All the facts
about motivation ••• fit this
identity hypothesis~ •• Whether
the structure which regulates
behavior and conscious experience
be called a mind or a brain
matters little:Provided we are
clear about viewpoints. The main
difference between the. conceptions
af mind and brain is that the former
is assumed from an individual point
of view, and the latter fram an
objective.BO ••• The assumption
of a single motivating structure
as the basis of a.l.l activity removes the difficulties latent in
the dualistic opposition of a real
mind and a real brain.Bl
'1 9 Ibid., p. 384 •
80Ibid., P• 532.
81 Ibid., P• 3'1.
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Following this first assumption, Young proceeds to explain
motivation as a physiol.ogica.l process which stimulates behavior
in the organism as a whole.

Motivation by means of neural

mechanisms releases energy and initiates bodily movements.

All

motivating factors, therefore, may be defined as conditions
which bring about the release of physica1 energy.

Motives may

originate within the organism or may be occasioned by environmental causes; the latter kind are called •incentives."
In his attempts to describe the dynamic energies of man,
Young has reduced the human individual to a physical, biological
structure.

Consequently, motivation designates any facto,r

which causes a release of bodily energy.

Consistent with the

basic pattern of the human person as a biological entity, the
"will-factor• refers only to muscular set or a specific determination made effective through the neura.1 organization of the
body.

Though the doctrine rejects mechanism in fa.vor of moti-

vational dynamism, ultimately both motivation and human dynamics are expounded as forb of physical determinism.

Young's

summary of moti va.tional psychology provides a worthy testimony
of these facts.
Motiva.tional psychology may be
defined as the study of all conditions Which arouse and regulate
the behavior of organisms. The
arouaa1 of beha~ior necessarily
implies a release of physical
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energy from the tissues. The
regulation of behavior includes
the control of activity through
determinations as well as the
restriction of act~~ity by
organic structure.

Kurt Lewin and Geeta1tiam
As an offspring of the Gestaltqualitat of the Austrian
School and the phenomenology of Husserl, was born the very
influential contemporary school of thought, Gestaltism.

The

principles and laws of Gestalt psychology are many, and the
adherents to this theory are subdivided into groups according
to their own particular interpretations and special researches.
However, the fundaments of Gestalt psychology are generally
upheld by all these groups within the school.

Like function-

alism and hormic psychology, Gest&1tism was a reactionary movement against structuralism, and from the outset h&a stead:faetl.y
defended the unity of mind and dynamic nature
animal activities.

o~

all human and

The immediate beginnings of this echool can

be traced to, Wertheimer's experiment on the perception of movement.

As a result of his investigations, Wertheimer, together

with Kohler and Koffka, concluded that psychological phenomena

82 Ibid.
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existed in our experiences which were inexplicable according to
the classical principles of Wundt.

The famous •phi phenomena•,

discovered by Wertheimer and his subjects, convinced these men
that life is more than a mere callection of elements.
The first principle established by the Gestaltists--that
the whole is more than the mere sum of its pa.rts--was a direct
attack on elementariam.

Adding up bits of associated elements

never produces a perception in its true nature.

lie first per-

ceive objects as wholes, not as a bundle of parts; therefore
the perception of the whole is prier to the perception of its
parts •

.Following this first principle, Gestalt psychology

rejects any form of connectionism, bonds of association, or
elemental unite

~f

behavior.

Such appendages are superficial,

unreal, and contrary to the oneness or gestalt quality of all
perceptions.

We can neyer determine the rea.l nature of our

mental experience by means of analysis because analysis itself
destroys the reality of our experiences.

Analysis breaks up

the existing unity, and in doing so changes the very essence of
the object under study.
confirm these facts.

Our own common everyday experiences

We p:ereeive objects as wholes,. not as a

mosaic of parts or a.s clusters of elemental sensations and
feelings.
A rejection of assimilated sensations as the basis of
experience included an abandonment of the constancy hypothesis,
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which maintained that a. direct one-to-one co,rrespondence
existed between isolated or local stimulations and immed.ia.te
behavior.

Sensations, aroused by their respective points of

stimulation, were supposed to become united by bonds of association or fused together to form the perceptions we experience.

Gestalt psychology vigorously contested all these

assumptions of elementa.rism and associationism, and built up a
psychology which describes all our experiences in terms of
"patterns,. and •tetalities•.

Its specific intention was ta.

cleanse psychology of all artificiality, and to replace the
inadequate and sterile doctrine of structuralism by

a.

theory

which interprets experiences as they really exist, not as they
seem to be under analytic eissectien.
All we intend to do is te replace
l.&ws. of local correspondence,
laws of machine effects, by laws
of a much more comprehensive correspondence between the total
perceptual field and the t o,ta.l
stimulation, and we shall, in the
search for these laws, find at
least indications of some more
specific constancies, though
never one of the type expressed
by the constancy hypothesis.83
This brief description of Gestalt psycholegy is only a
schema of a very complicated and intricate system of thought.
8

~. Koffka.

•rinciples J! Gestalt Psychology.
Harcourt, Bra.ee and Compa.ny, 1935, p. 97.

New York:
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In our diecussion,we are primarily interested in the theory of
will as proposed by Gestaltists.

As a preface to this parti-

cular investigation, it will be wel1 to understand something
about the general nature of dynamics acco:rding to Gestaltists.
These theorists are severely critical of mechanisms of the
behavioristic kind.

Behaviorism stresses the stimulus-response

bond as the unit of activity; reflexes are the ultimate source
of all action.

But the reflex theory, in describing behavior,

emphasizes the importance of isolated movements elicited by
isolated stimUli, a direct contradiction to the Gestaltqu&iitlt
c

of behavior in reality.

Iech&nism of this kind is promptly

rejected; in order to preserve the "to:tality" of action as well
as the "wholeness • o:f perception, the Gestalt ists established
an analagoue relationship between the laws of behavior and the
laws of physics.

However, the Gestaltists do not identify

psychical and physical forces, but emphasize the close analogy •
••• the treatment ·of causal dynamic
prnblems campels· psychology to
employ the fundamental concepts
of dynamics, not, as frequently
in the past, promiscuously, but
in the development of a differentiated cancept-:f'ormation in
dyna.:adc fields. Physical analogies
may often be drawn without damage
to clarification. On the other
hand, it is always necessary carefully to avoid certain very ea.sy
errors, for example, in the adequate comprehension of the
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psychical field forces; and it
must always be kept in mind that
we have to do with forces in a
psychical field and ng1 in the
physical environment.
Mental. laws were prescribed to provide an explanation fo:r
the simultaneous and orderly reactions of the organism as a
whole to the many a.nd various kinds of stimuli.

Many patterns

of stimulations occur in rapid and often haphaZard sequence,
but beha,vior itself is purposive, o:,rderly, and· meaningful..
Because the organism reacts to these stimuli as a whole and not
in isolated sections, the order· and meaning of actions are pre- ,
served.

What is it that maintains this order and directs our

performances toward goa.ls and purposes?

The Gestaltists say

that just as the solar system and the various other systems in
nature are controlled and piloted by the interactions of physical forces, so are the activities of the human organism
governed by psychical forces.

Psychical forces are dynamic and

are the source of all human power; by means of their own mutual
interrelationships they direct, organize, and contro;l all the
activities we perform.
Dynamica1 interaction, undisturbed
by accidental impacts from without,
leads to orderly distribution,

8 "Kurt Lewin. A Dynamic Theory of Personalit)': Selected
Papers. Trans. by Dcm.&l.d K • .Adams and Karl E. Z.ener. New
York and London: llcGra."W-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935, p. 46.
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though there are no special preestablished arrangements.
And what is the explanation
of this general tendency in undisturbed dynamics? It is simple
enough. In all these systems we
have one resulting force at each
point at each instant of time.
All the resul.tant forces together
form one texture af stresses.
From the principles of physics one
can deduce, therefore, that, .!2£
!!!!t s_y stem ~ !!. whole, the immediate effect of a]l those forces 85
will have one definite direction.
In the field of dynamics, then, the prima.ry assumption of
Gestalt psycholLogy is1

that psychical forces are the point of"

origin for all activities of the organism.

Human precesses &re

directed and distributed by the dynamic interactions of these
natural executive forces.
The GestalLtists h&v.e not

t~t&lly

discarded the ter.m will,

and have made some attempts to distinguish between voluntary
and non-voluntary actions.

Koffka, Kohler, and others have

based their discussions of will on the earlier investigations
of Kurt Lewin.

Introducing the problem of will in his chapter
I

on Action, Koffka says, •The discussion which is to follow will
again be based very largely on the work of Lewin, whose lucid
and acute analysis of the problem has probably been the strongest
85 Wolfgang KShler. GestalLt PsycholLogy.
Publishing Corporation, 1945, P• 139.

New Yorks
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force in re-establishing problems of volition as primary problems of psychology.•86
Strictly speaking, the Gestaltists make no clear-cut
segregation of actions into voluntary and non-voluntary types.
Actions are complex and may contain both positive and negative
valences, as well as external and internal influences.

An

intense resol.ve to perform an action may include a.n actual dislike ar unwillingness to fulfill the deter.mination.

~lenees

often control the situation, so that it is difficult to say
whether the action is voluntary or not.

An already existing state of
tension, which may go back to a
purpose, a need, or a halffinished activity, is interested
in a certain object or event,
which is experienced as an
attraction (or repulsion), in
such a. way that this particular
tense system no:w obtains control
of the mot o·rium. We shall say
of such objects that they possess
a. 'valence ' •
Valences of this sort operate
at the same time (as do certain
other experiences) as field forces
in the sense that they steer the
i~~~~f::a~rocesses, above all the
Lewin offers a classification of activities consistent
with the determinism of Gestaltism.
86 t"\n

t
P• 416 •
K. Lewin • .QR.• ill•, p. 5l..
•

87~· £!_.,

Instead of voluntary and
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involuntary activities, he refers to "field-actionstt and
ttcantrolled actions".

Field actions refer to those actions

directed by external forces situated somewhere outside the
subjective ego.
ego-forces.

Controlled actions refer to actions ruled by

This division does not imply complete mutual.

exclusion of either kind of forces; for we may say that
environmental forces predominate in field actions, and egoforces, in controlled actions.

In the final analysis, the

distinction is due, not eo much to the type of fo,rces concerned,
but, rather, to the difference in organization of the forces
involved, whichever ones they may be..

•A continuous control of

the process by the forces of the outer psychologicalL en-vironment occurs when the activities are not (or are in only slight
degree) autochthonous, or when the forces inherent in the
course of the process as such are small relative to the field
f orces.

.. as

Lewin does not describe will as a single power or even as
an individual "force•·, but regards volition as a type of determinis tic organization of many fo:rces.

The human organism con-

tributes little in the way of direction to the total process;
the individual himself is atsteered" either one way or the

8811?.!!·' p. 49.
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other, depending on many circumstances.

The forces,both of the

inner and outer environment, the process itself, the intention,
the positive and negative valences existing in the field of
forces,--all these, depending upon the particular pattern of
their organization, determine whether an action be controlled,
or whether it be impulsive.

The steering process is governed

immediately by the pereeptua1 field, but remotely by the total
organization of all forces and processes concerned •
••• the action process •••proceeds
typically in successive action
steps which themselves for.m
largely autochthonous wholes •••
Whether the control of. the process by the field of force occurs
in this latter manner or in the
sense of a continuous steering
depends, on the one hand, upon
the integral firmness and the
forces of the action process
itself and, on the other hand,
upon the strength of the forces
in the field. Hence changes in
either of these circumstances
lead to essential changes in the
course of the process. At all
events, the steering processes··
are of fundamental significance
for the whole field of im~ulsive
and controlled behavior.s
I.ewin'.s theory of will, which is practically that of
Gestal.t psychology, is essentiall.y deterministic and
89

Ibid., P• 49.
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mechanistic.

Whether behavior is controlled by stimulus-

response connections or by psychical forces, in either case, it
is determined and not free.

Gestalt psychology has not reJected

mechanism but has substituted one kind for another.

Will is

not a supreme, directive power, but simply one of the many
dynamic ego-forces of which the total organism is composed.
Man is completely without a substantiality of his own, for
every act changes the whole individual and every act is controlled by psychic energies.

Not only is he at the mercy of

cosmic forces, but he is even wholly subjected to the psychical
forces within his own organism..

In brief, actions, volitional

or impulsive, are the physical or cortical patterns of dynamic
energy arising from a biological whole which is man.

Johannes Lindworsky
Among the modern scholastic psychologists, Lindworsky is
the most eminent authority on will.

He has made an intensive

study of volitional processes, and ha·s been a strong opponent to
those who define will as muscular tension or conative set.

His

investigations and written works reaffirm all the essential.
fundamentals set forth in scholastic philosophy.

His findings

are but further substantiations of the true rational. character
of will.

He has made invaluable contributions to the study of
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will in his detailed psychological developments of principles
already established by metaphysics and the philosophy of man.
Lindworsky points out that volition, unlike cognition, is
not a primary conscious power.

Perceptions and sensations are

a part of the cognitive process and nothing else precedes them
in our conscious life.
be knowledge befo:rehand.

In the case of will, there must always
The most important of all the cogni-

tive contents which precede will are motives.

For Lindworsky,

motives :form an integral. part of the volitional process a.nd are
defined as fo,llaws:
everything

which~

tt!B& motive of
represented to

~volitional

~mind~~

.!£!..!!.

val.ue realiz-

able through ill_ va.lunta;:y act.

We understand by value anything that is advantageous for the individual eoncerned.• 90

Motives may be classified as higher and lower, and inner and
outer.

Lower motives find their only value in the pleasurabie

feelings which they excite.

Higher motives refer to values

derived through cognizance of relations.

Inner· motives are

concerned with the goal in question and its personal value,
while outer motives pertain to a more extensive realm of values.
Obviously, the most essential requisite for all motives is
appearance in consciousness.
9

'~ile

other-organic processes

~xperimental Psychal.agy. Trans. from the Ger.man (1930) by
Harry R. De Sil.va... New Yo:rk: The l&:a.emillan Company, 1931.,
P• 304.
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progress effectively without the presence of consciousness,
motives and values must be cognized by the mind in order to
exist.

They are subjective contents, not objective ones.

Because of their subjective nature, the efficacy of motives may
vary from time to tiDe.

Imagination may enhance certain

motives beyond their actual value, o.r at times we may be mor-e
cognizant of hidden val.ues than at other times.

In training

the will, greatest emphasis should be given to motives.

The

older notions of strong will-power were founded on the belief
that continual. exercise increases strength--as if will were a
muscular power.

Lindworsky's thesis maintains that strength of

will is achieved by habituating it 12

!£!~proper

The author's experiments on the
resolutian of the disagreeable.
speak decisively against the
existence and significance of
intensive acts of will. Our
will appears to be comparable
not to a fo·rceful stroke of a
hammer, but, rather, to; a switching, or a closing of a contact,
for which no particular force is
necessary. The t o.tal strength of
will might depend on the placing
in readiness of valuable goals,
and in a skilled diiversion of the
attention. In this way, many
facts may be e.:x:.P~ained satisfactorily; for example, the circumstances that the strength of will
is not reserved for any age err
sex alone and that men who in one
domain have great strength of
will :may lack it completely in

motives.
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ethers. It is not the existence,
or the lack of strength of will,
but· the readiness or lack of'
motives, that furnishes the key
to the understanding of' iueh ·
contradictory behavior. 9
The concept of value is, in turn, dependent upon the
entire hierarchy of values and the compete philosophy of life
which an individual pessesses.
objectives.

Motives and values are relative

However, in will training, it is of utmost impor-

tance that· eur motives be specific.

Just as images are neces-

sary to bodily action, so are specific motives necessary to
right will-action.

Abeve all, we must distinguish between

subjectively experienced values and merely speculative ones aa
effective motives.
values.

Ideals are simply cqncrete, complex motive-

A sound permanent set of values embodied in concrete

ideals is the only guarantee for stability and security in one•s
psychological development.
The internal act of will., though prompted by motives, is
per~

a rational, appetitive movement, distinct from pereep-

tion, thought, or feeling.

Acts of will form a distinct ca.te-

gory of their own in the intel.lectual life of man.

But the

voli tiona.l process is a cap lex pheno-menon and includes a
diversity of other elements besides actual willing.

There are

three stages in every complete process of volition:

•first,
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the acquisition of motives preceding the resolution--we might
call it the accumulation of will power; second, the resolution
or rather the choice; and third, the execution of resolution.n92
From experimentations on will, Ach had concluded that a
sort of psychic force, acting subconsciously, existed in the
volitional process.

A "determining tendency" leads to the

fulfil].ment of resaltuion.

Lindwor·sky refuted Ach's law of

special determination, and pointed out that voluntary attention
explained the performances of tasks unadverted to after the
original resolution.

To will or resolve something specifically,

we must first intellectually perceive the task before us, and
in doing so we attend to the object of our will.

The image of

the task is strengthened by the attention thus given to it, and
even in the absence of the initial resolution the task may be
performed effectively.

Lindworsky says that the resulting

performance is not the outcome of a specific determining force,
but of voluntary attention, acting under the influence of
previous habit.
Lindworsky carefully distinguishes voluntary actions from
will acts and also from reflex and instinctive movements.

All

these movements, however, are at times associated with the
92

!h! Training of the Will.
Fitzpatrick.
P• 112.

lifiwau'iCe'ei

Trans. by A. Steiner and E. A.
The Bruce Publishing Company, 1929,
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volitional processes.

Inward wil1ing requires various bodily

activities for its objective fulfillment.
arises the problem of images.

In this discussion

Some authors, as we have seen,

designate kinaesthetic images as a prerequisite for voluntary
movements.

Lindwo:rsky states that experimental self-observation

reveals the scarcity of these images.

However, at some time or

other, previous to the movement, there must have been an image
of the movement.

The image is a necessary step to the final

production of an action.

•It has been shown in every case that

no direct path leads from the im&ge of the goal to its realizatia.n.

Otherwise, each no~l person should be able to move
either of hie eare.•93 FUrthermore, in customary voluntary
movements, a visual image of the goal pursued is more significant than kinaesthetic images, which might even prove to be
disturbing :factors in the actual performance.

Lindwo,rsky

affirms the advantages of kinaesthetic images previous to
voluntary actions, though he apparently does not assert that
they are immediate prerequisites; it is possible that they are
frequently present only in the remote background.

Neither

visual nor kinaesthetic images should be regarded as superfluous appendages, but, rather,

as

:factors contributing to the

total process of willing an act and executing it.
9 3-Experimental Psychology, po 320.

•According

143

to our view, the kinaesthetic images assist in making the finer
corrections of the occasionally occurring movements, while the
94
visual images assist in making the coarser corrections.•
We may now briefly summarize some of the outstanding
features of I.indworskyt-s theory of will.

{l) While other

authors hav.e emphasized exercise by repeated performances as
the important factor in will training, Lindworsky stresses
motives and value as the main source of will power.

However,

Lindworsky does not overlook the value of repetition, and
recommends its use whenever it is found to be efficacious.
Education of will should train it to act on proper motives.
He makes careful distinctions between subjecti"fely experienced
values and those which are merely speculative ones.

FUrther-

more, the more specific motives are the more effective ones.
(2) Objective experimentations cannot prove the existence of
will or freedom of the will,
them, or at least negatively.

th~ugh

it follows indirectly from

(3) While the will-act is

per~

a rational appetitive act, the volitional process in human
beings is complete only when will reveals itself in outward
behavior; • ••• valid observations indicate that there is no
isolated willing, that there is no pure act of will, and
94 Ibid., P• 321..
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that just as the mind needs the body, so the vo1itional act
needs a mode of behavior in which it can reveal itself.• 95
We have attempted to review some of the most influential
theories of will and to present a cross section exemplifying
the many diversities and individualistic tendencies apparent in
so many of the outstanding ones.

However, the picture is still

ineo.mplete, for experimental.ists have also contributed theories
based on objective data and introspective reports.

It is out-

side the scope of experiments to determine anything about the
nature of will directl.y, but by these indirect methods it is
po·s~ible

to know more about effects of volition.

In the next

chapter we will give a resume of the classic experiments on
Will.
95

lli.Q..

CHAP!'ER IV

EXPERIMENTS ON WILL

In recent years experimentations haTe flourished in psychological fields.

Our· knowledge of perception, imagery,.

memory, and thought has made great adTances, and much of this
progress is the result of the many ingenious experiments
carried through by careful inTestigatere.

Will experiments are

few in number and the results inconclusiTe.

However, both the

methods used and the achieTements attained are well worth our
consideration.

lla.rziss Ach
Preeminent among the early experimenters on will is
llarziss Ach.

There is scarcely a chapter on volition among our

modern psychology books which does not include a discussion or
at least references to Ach's remarkable work.

Ach's new mode

of procedure, rather than the conclusions he drew, established
a.. precedent in experimental psychology of the higher thought

processes.
145
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Ach rea1ized that the will-act and the external reactions
ar-e two separable phenomena.

In order to gain introspections

on the act of willing as well as on the ensuing reaction, he
fractionated the obserTations into three periods; a fore
period, the main period, and the after period.

In the fore

period, the subject reported his experiences between the preliminary instructions and the presentation; in the main period
he described his actual reactions to the stimulus; in the after
period he introspected for the time subsequent to the reactionary period.

Ach tried to create a situation which would be

certain to include an observation of the will act, for volition
occurs when the subject accepts the task and not only when he
performs it.
In Ach'a experiments, the subjects were required to memorize a group of paired nonsense syll&bli.es, so that when one
member of the pair was presented, they would readily respond
with the other member.

After they had completed this task,

conflicting conditions were established.

Instead of responding

with the other syllable of the pair memorized, they were now
required to giTe a syllable that rhymed with the proposed one.
In order to fulfill the Ia.st requirements, the subjects had to
oTercome a

preeatablishe~

will-acts were necessary.

habit; and to accomplish this feat
Through introspective reports from

the eubj ect s a.bou t their experience during the pro,ce ss, Ach

14?

obtained descriptions of Tolitional action under controlled
conditions.

The presence of conflicting tendencies eToked in

the subject a strong resolution to overcome the established
•determining tendency".

Ach contended he could measure the

strength of will manifested in these subjects by measuring the
force of the determining tendency; the measure was termed the
ttassociati Te equi Talent".

In ather words, the stronger the

conflicting tendency, the greater the strength of will.

If the

determining tendency proved to be stronger than the reproductiTe tendency, the subject was able to overcome the association
already established. 1
Ach's analyses of the introspect! ve reports of the subjects led him to some Tery significant conclusions.

These

1 •Der Erfolg und mit ibm der Wirkungsgrad des Wol1ens ist
nlm1ich abhangig von yershiedenen Faktoren.
·
Vor a.llem ist er bedingt durch die starke der
Determination, welche durch den Willensakt gesetzt wird. Je
eindring~icher, da.s aktuelle :Moment im Entschluss hevortritt,
desto starker ist im aU.Semeinen a.uch die determinierende
Tendenz, welche beim Erleben der konkreten BezugsTorstellung,
des :Mittels zur Erreichung des Zweckes, den Ablaut des
psychischen Geschehens bestimmt. In der Starke dieser durch
den Willensakt gesetzten Determination, die, wie in w. u. D.
nachgewiesen ist, aach im Unbewussten weiterwirkt, zeigt sieh
die Intensitat der Willenskraft des IndiTiduums, der
llachtbereich seines Wollens. D&bei ist diese Intensitat
bedingt einerseits durch eine persanliehe Konstante,
andererseits durch die Eindringlichkeit, mit der d§s aktuelle
:Moment des konkreten Willensaktes erlebt wurde.• Uber den
Willensa.kt l!!!! 9.!!. ~emperament. Leipzigt Verlag Ton Q.uelle
und Meyer, 1910, P• 250.
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reports made it clear to Ach that the determining tendency
included four distinct e1ementsr

first, a sensory element

manifested by physical feelings of tension and effort;
seeondly, an intellectual element, ideas and thoughts cancerning the purpase in Tiew; thirdly, the consciousness of effort
exerted to·wa.rds acquisition of the goal; a.nd :fina.Jily,. the
actual or essential element which is an awareness o·f the "I
w111•.

The last mentioned element constituted the most

distinguishing attribute of the will-act.

i'he subjects were

aware that the action in which they were engaged proceeded
fram the self.

They were experiencing, here and naw, the self

in action, a phenomenon unrealizable in any other kind of
dynamic actiTity.

2

As Kulpe, llarbe, Orth, a.nd others of the Wiirzburgers had
arrived at the presence of irreducible elements in ideas and

~ur so viel ist klar, da.ss hier die "Ichseite• des psychischen
Geschehens in ganz anderer Weise hervortritt als bei sonstigen
'Erlebnissen, sowie dass ferner in dem J(omente, wo der Willensa.kt in seiner energischen Form gegenwartig ist, eine
eindeutig bestimmte Anderung des Verhaltens des 8 Ich" erlebt
wird. Es ist mir vorerst versagt, noch naher auf eine
Char&kteristik dieses Teiles des Erlebnisses einzugehen. Bine
Klarung ist insbesondere dann moglich, wenn die innerste Seite
des seelischen Geschehens, welche wir eben a.ls das "Ich"
bezeichnens der Untersuchung nlher zug&nglich sein wird. Und
das ist dann der Falls wenn der Willensakt im H~blick auf die
Art und Weise seines Zustandekommens betra.chtet wird • Ibid.,
P• 241.

----
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judgments, so Ach believed that non-sensory contents existed in
volitions.

The lrdrzburgers had made the first serious break

with traditional sensism; the strength of their opposition was
increased by their unanimity of opinion reached through various
kinds of experiments.

During the expertments,Ach observed that

the subjects exerted great effort,and often their attempts were
accompanied by tense bodily posture or characteristic gestures.
These physical concomitants were definitely classed as externa1
signs a·f the internal act of will.

Ach did not consider these

conative movements as part of the will-act

itsel~but

only as

outward manifestations of the internal resoJLve.
Only a few af the subjects were successful in overca-ming

the strong reproductive tendency developed in the first part of
the experiment.
At this point it is well to reconsider Ach' s. •associate
equivalent•.

There is no real evidence that the "deter.mining

tendency• is the will-act only.

In his attempts to measure

will by the experimental procedure described, Ach was actually
only comparing the strength of two reproductive tendencies; and
he did not discuss the further problem of freedom of choice
involved in the acceptance o.·f the ta.sk.

For, the tendency to

comply with the directions, whate?er the subjects moti "Ye for
acceptance may h&"Ye been, by giving a rhyme instead of the
learned syllable is also, in a sense, a reproductive tendency •.
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Personai experiences of the subject may have greatly influenced
their ability to reproduce rhyming syllables.
his

~asure•

Ach determined

by first finding out how many repetitions of

nonsense syllables were needed for the learning process, without at the same time hampering the efficacy of the resolutions.
He found that 120 repetitians formed so· strong an association
that it overcame the subject's resolution to respond according
to the directions.

Strength of will, then, was measured by the
~

number of repetitions needed to form an effective •associative
equivalent •.

To attempt the measurement of will power on a

numerical basis is a precarious procedure to say the least.
This method would never permit of generalizations in other types
of will act ion.
In his work on the will, A.ch,. like others, recognized the
existence of mental states which were unpicturable, incapable
of being represented by any sensible images. 3 Ach's analysis
of will-acts m&rks a great contrast to the interpretation of
the sensists.

Sin.ce the time of Locke and Hume, will popularly

3 -oabei war dieses Wiesen unanschaulich gegeben d. h. es waren
keine phlnomenologischen Bestandteile wie visuelle, akustische,
kinlsthetische Empfindungen oder Erinnerungsbilder von so.lchen
Empfindungen nachzuweisen, we1che den als Wiesen gegebenen
Inhalt seiner ~u&litlt nach bestimmten.• Uber· die Willenstatie;keit !!!!9.!!!!, Denken. Gottingent Vanderh"''e'Ck a.nd
Ruprecht, 1905, p. 210.
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had been described as a complex process characterized chiefly
by the feeling states or by emotional elements.

Contrary to

these views. Ach claimed that the will-act was something over
and above the physical feeling of effort.

His experiments gave

ample evidence that the acceptance of the task and actual. "I
will" was an intellectual process- and like thought itself
contained neither kinaesthetic images nor physical tension.

4

While it is no,t possible to experiment on the will
directly, Ach's works show that experimentations have .contributed invaluable descriptive data on volitional activities.
Hie experiments offered objective proofs for the fact that
the internal act

o~will,

at least as a tendency, cannot be

identified with cognitive processes, whether sensory or

~in derartiges Gegebensein von kinasthetischen oder akustischkinlsthetischen Vorstellungsbildern mag wohl die Ursache fur
die weit verbreitete Annahme sein, dass sich unser Denken
stets in innerem Sprechen oder in a.daequa.ten visuellen,
akustisohen u. dergl. Erinnerungsbildern vollzieht.
DemgegenUber muss darauf hingewiesen werden, dass es sehr
4omple:x:e Inhalte.gibt, bei denen, wie sohon erw~hnt, die
Teilinhalte in mannigf&chen gegenseitigen Beziehungen bewusst
vorliegen, ohne da.ss hierbei diese einzelnen Inhalte durch
ihre adaequa.ten sprachlichen Bezeichnungen u. dergl.
reprt'i.sentiert sind beziehw. Uberha.upt reprasentiert sein
k~nnen.•
Ibid., P• 215.

4
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intellectual, nor with any of the feeling or emotional states.
Willing is a dynamic process distinct from all other mental
5
a.ctivities.

Kichotte and PrWa
Kichotte and PrUm of the Lcuvain School undertook to
investigate another type of will-act, namely choice.

Methods

were planned so that records of the process of choice could be
secured under experimental conditions.

~he

subjec- were asked

to choose between two mathematical operations at each trial.
~wo

numbers were presented by means of a tachistoscope:

if the

card contained a four-digit number, the subject had to choose
between addition and subtraction; if the number presented was
smaller, he was to choose between multiplication and division.
As soon as the decision was made, the subject pressed a key.
~he

subjects were asked to report their introspections during

5 •Aus unseren AuafUhrungen ergibt sich, dass der Willensakt als
solcher in seinem unmdttelbaren Gegebensein wohl
cbarakterisiert ist und als ein spezifisches psychisches
Erlebnis angesprochen werden muss. Info·lgedessen sind alle
jene Ansichten zurttckzuweisen, welche entweder nur in einem
der angegebenen Elemente ein charakteristisches Kennzeichen
des Wollens sehen, oder welche nur in einem besonderen
Zusammensein einzelner phitnomenologischer Inhalte z. B. der
Spannungsempfindungen und der Bewusstseinlage der Anstrengung
ein spezifisches Merkmal der Willensbetatigung annehmen."
••
~ ~ Willensakt ~ das Te!Per&ment, p. 247.
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the time preceding actual choice, as well as their experience
of the final selection itself.

The directions requested that

the choices be made for a serious reason and that they be made
as quickly as possible.

From the data obtained, Michotte and

Prum made a complete and careful study of the factors in volitional. consciousness.
Upon the presentation of the EStimulus card, it was
observed that the subjects immediately began to evaluate the
twa: alternatives according to the motives which they had in
mind.

During this time one object was found to be more worth-

while than the other.

This period was characterized by con-

sciousness of motives and values.

After the period of

motivation, an •intermediary" period ensued

wherein the sub-

jects realized a consciousness of doubt and hesitation; and they
found themselves engaged in reasoning, comparing, evaluating,
etc.

Sensory contents at this point were completely lacking.

During this time, preliminary to actual selection, the subjects
often experienced muscular tension, especially in the finger
which was preparing to press the reaction key.

The whole tenor

of this transition period was one of suspension, and for this
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reason it is natural that physical accompaniments would be
present.

6

In the final state which included choice, an interesting
differentiation was noticed by the experimenters.

Two factors

were present, decision and consent; and these were found to be
distinguished by definite structural differences.

Decision

followed immediately after the adoption of motives, or after
the two alternatives were clearly within consciousness.

In

this case, the subject designated the chosen operation in one
of two ways; either in a •live]y• fashion or in a "cold"
fashion.

Decision was "lively" if it followed after consid-

era.ble muscular tension; it was •cold tt if no muscular tens ion

6 •Le stade intermediaire comprend tout d'abord un etat
subjectif assez caracteristique du aujet. Cet etat contient
camme facteurs conatitutifs:
1. Une conscience de doute, d'heaitation, d•oacillation.
2. Une conscience d'attente, de auspena.
3. Une tension muaculaire gen~rale, localisee plus
specialement dans le doigt qui doit reagir et dans la
poitrine. La respiration eat superficielle acceleree,
et preaente des arr~ts.•
,
''Etude Experimenta.le sur le Choi:x: Volontaire", Archives ~
Psychologie, Tome X {1910), P• 180.
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preceded it.

7

Consent followed only when the desired alter-

native was present alone in the focus of consciousness.

While

decision requires two alternatives,. consent which follows
decision is characterized by acceptance; therefore it needs
only consciousness of the desired alternative. Consent is also
closely related to motivation. 8 One more important distinction
was observed, namely the dif"ference between voluntary and •nonvoluntary" choice.
7

Some subjects did not possess any

~r.mi lee actee volontaires, la distinction la plus

caract~r.istique est celle qui separe la dicision du consente-

, '
ment, ou de l'adheeion. Ces phenomenes
peuvent, de plus,
presenter divers aspects. La. decision peut ~tre 'froide',
'vive', ou 'active', qui diff~rences qui paraissent tree
accus,es chez lee sujects non-exerc,s, mais qui, avec un peu
d'habitude de !'introspection, semblent de peu d'importance
ou point de vue du ca.ra.ct~re volontaire ••• La. decision est, en
g€neral, 'vive' dans le sene que voue venons de decrire, quand
elle est precedee par un etat de forte tension, et elle
s•a.ccompagne alors normalement de contractions dane diverses
parties du corps ••• la tension ne s'6tant pas rel€ch€e
immediatement, 1a decision est froide." Ibid., PP• 181-184.
8 •Les deux formes d•a.pparition du choix vo"i''iitaire, d~cision et
consentement, r~Qondent ~ des conditions bien definiee. Le
choix est considere toujours comme veritable d~cision, quand
il appa.raft iDDD6diatement apres lee motifs, ou immediatement
apres la pause pendant la.quelle se developpent l'attente et le
doute, ou encore quand lea mots d'signant lea deux operations
sont prononces interieurement par le sujet immediatement avant
le choix. ~uand, par contre, seule !'alternative qui va €tre
choisie se presente
la conscience, sous forme interrogative,
ou bien accompagnee de la notion'c'est ceci Ji.U'il faut
choisir, '· ou enfin quand cette notion appara1 t seule, le sujet
consid~re toujours le choix comme ayant la forme du consentement. Il r'sulte de la, que le choix revet cette derniere
forme quand au moment ~ui le ~r'c~de imm~diatement, !'alternative la PllfS favorieee a. ete specialement consciente,. ou que
sa valeur a ete nettement presente. Le caract ere du choix
semble done en rapport intime avec la motivation.• Ibid.,
PP• 190-191.
---~
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consciousness of action, and consequently their actions or
choices were automatic and not voluntary.

Iichotte and PrUm

established •consciousness of a.ctionft as a fundamental requisite
9
for volitiona1 activities.
Michotte and PrUm found that volitional activity was characterized by an irreducible element--consciousness of self
cannot be analyzed into sensations, feelings, or images.

This

awareness of the self in action is a phenomenon, distinct in
itself and independent of sensory exp-eriences.

While other

factors of volition may vary from time to time, the conscious~~

action constitutes the essential nucleus of will.

Con-

sciousness of activity is often accompanied by muscular tension
and physiological processes, but it is in no way identifiable
with these concomitants.

1-he presence or absence of physio-

logical accompaniments does not affect the essential nature of
10
voli tion.
The experiments repeatedly attempt to substantiate
9 "D'autre part t il e:x:iete des processus qui paraissent etre tout
a. fait semblables a nos d~cisions volontaires et qui cependa.nt
ne sont pas consideres comme tela par le sujet; ce sont lea
decisions automatiquee. Le seul facteur qui dans ces cas, est
u;oujoura absent, est la conscience de l 1 action." Ibid., P• 195.
Ce facteur que nous nammerons afin d'~viter toute~ivoque,
'con.science de 1' action', n' est pas un contenu distinct, plac'
cot~ des autres; absolument different du sentiment 'd'
/
activit~ mueculaire', il se ma.nifeste comme une simple modalite
qui affecte certains phenomenes, comme un caractere qui ne
eubsiste pas en .lui-.meme comme contenu de conscience, mais qui
n~cessite un eubstrat qu'il qualifie. Ce qu'il y a de
caract~ristique dans !'intervention de ce facteur, crest qu'il
porte directement le caract~re de l' action, et ne peut sr exprimer que pa.r ltinfinitif; crest la conscience de 'faire•,
'd'agir', de 'designer•, de •se tourner vera•, de 'dire•, de
'laisser a.ller•, etc.• Ibid., PP• 19~-194.

a
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this principle by reference to automatic actions which are so
obviously devoid of consciousness.

What may be said of con-

scious, dynamic sensory processes?

Michotte and PrUm do not

consider these activities to any great extent.
Though consciousness of goals and purpose is necessary
even for instinctive activities, something more is required for
rationally directed activities, namely awareness of the self-inaction.

Animals are aware of the objects they pursue, but give

no evidence o.f self-consciousness in the process.
Prum are not too clear on this point.

Jlichotte and

They say their experi-

ments confirm the fact that choice contains immaterial attributes, but they claim that "consciousness of self• is also
present in activities other than rational volitions.

Their

emphasis on physiological accompaniments as being distinct from
volition is admirable; but they stress the sensory and dynamic
comp:onent of will-acts, and apparently see in these a kind o'f
awareness of self.

The distinctive feature of volition, namely

awareness of self-in-action, is not brought out clearly enough
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in the interpretations of their experiment; although they
11
sametimes seem to imply a distinctive feature.
The analyses made by JHehotte and Prlim are in close agreement with those of Ach.

Eoth experiments, investigating two

different aspects of will activity, have arrived ultimately at
the same general conclusions.

The most imp.ortant among these

is the recognition of an irreducible eleme·nt or rational
quality in the mental processes of volition.

The works of

Michotte and PrHm, like those of Ach, have demontrated in an
11 •quant ~ la conscience de l'action elle-m~me il ne semble pas
qu 'elle soit un attribut exclusif de ce que nous appelone
vulgairement ph~nom~nes volontaires, en ce sene que sa
pr~sence conditionnerait toujours le caract~re volont&ire des
ph~nam~nes qu' elle affecte. Si, en effet, cette conscience
de l'action se d€finit ad~qua.tement au point de vue
descriptif, en.disant que lee ph,noraenes qui la portent ne
peuvent s exprimer que par l•infinitif, il est ~vident que
certains faits de la vie psychique ont ce caractere, sans
toutefois Btre ~ proprement parler des ph~nom~nes
'volontaires'; telles la conscience de 'tendre', de 'desirer',
'd 'avoir envie de'. Cee divers ph~nomenes portent sans
aucun doute possible, le m$me caractere d'action que nos
'decisions' et nos 'consentemente'; de mame que ceux-la, ils
ne peuvent s'exprimer que par l'infinitif, et menent
directement
l'affirmation de l'intervention au 'moi'. La
m~me conscience d 'action peut done affecter divers 'noyaux',
divers contenus de conscience, toutes lee combinaisons de la
conscience de l'action ne constituent pas des phenom~nes
auxquels on donne spontan~ment le nom de volontaires, mais,
au point de vue descriptif, elles font toutes partie d'une
m~me classe de ph~nominee, que neue o.pp,osons, comme '~tats
dynamiquee de conscience' aux '~tats statiques', c'est-a-dire
c'eet ~tats de conscience qui ne comprennent pas la
caract,restique de l'&ction, soit sous forme active, soit sous
forme passive, tela par exemple lee sentiments du groupe
plaisir-depla.isir." l.la!9..•, PP• 195-196.

a
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objective, scientific manner, the immateriality of volitional
processes.

Cammon to both experiments is the strong evidence

of self-awareness, of the "Bgo-in-action•.

In all the intro-

sp.ections, the experimenters noted that the predominant characteristic was the conscious intervention of self, operating in
the capacity of its dynamic, appetitive nature.

12

Boyd Barrett
Boyd Barrett, another experimentalist of the Louvain
School, made investigations very similar to those of Michotte
and

Pram.

tion.

His prime purpose was to study motives and motiva-

In order to do so it was necessary to set up laboratory

conditions through which records of numerous choices could be
obtained.

The experimenter was then able to make an intensive·

study of the motives, circumstances, and phenomena of the
choice a made.
Five psychologists were used as subjects; the experimenter
proposed twenty-eight different choices.

The choices were pre-

sen ted in a precise o·rder and under identical condi tiona.

For

•11. y a coincidence, tout d 'abord, au au jet de la pr~sence de
la 'conscience de l'action' et de son importance au point de
vue du ca.ract~re volontaire. Le 'facteur actue1' de/ Ach est
en effet, sans aucun daute, ce que naus avons appele
'conscience de l'action'; c'est une activit~ vecue. Ibid.,
P• 310-311.
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each choice, the subjects were required to report their introspections.

The time duration of each choice was recorded by

the experimenter.

The. materials consisted of eight different

iiquids which were carefully selected so as to present a series
of tastes, graduated according to their degree of agreeableness.

Some were highly .obnoxious, some were indifferent, and

some were very pleasant.

All the liquids were colorless and

could be differentiated only by their tastes.
lables were used to designate each liquid.
included three divisions.

Nonsense syl-

The experiment

In the first part, the subjects

learned the associations between the tastes and their respective names.

Secondly, the strength of the associations was

measured by testing the subjects' ability to recognize the
liquid by the stimulus card.

Thirdly, the subjects were asked

to make choices from the objects ptesented.

After the subjects·

had thoroughly learned the associations between the nonsense
syllables and the liquids, the following directions were given
to them:

"Two words will appear corresponding to the substance

in the two glasses.

You are to choose between these substances
and to drink at once the liquid which you have choaen.• 13 ~e
act of choice which followed these instructions contained two
13
Motive--Fo.r'Ce and Motivation--Tracks. London and New York:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911, P• 51.

].6].

periods:

(1) the time bet.ween the app.ea.ra.nce of the stimulus

card and the reaction; {2) the time between the reactions and
the actual fulfillment of the choice.

Th~

first period was

measured by the Hipp chranoscope, and the second, by the
Vernier chronoecope.
Acco·rding to Barrett, the most important factor in the
whole experiment was motivation.

Evaluation of motives

engrossed the attention of the subjects more than any other
activity.

The whole process of selection centered around the

balancing of values.

Various types of motives induced the

subjects to choose one card rather than another.

Sometimes the

motives were subjective, and the subject b•sed his choice on
some whim or feeling rather than the quality of the differences.
Most of the motives, however, were objective ones of an
intrinsic kind.

These were based on the it}}edonic .. quality o-r

the substance indicated.

Sometimes the subjects resorted to

less serious mptives and simply chose the nearest glass or the
most familiar one.
Intraspections revealed that motives themselves were
influenced by circumstances, and fluctuated even during the act
of choice.

Conflicts arose and caused hesitations until one

motive succeeded in predominating over the other.
calls this· success of domination
Motives.•

·~e

Barrett

Critical Point of
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It is not sufficient that one
motive should predominate over
another, in order that the choice
may be made ~n its favor. It
must predominate by a certain
surplusage. It do,es not suffice
that it should be stronger than
the other, in order that it may
win. It must, itself, first
reach a certain degree of strength
or force--it must reach what we
shall ca11 its Critical Point.
By the Critical Point &f
:Mo·ti ves we mean that point or
degree of strength, which, being
reached by the motive, the choice
results automatica.lry.l4
)Ia.ny different conditions increased the strength of a motive
until the Critical Point was finally reached.

A motive was

strengthened merely by being in the focus of attention for a
long time.

Or perhaps a. weak motive became effective because

there was no other to oppose it.
~otive-strengthening

process.

According to Barrett,

is indeliberate, and even an unconscious

It is none the less real.."

15

Choices of the same

kind tend to follow the same course, and after many of them have
been made,a sort of ttmental furrow"' is established.

Barrett

called these vo,li tional tendencies "moti vation-:-tracts .•
Choices. when of the same kind,
normally run along fixed lines,
The general structure of the
choice act, and the psychical
14

Ibid •, P• 83.
15 Ibid., P• 86.
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contents remain the same, save
for the inevitable evolution and
shortening in point of time and
content. The motives which recur
are usually the same, though in
a gradually modified for.m--they
evo;lve. These motives and the
Whole choice act, so to speak,
pass along beaten tracks. We
speak figuratively, to m&ke the
matter clearer, not to tinge it
with a materialism or a determiner for whf~h we see no shred
of evidence.
One of the chief purposes o·f Barrett's experiments was to
find out the influence of hedonism on motivation.

There was

ample evidence that the influence was significant, and examp1es
of hedonic attractions and repulsions were abundant.

WWe found

that a correlation existed between the quickness o:f reaction
and the hednnic value, or motive-force of the
chosen.•

1'1

alt~rnative

It is interesting to note that.pleasantness made

for rapid choices, while the slowest choices were those whose
objects were unpleasant substances.

But over and above choices

influenced by "hedonism•, there were always present non-hedonic
motives.

Even in an experiment which involved no ethical

principles, it was evident that the pleasure-pain principle was
not always the determiner of choice.

~~Ibid., PP• 119-120.
Ibid • , p. 95.
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Barrett's general conc1ueions correspond closely to those
of Lindworeky's.

Both psychologists empha..size the tremendous

influence of motives.
the motives.

"The whole capital of the will lies in

But these are thought complexes by which we com-

prebend values.•

1.8

Barrett, how·ever, claims that motive-

strengthening is indeliberate and unconscious.

Lindworeky, on

the other hand, stresses the. fact that the first inculcation of
motives becomes the more effective precisely a..s these motives
come into the focus of attention; though, of course, later on
certain choices may become more or lees habitual processes.
For Lindworsky, the building up pro:cese is not an unconscious
procedure, but rather an intelligent, directed course of a.ction.
While Barrett believes that motive-strengthening is acquired by
repetitions which, in turn, form a

11

bea.ten path"', Lindworsky

ascertains that all the strength of mo-tives lies in the value
attached to, them.
No matter how well furrowed the course of choices may be,

once the object-value is changed, minimized, or lost, willaction is in some manner or other changed or redirected.

Per-

ma.nency does not result from repetition, but, rather, from
goals which are. intellectually grounded.

Life experiences seem

to bear witness to the fact that •motivation-tracts" are not
18
The Training of !.h!t !!,!!, P• 159.
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the result of routine repetitions.

They are dependent upon the

permanency of the goals toward which they lea.d.

Robert

s.

Woodworth

Though the investigations of Woodwo.rth cannot be considered as outstanding experiments in will psychology, they have
earned wide acclaim because of the evidence which they proTide
against the widely accepted theory

o~f

ideomotor will action.

First of all, Woodworth was concerned chiefly with dynamics as

a. whole, and not specifically with volitional activities.

T.he

imp.orta.n.ce of his works on voluntary movements is deriTed not so
much from the nature and results of the experiments themselves,
but more from the fact that they a.re the works of Woodwo:·rth.
In the field ·of contemporary psychology, Woodworth is found
among the top. ranks of experimentalists.

The accuracy and

precision of his methods together with the extensive range of
his researches has made him an outstanding authority in experimental psychology.

In perusing a resum' such as ours, Wherein·

attempts have been made to recount the works of notable
psychologists, the natural tendency for a critical reader would
be to wonder what Woodworthts opinions on this particular issue
might be.
his

The renown achieved by Woodworth is due not only to

intenei~e

researches, but is also the result of hie
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endeavors to follow a. middle course, avoiding at all times the
position of an extremist.

Accordingly, Woodworth is cautious

in hie acceptance of new interpretations, and ha.e tried to.
establ.ish his own system of psychology on a sound factual
basis.
So if you ask me which school ta
choose for your own, I should be
inclined to advise you to stay
in the middle of the road. We
must remember tha.t the middle-ofthe-road group are no:t simply the
left-overs or those who cannot
make up their minds. Sometimes,
with a slight change in the figure
of ep.eech, we middle-of-the-roaders
are said to be sitting on the fence,
and to have in bad individual cases,
a.n inveterate tendency to sit on the
fence. Wel1, in support of this
position it may be said that it is
cooler up here and one has a better
view of all that is go-ing on. But
I like the middle-of-the-road figure
better, because it brings sut the
continuity of this group. 1
For Woodworth, the whole problem of dynamics lies in the
relatione between cause and effect.
the study of reactions to stimuli.

Psychology, in general, is
This concept of psychology

is not to be confused with the narrow interpretation of behaviorists who base all human activities on stimulus-response
connections.
19

Woodworth simply means to imply that all behavior

Contemporary SchooJLs of Psycholegy.
Press, 1931, P• 216. --

New Yorkt

The Ronald
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is related to dynamics, because all activity pro;ceeds from some
energizing source.

The stimulus alone does not constitute the

entire cause of action, for the individual himself contributes
much.

The very individuality of the person concemed influ-

ences the action which results.

Watson, Thorndike, Hunter, and

others have attempted to trace behavior to S-R bonds which are
described as isolated unite or events.

Woodworth, on the other

hand, rightly insists that there is no such thing as a single
reaction within a unified organism.

The individual, as a

whol.e, is always in some way affected whenever a part is
involved.

The stimulus-response units are in themseives sub-

ject to change as weil as whole patterns of activities.

It is

not possible to describe any one kind of activity as rigidly
stereotyped.

Human behavior, especially, is characterized by

variability in all responses, and complexities arise because of
goals and purp.ases which are so essential to conscious life.
Woodworth performed a series of simple experiments for the
purpose of ascertaining the cause of voluntary movement.

TWo

separate sets of experiments were performed; "one on practice
in gaining voluntary control of an unfamiliar movement, and one
on the execution of a familiar movement.• 20 The subjects were

~tThe Cause of a Vo:luntary llo-vement" in Psychological Issues.
llew York: Columbia University Press, 1939, P• 33.
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asked to perform certain movements and to note particularly
what imagery occurred.

The subjects were requested to make

some of the movements hesitatingly, so as to give ample time
for the appearance of imagery.
promptly in order t a afford

Other movements were made

opp~rtuni ties

for comparisons.

instructions required three types of movements:

The

first, move-

ments which were confined to the person himself, such as opening the mouth, wagging the jaw, winking, opening elosed eye:s,
flexing or separating the fingers, and flexing the foot;
secondly, movements were made involving the use of an instrument--scissors, forceps, or the dynamometer; thirdly, choice of
movements was permitted, such as touching any part of the body,
or any object in the foreground, flexing or extending the
fingers, responding to a sound by a. movement of either the hand
or the foot.

Thirteen subjects were used, and the interpreta-

tiona made were based almost entirely on the introspections of
the subjects.
observations are not adapted
to statistical treatment. The
study does not purport to be a
census, but a rough survey of the
so,rt of facts that occur. The
different subjects did not make
equal numbers .of observations,
nor was care taken to have the

~
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movements chosen a. fair sample,
statistically, of the voluntaf.l
motor activity of daily life.
From his analysis of these introspections, Woodworth
formed his theory of "conceptual control•.

The int'ro:spections

of the subjects showed that, in a. great number of cases, no
imagery of any kind appeared in consciousness.

Furthermore,

the subjects frequently experienced movement without any previous kinaesthetic image o·f it.

This observation led to a

conclusion directly opposed to the main tenet of James's ideomotor theory of will, which emphasized the necessity of kin&esthetic imagery acting as cues for voluntary mo,vements.
As might be expected, the subjects
differed greatly in the sort and
amount of imagery which they experienced. Some had motor images in
advance of most of the movements
tried; others had none. some cOlllmonly had visual images, some never.
Some had auditory images in preparation for speaking a word, some
motor, some visual in addition to
motor. Touch, pain, temperature,
and semicircular-canal imagery
cropped out occasionally. Verbal
imagery, naming the act to be
performed or the object to be
moved or touched, was not infrequent. Some subjects did not
anticipate movements in imagery
of any sort but attended to sen~
21

Ibid .. , P• 36-3'7.
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sations of the initial po-sition
and of khe beginning of the movements. 2
Since so many of his subjects reported no imagery at all,
Woodwo:rth discarded imagery as a cause of voluntary movement.
Kinaesthetic imagery as an essential precedent to voluntary
movement was found to be an unwarranted claim.
was t a:t&lly absent.

At

time~

imagmey

Woodworth found the source of voli t iona.l.

movements elsewhere, namely in thought itself.

Before ane can

perform any conscious action, there must be knowledge of the
action to be done.

In other words, before voluntary movement

can take place, there must be perception of the movement and
the intention to perform it.
The cue of the act is the thought,
not the im&ge. The mast d efini te
feature of the thought is the cause '
of the definiteness of the act.
If it be allowed that there is such
mental content that is not reduced
to sensorial imagery, and that some
of this content usually lies at the
focus of attention, constituting
the real point and meaning of the
thought no reason remains for supposing that there 'must be' a sensorial image O'f the act which shall
function as the cue of the movement.23
Up to, this point, ,Noodwo.rth's conclusions are in close accord
with the scholastic doctrine which maintains that all volitional
22
P• 34.
23 Ibid.,
Ibid., P• 56.
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activities must be preceded by intellectual perception.

Images

may or may not be immediate]y present, but there must be cognizance of the action to be performed.

Woodwo·rth's investiga-

tions on the causes of a voluntary movement have also produced
valuable objective evidence in favor of the assertion that a
volitional activity is necessarily preceded by something more
than mere kinaesthetic images.
Besides thought, however, Woodworth mentions one other
factor as essential to voluntary movement--a neuromuscular set
directly related to the bodily movement involved.

"The

comp~te

determinant of a voluntary motor act--that which specifies
exactly what act it shall be--is nothing less than the total
set of the nervous system at the moment." 24
Woodworth's canclusions are sound as far as they go, but
does voluntary movement consist only of concep.tua]. elements and
physical set?

Woodworth has neglected to describe the most

essential feature of all, namely the "voluntariness" of such
movements.

It is insufficient to describe voluntary movements

without including an explanation of their essential constituents.

A movement is voluntary not because it proceeds fram

thought or because it is dependent upon neuromuscular activities, but precisely because it proceeds from the fiat of the
24

Ibid. , p. 59.
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wil.l.

A voluntary movement is one whose very execution depends

upon its previous acceptance by the self'.

All external acts of

will proceed from the internal a.ct; the two· kinds of volitional
activities are distinct, for the will may act without any
external manifestation.
Now in a voluntary act, there is
a twofold act, viz., the interior
act of the will and the external
act; and each of these acts has
its object. The end is properly
the object of the interior act of
the will, while the object of the
externa..l action is that on which
the action is brought to bear ••• 25
The a.ct of the will is twofoldr
one is its immediate act, as it
were elicited by it namely, to
will; the other is an act ofthe
will commanded by it, and put
into axecution by means of some
other power; e.g., .t_o w.alk and 12.
speak, which are commanded by the
will to be executed by me~3 of
the power of locomotion...
And
thus it is that we can have the
voluntary without an act, and this
sometimes without an outward act,
but with an interior act, for
instance, when one wills not to
act, and sometimes without even
an interior act, as when one does
not will to act.27
25st. 'thomas Aquinas~ !1!! Summa. Theologica, (ed. by Peg·is) I,
xviii, al 7o.
26~., P• I, vi, a. 4, c.
27 Ibid. , a. 3, c.
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Francis Avel.ing
Outstanding among the modern experimenters in will psychology is Dr. Aveling of the King's Col.lege Laboratory at the
University of London.

Experimenters such as Father McCarthy,

Honoria. WelLls, Stevanovic, and others conducted many researches
on will, or problems closely related to will, under his able
direction.

He himself has made several intensive studies of

will phenomena.

One of the most important of these is the

experiment on the infl.uence of volition upon thinking.

Other

influences of will had been successfully studied by Aveling's
students and co1laborators.
In a.cco·rdance with the conclusions
of Ach, whose researches upon the
will established the existence of
'determining tendencies' which follow upon volitional acts and, though
sinking beneath the conscious
threshold, tend to secure the carrying out of the Willed actiTity, we
found that other processes than those
investigated by him were influenced
in the same way. Thus, for ex&mp1e,
Saidullah showed that it was possible by willing to increase the
span of apprehension; :Messer proved
that the time of presence of one
of several alternating visual aftersensations could in a similar manner
be lengthened at the expense of the
others; and Caws showed that W•illing
to perceiTe a given symbol, exposed
tachistoscopically among a group of
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symbols too great to allow of s imulta.neous perception, increased the
likelihood of its being perceiTed.28
The purpose of Aveling's experiment was to find out the
influence of volition on three cognitive processest
cognizing of

exp~rience,

"the

the awareness of relations between the

ite•e of experience {whether cognized or merely lived) and the
production of ideal correlates.•29
The materials consisted of several groups of monochr,ome
letters and colored symbol.s drawn on slides.

A Iichotte rotary

projection tachistoscope was used for the exposure of the
sl.ides.

The slides were divided into three different series of

groups, each series containing twenty-four slides.

Within each

group, nine letters and symbols were arranged in three rows,
and in each column were three items.

'fhe content of each slide

was well beyond the perception span of all the subjects.
The effects of volition were secured by a C·omparison of
results fol.lowing two sets of instructions&

(1) Observe all

you can and record what ·you see; {2) Look far a given letter
(or symbol or relation), if it should be shown, and
that you see.

reco~rd

The same materials were presented under each set

•The I~luence of Volition up,on Thinking", The British
Journal of Psychol.ogy. General. Section, Vol.. XXII-XXIII
April., 1932, P• 324.
2 9(1931-19'33)
Ibid • , p. 325 •
28

all
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of directionij.

All the expositions were made in a darkened

room and each subject recorded his observations immediately
after every presentation.

The subject was asked to draw what

he had seen and to note all his introspections in the processes
of perceiving, holding, and recording the similarities which he
recognized. 30 The results were scored on the basis of indexes
and va.lue marks devised by the experimenter.
item, two marks were given.

For every correct

One of these was substracted if

there was an error in location or if a similarity was reported
which did not actually appear.

Besides the individual scores,

three indexes were used to obtain percentages which represented
expectation, loss due to set, and actual gain over and above
these two variabl.es.
The figures obtained showed a definite gain for the tasks
in which the subjects made a pre-vious determination to apprehend the similarities.

From these general results, Aveling

concludes that resolution has a decided positive effect upon
intellectual perception.

Relatians, similarities, and specific

items are more readily recognized if the observation has been
preceded· by will-a.cts.

While some authors have attempted to

attribute similar results to imaginal contents or preperceptive
30 Ibid., p. 32'7 •
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elements, Aveling claims that these mental factors could not
account for the recognition of relations.

Relationships were

perceived· regardless of positian or external type of figure
used.
There was a general lo·ss, however, in the entire amount of
ma..terial perceived.

The subjects themselves acco,unted for this

deviation in their introspective reports; they were unable to
retain all that they saw long enough to

rec~rd

it.

Aveling

explains this loss according to the "drainage theory" proposed
by :McDougal1.
Such loss could be explained on
the ground either of a drainage
of mental energy towards the item
for which the subject was lo·oking,
with or without drainage away in
the conation itself, or of a
drainage of energy in holding the
required item, which would result
in a speedy sinking beneath the
threshold of those items and
relations Which W!ie not relevant
to the main task.
If Aveling considers all mental energy in his "drainage theory•
as something material and measurable, his theory is inadequate
and even incongruous with the general, high caliber of his
work.

For the most part, however, Aveling's principles are

based on the essential distinction between rational. and sensory
31

Ibid., P• 329.
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processes as set forth by the scholastics.

But at times the

influences of the British materialists seem to be reflected in
certain parts of his writings.
A further interesting and significant observation was made
concerning the perception of relations.

In spite of the !"act

that several subjects apprehended only one of the given f"undaments c1early, they
relationships.

w~re

still able to perceive the correct

It is possible that in some cases the other

fundament had been perceived but not retained.

In any event,

Aveling infers that these occurrences signified the possibility
that

~a

relation

~

emerge clearly in consciousness and remain
clear in the absence of one or both of its fundaments." 32 This

point is substantiated by the experimental conditions themselves.

Some of the subjects said they were cognizant of look-

ing from one symbol to the other in order to find the
relationship.

But no eye movements were possible during the

time the slides were exposed.

Frequently, the two fundaments

were so far removed from one another that only one could possibly have been within the subject's span of perception.
Aveling demonstrates, by the results of his experiment,
that there is a noticeable positive influence of volition upon
thinking.
32

While the same relationships existed in the two

Ibid • , p • 330 •
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presentations of slides, recognition or perception of these
relationships occurred, for the most part, only when a definite
will-act had initiated the observation.
If we will to observe a given
object should it be presented
among a number of other objects,
there is a tendency fo-r the consciousness of that object to be
·enhanced and/or held in mind at
the expense of the others. If
we are looking for a given
relation, there is a greater
probability of our finding it
or, having found it~ of holding
it c1ear1y in view. 3

:B. H. Wild

Based on the hormic theory of McDougall and the principles
of cognition introduced by Spearman, E. H. Wild performed a
series of experiments to determine the inf1uences of conation
on cognition.

It will be well fir·st to understand Wild's use

of the term conation.

When he considers the effects of conation

on the cognitive processes,he is considering the effects of
attention.

JlcDougall described conation as attention; and this

is the meaning adopted by Wild. 34

Conation, effort, attention,

and mental energy are used interchangeably.
33 Ibid., p. 331.

34See a.bo;ve, Chapter I, P• BU.
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Test material. which would evoke different amounts of
conation for the given performances.and which would offer a
wide survey of cognitive processes was selected for the experiments.

The fol.lowing tasks were given:

simple cancellation,

same and opposites, sentence completion, number-checking,
multiplication, complex cancellation, inferences, and instructions.

These tests were similar to the common intelligence-

test forms and were administered to various group.s of students
both in the colleges and in the grade schools.

Some of the

groups were used to determine the influence of conation on
rate, while others were designated to find out the effects of
mental energy upon quality.

Before these group tests were per-

formed, the experiment was administered to six psychologists in
order to secure det.ailed introspections on the various kinds of
materials used.

Mathematical formulae based on Spearman's

principles were used to compute the objective data.

Correla-

tions were made between performances of the same subjects under
the two types of directions and between the average scores of
the group under the two sets of conditions.

The most signifi-

cant factor here is the method used to produce the difference
of effects--i.e., to provide for a •conative attitude• or a
•non-conative attitude.•

The whole research is naturally based

on this condition, and subjective methods of inducing the conative attitudes were employed for the purpose.

•The experimenter
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used his personal influence to induce the required attitude in
the subjects and the responsibility rested largely with the
35
subject in a voluntary adoption of the attitucle.•
In the first of these tests, simple apprehension, for the
most part, was required; and the results showed a large variation in rate and quality of conation.

The same was true in

regard to the tests on sentence completion.

In the eduction of

simp:le relations, carried on in the number·-checking exercises,
it was noticed that the variation of conation produces a corresponding variation in rate without any particular change in
the quality of the cognitive operation.

Wild describes multi-

plication as a complex reproductive process; and the effects of
conation are dependent upon the particular multiplication
exercise in question •
• • • in complex rep,roductive processes, conation is required in
proportion to the extensity of the
simultaneous cognitive operations
(retention in consciousness and
reproduction); that the possible
variation in conation is greater
if the extensity of the operations
involved is smaller; that increased
conation produces (a) an improvement
in quality with unlimited time, by
repetition of the reproductive processes for checking purposes, and
35 •Influence of Conation on Cognition" Part II, The British
.Journal of Psychology. General Section. Vol.--x'VIII ( 192'71928), .ranua.ry 1928, p. 335.
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(b) an increased rate without
change in quality under speed
conditions, by the exclusion of
all irrelevant cognitive processes to increase both speed of
reproduction and extensity of
cognition, and possibly also by
increasing the abgglute amount
of mental energy.
Sentence completion involved both the eductive and reproductive
processes, and the conation expended was in proportion to the
subject's own facility in recall and the extensity of cognition
required.

In the test on •-same and opposi tee 11 , educt ion took

place on a conceptual level.

The subjects were required by him,

first, to reproduce mentally the meanings of word-symbols, then
perceive them, then cognize the relationship existing between
the meanings.

Wild found that the eduction of relatione on the

conceptual level demanded intense cognition and,therefore,a
great deal of conation.

The same results followed the other

tests on this level, namely eamplex cancellation, inferences,
and instructions.

The extensity and intensity of cognition was

eo great in these tasks that all available mental energy was
needed for success.

Not only was it necessary to direct cona-

tional energy towards the task itself, but also towards the
elimination of all extraneous mental phenomena.

In other

words, intensive concentration was necessary in the perception
36

Ibid., PP• 344-345.
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of relations and in all other of the higher thought proceases.
Introspections obtained from the special groups of psychologists were classed as the qualitative experiments.

Wild

found that the results of these reports were of great value in
the analyses of the quantitative results.

The tests had been

divided into special groups, and the introspections testified
that the division was adequate.

Tests on simple cancellation,

factual sente-nee completion, and number-checking were judged to
require minimal conation; tests on complex cancellation,
inferences, and instructions called for a maximal output of
mental energy.

The introspective reports were evidently limited

to< a description of the amount of conational release; a description of the actual process or of other mental phenomena. experienced during the time of the test was not included.

The

emphasis in this experiment seemed to have been placed on
quantitative results,

on~

or speed of achievement, and on

the amount of material covered.
The general conclusions are much as one would expect.

An

increase in speed or in the amount of material covered demanded
a corresponding increase of conation.

However, effort did not

seem to depend on the quality of the cognitive processes.

No

more conation was required to apprehend experience than to perceive relations or to educe correlates.

In the apprehension of
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qualitative material, conation increased the intensity of the
cognition and, therefore, the efficiency of the qualitative
processes.

Likewise, when the goal (a simple task) itself

required few cognitive operations or little intensity, the
conational output was accordingly small.

The experimenter was

convinced by the results of his investigations, "that we do
strive little or greatly, according to the instincts or sentimente at work in us at the moment and the degree to which they
37
are aroused • •
In appraising an experiment of this type, it is necessary
to recall the fundamentals on which the entire work was based
and interpreted.
The basic theory on which this
investigatio:n rests is the Hermie
Theory of Action as restated by
McDougall. On this theory all
hwnan a.cti vi ty springs ultimate~
from our instincts; 'by the conative ••• force of some instinct
every train of thought ••• , is
borne along to its end. All
mental activity is therefore
purposive, it is a. teleological
process exhibiting the three
aspects--cognitive, conative, and
affective. 'Our intellect or
cognitive organization, is essentially the instrument of our purposes; it is brought into play in
the service of our desires, the
driving forces of the organism,
which 'are identical with the
37

Ibid., P• 351.
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impulses, the conative tendencies
of our instincts.' Accepting this
fundamental theory of the relation
'of conation, cognition, and
affection', an analysis of the
cognitive aspects of mental processes was found in Spea.rman's
Principles of Cognition while
the analysis of the conative
aspects was based on Avzging's
Principles of Conation.
From this quotation it is easy to see that a critical estimate
of the experiment is not an easy task.

Wild has based his

conclusions and interpretations on many diverse theories, and
it is a difficult process to separate the intricate combination
which he has formed, and to understand clearly the inference of
his conclusions.

First of all, though he claims to have accepted

Aveling's connotation of conation, in some respects his own
description does not conform with Aveling's basic concepts.
Many references throughout indicate that, for Wild, conation is
attention or at times a sort of •effortful energy"; his explicit
acceptance of McDougall's hormic theory reduces conation to a
form of instinct.

Strictly speaking, Wild's exper·iment is not

an investigation in will psychology, but rather a study of the
procees of attention.
our criticism:

This objection may be offered against

the purpose of Wild's experiment was not to

investigate influences of will, but, rather, the influence of
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conation.

While this hypothetical objection is true, there is

still another consideration to be regarded.

Many of the influ-

ences which Wild attributes to conation of a sensory kind or to
cognition are really results of volitional factors.

Perception

of relations is an intellectual process, and no amount of
instinct or sensory conation alone could evoke a rational process.

Will is intimately related to intellectual cognition.

While attention directs cognitive powers to an object, intel-.
lect and will direct attention.

In view of these remarks,

Wild's experiment, though the procedure, techniques, and methods
were carefully planned and executed; has contributed only
negatively to the psychology of will.

He ha.s shown both by

quantitative and qualitative results that cognition is influenced by attention.

But even as an investigation on attention,

we must admit many serious drawbacks in the experiment.

It

will suffice to mention one of the most fundamental of these
objections; voluntary attention is a. rational process, and, as
such,is in no sense a derivative of instinct as Wild infers when
he professedly accepts McDougall's instinct theory.

Rapha.e 1 McCarthy
Similar to the experiments of Ach in procedure and content
is the work of Father McCarthy,

s.J.

Ach's experiments had
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revealed that conflict between the determining tendency and the
associative tendency constituted an interesting and significant
part of his experiments on will..

In the period of conflict

arising from opposed motives, Ach had observed that mental
processes occurred which greatly influenced the ensuing actions.
Further experimentation was needed to find out what mental
phenomena intervened to cause the predominance of one tendency
over the other.

Father McCarthy undertook to study precisely

the conscious mental actiTities which occurred when the subject
was stimulated to perform two diverse kinds of activities at
the same time.
The methods of procedure closely resembled those of Ach.
The subjects were required to establish specific habits under
laboratory c ondi tiona.

They learned nonsense words in paired

associates until the appearance of one would immediately evoke
the other member of the pair.

While Ach had established 120

repetitions as the basis for his •associate equivalent",
McCarthy required the subjects to repeat the syllables 160
times.

A further significant modification was made:

in Ach's

experiment the subjects were instructed beforehand as to what
theywere expected to do when the stimulus appeared; McCarthy's
subjects were not aware of their particular task until after
the stimulus appeared.
tancy variable.

In this way he eliminated the expec-

The method of presentation was as follows:
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The stimuli were printed on white
cards in letters of uniform size
and shape. If they were red they
instructed the subject to rhy.me
the stimulus. If they were green,
he was to transpose the first and
last consonant (e.g. the correct
response for the word DOM, when
it appeared in green, was MOD).
When the word was printed in
black, the subject knew he had to
change the vowel (to give a response DIM, for example, to the
black DOM). A blue syllable gave
him a choice of rhyming or transposing as he wished. Before the
appearance of the stimulus, our
subjects knew neither what the
word would be, nor what they were
t 0 d 0 with it •
The subjects were previously
familiarized with the meaning of
the colore by responding to them
with a series of words not used
in the later experiments until the
Reaction Times fgg each colour were
fairly constant.
Reaction time for each response was measured as well as the
psychogalvanic reflexes.
In Ach's experiment, the false reactions of the subjects
we~e

many and were thought to indicate the strength of the

associative tendency; opposite results
expe.riments.

follo~ed

Ach had reported that hardly any of his subjects

were able to overcome the associative tendency.
39

in McCarthy's

The Measurement o:f Conation.
Press, 1926, pp.~-10.

Chicago:

Referring to

The Loyola University
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Ach's "false reactions" McCarthy says, "In our experiment this
kind of false reaction is the rarest exception.

Only once in

the first group was the associate syllable given ae the response
40
to the etimulus.•
Such contradictory results are the more
remarkable when we recall that McCarthy required even a greater
number of repetitions to establish the necessary association
which Ach had set for hie •associative equivalent."

1'he sub-

jects in McCarthy's experiment hardly ever responded to the
s.timul.us with the learned associate; when they did so:, they
described it as being dimly present in consciousness.

Finally,

a further change was made in McCarthy's experiment; unfamiliar
nonsense syllables were presented to the observers by showing
them irregularly among those already learned.

With the intro-

duction of this change in procedure arose the tendency for the
learned associates to appear.
of results obtained?

What factor explains the variety

It is evident that the direction of

attention is a guiding factor in the responses evoked by different stimuli.

Thus, proper reactions are influenced both by

the previous resolutions and by the concentration of attention
on the task to be performed.

"It seems clear that the appear-

ance or non-appearance of the associate is conditioned by the
quality or direction of attention.
40 Ibid., P• 49.

When the subject attends to
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the stimulus as a syllable, its companion syllable comes up;
when he focusses on the colour, the associate fails to emerge
.
4lL
into consc1ousness.•
Ach had claimed that success or f'ailure

to respond with the proper syllable depended upon the strength
of the will-act.

The determining tendency was able to overcome

the associative equivalent only if it was stronger than the
habit already established.

In mast of Ach's cases, the deter-

mining tendency in each of the subjects did not succeed in predaminating.

XcCarthy'e work like that of Lindworsky, Rux, and

others refuted Ach'e conclusions.

Both McCarthy and Lindworsky

believe that the guiding power in laboratory controlled tasks
such as these is attention.

Experiments such as Ach's do not

test strength of will, but, rather, give evidence that results
are dependent both upon the direction and quality of the
observer's attention.

I

Results showed that, with McCarthy's

subjects, the companion syllable was evoked if the subject
attended to the stimulus as a syllable.

When they focussed on

color, the associate failed to come into consciousness.

The

instructions had so directed the attention of the subject to
the color which was to appear and to the operation which it
signified that the previously learned associate was literally
pushed out of consciousness.
41

Ibid., P• 85.

Consequently, the associate
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syl1&ble, under the conditions of McCarthy's experiment, did
not. hinder the subjects in the performance of their tasks.
There is amp·-le evidence, both from results obtained in McCarthy's
experiments and in the very descriptions and interpretations of
the determining tendency which Ach himself had offered, that
the associative equivalent is anything but a scientific
measurement of will power as it once was claimed to be.
Other factors in McCarthy's experiment confirmed his refutation of Ach's determining tendency as a scientific measure of
will activity.

At this stage a change was introduced by means

of the following instructions:
lables of different colours.

~au

will be shown a set of

~1-

Rhyme everything you see and

react as quickly as p.ossi ble"; or "Reverse every stimulus", and
later, •change every vo•e1•. 42 These changes caused a pronounced struggle between the old tendency to react according to
the original instructions and the tendency to comply with the
new ones.

Ho:wever, from the fourth reaction on, the strength

of the habit had been weakened and the old tendency rapidly
grew less intense and was finally subdued completely.

McCarthy

pointe out the existence of two distinct will-acts under the
changed instructions:

"There was one will-act made when the

subjects accepted the new instructions.
42

Ibid., P• 92.

There was another
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distinct will-act when the two tendencies clashed; and it was
this

that was immediately responsible for the specific
reaction in the individual experiments. tt 43 In app,lying this
will-~ct

deacription to ordinary life, McCarthy is cautious in stressing
the necessity of intentional direction for any volitional
activity.

In the conflict of impulses, one may predominate

oTer the other without the exercise of volition.

Volition

enters the picture only when there is conscious preference fo·r
one or the other, or intelligent direction of energy into this
channel rather than some other.
A determining

tenden~y

such as Ach has described is pre-

ba.bly the. result of volition, but, like the many other habitual
actions which have originated from a volitional source, it ma.y
continue

t~

function in virtue of itself,

The subjects, by

voluntarily accepting the instructio:ns, set up within themselves a "determining tendency• to accomplish the given task.
But in order that the tendency may actually express itself,
other abilities are n.eeded; it is dependent, to some extent, on
the capacity to form verbal associations and the like.

The

struggle which ensues is not between will and the force ·of
association, but between two •blind" associations.

Volition

initiates the process, and the other tendencies or mental
43

.

Ib1d • , p. 97 •
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energies continue the activities so that the measurement of an
associative equivalent is only an indirect measure of

wi~l

at

the most.
KeCarthy's experiments brought to light a significant factor in the psychology of habit.

As we have seen, specific

changes were introduced during the course of the experiment in
order to break the habits. formed through repetitions of the
task.

The objective results, together with the introspectio.ns

of the subjects, showed that these well established habits were
quickly broken when attention was focussed on an antagonistic
mode of action.

Life experiences bear witness to the reliabil-

ity of these conclusions.

An over amount of attention to bad

habits only strengthens them the more.

Success in the removal

of these impediments is achieved more quickly and per.manent1y
by directing our energy and attention to some opposite activity.
Because of the interdependence of will and intellect,
will-acts require foreknowledge of an end or goal.
related to both will and intellect is attention.

Closely
Without

attention there is no cognition; without cognition there is no
willing.
ship.

Among these three powers exists an intimate relation-

It is evident that attention is always a significant

volitional factor in all human activities.

But an attempt to

measure strength of will accurately and in a quantitative way
is practically impossible.

The immateriality of will defies
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objective measurement.

The conclusions which McCarthy drew from

his experimental a.ttempts to measure conation conta.in an honest
exposition of these facts.
We began our research with the
intention of studying conational
activity with a view of measuring
it, at least in some rough way.
We must confess that we baTe not
succeeded in doing so. Our data
show that the psychoga1...anic reflex
is influenced by conation, and that
the size of the deflection bears
some proportion to the amount of
conative energy released during the
reaction. But the p;sychogalva.nie
curve is such a complicated one,
resulting frGm so many different
causes and modified by such a
variety of factors, that we do not
think it is (in the present state
of our knowledge of it) a serviceable measure of conation. In fact
our experiments have practically
convinced us that it is futile to
hope for anything like an exact
scientific measurement of conation,
especially when that conation is
intentionally directed and thus
constitutes a real act of will. 44

Honoria Wells
A Tery comprehensive experimental study of volitional con-

sciouaness was made by Honoria Wells at the psychological
44

Ibid., P• 102.
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laboratory of the UniTersity of London.
research was an ambitious oner

The purpose of her

to analyze as completely as

possible &11 the phenomena invOlTed in acts ofChoice.

Intro-

spective methods were used in the investigation and reactiontime measurements were made throughout.

The experimenter was

particularly interested in determining the influence of aff'ective states on volitional acts.

For these purposes, attention

was given to physiological factors as well as to the
processes concerned.

~nta1

Physiological concomitants of' emotion and

feelings were measured and recorded by the psychogalvonometer,
the pneumograph, and the sphygmograph.
This particular study is a significant one in the psychology of will.

Previously, a controTersy oTer the nature of' the

so called "'consciousness of action", had been in progress among
various psychologists.

Michotte and Prftm contended that the

data in their experiments demo;nstrated the existence of a. definite "consciousness of action",and that this pehonomenon was,
indubitably, of a rational nature and irreducible to sensory
elements.

Raymond Wheeler, likewise performed experiments on

choice; on the basis of :results o·bta.ined fr.om these investigations he has denied the immaterial nature of' the act of choice,
and claims that all the phenomena of choice ultimately can be
analyzed into images and sensations.

Honoria Wells, in her veey
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thorough and extensive experimentations, has verified the
reports of Michotte and

PrU..

The materials used and the procedures followed closely
resemble those of Boyd Barrett's work on
Motivation Tracks •.

~otive-force

a.nd

Several different liquids, odorless and

colorless, and varying in hedonic quality, were presented to
the subjects.

Each taste was de signa ted by a particular non-

sense syllable.

The experiment consisted of three stagesr

(1) Learning the tastes, (2) Recognition Experiments, (3)
Choice Experiments.

During the first stage the subjects

.

established a strong association between the taste of the
liquid and the nonsense syllable which was used as a symbol.
When these tasks were completed, the recognition experiments
were given.

The reaction-time for each of the associations

already formed was measured.

In this way, the reproduction

time was kept at a constant, and the experimenter thus eliminated any variable arising from temporal differences.
the choice experiments proper were administered.

Finally,

Eight liquids

were presented, two by two; and fifty-six combinations were
used.

As·UcCartby had modified Ach's technique in order to

prevent automatic responses resulting from many repeti tiona,
Wells also introduced.a change about midway through the choices
for the same reason.

How, nonsense syllabl.es, representing

unevaluated alternatives were used along with the old ones.
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The experimenter observed that the appearance of the "new
tastes• occasioned motives of curiosity, and, later on, conflicts between certainty and opinion or belief'.
The interpretation of results is practically the same as
those of 1Uchotte and Priim.

Wells ha.d asked her subjects to

•choose for a serious reason •; the subjects were then obligated
to base any and all choices on a motive-value.
deliber~tion

A process of

naturally ensued wherein the motive values were

weighed in the balance.

It was during this period tha.t "con-

sciousness of self" was preda.minant.

The self as such enters

into the realm of consciousness and directs action towards one
or the other goal;. at this point the subject is cognizant of
the self-in-action.

Like Michotte and Prilm, Wells considers

this particular awareness as the nucleus of the whole volitional process.
Reaction-time for the process of choosing depended upon
the motives whichappealed to the subjects.

If the immediate

motive did not c omp;ly with the standard of value first accepted
by the subject in the instruction, then the process was delayed
until some further means of strengthening the motive were obtained.

These motives were strengthened in many ways, and the

most important of the means used was •reference to the self".
Actually, the most frequent method of motive strengthening was
the intervention of self.

When two motives at first appeared
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equa.l or negative, the motive which was strengthened by
referral to self was the one which predominated in choice.
The consciousness of self in action was the phenomena
which caused the most serious controversy among the experimenters on choice.

Wheeler strongly contended that the con-

sciousness of willing was merely a derivative of the real basic
phenomena.

Such awareness of the self arises,first of all,from

kinaesthe-tic sensations and. images.
can

~yze

contents.

Therefore, the subjects

all volitional consciousness into these simpler
Wells vigorously apposed such an argument and

offer~

her own observations and the introspections of her subjects a.s
substantial proof' for her conclusions.

Her subjects ha.d

reported, definitely, that the consciousness of

self-in~etion

was an experience which differed essentially from any of the
muscular movements, kinaesthetic images, or visceral sensations
which they 'BJS.y have had.

While all these organic sensations
\

differed from time to time and from person to person, the eonsciousness of action was especially characterized by its
universality and intangible quality.

The subjects found dif-

ficulty in describing their "'awareness of self•, but unanimously
agreed that it was unanalyzable into sensations and feelings.
While we are entirely in agreement
with Wheeler and others who hold
that kinaesthetic and organic
sensations are always to be found
in volitional consciousness, we
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can also show that our subjects
clearly distinguished a phase in
consciousness when 'self-in-action'
became momentarily focal. Though
this immediate awareness of 'self'
was very fleeting and readily displaced again by the sensory processes, our subjects were quite
clear and insistent in emphasizing
the radically different nature of
awareness of kinaesthetic and organic sensations on the one hand,
and the consciousness of 'selfactivity' on the other. Their
reports show that they find it
possible to separate the two when
(1) consciousness of 'self-activity'
and kinaesthetic and organic phena.mena are present together in
consciousness, (2) 'self-activity'
occupies the focus to tha rela~ive
exclusion of everything else.4
While the experimenter's assertion, that "self-awareness"
in volitional activity differs entirely from sensory experiences
is well substantiated by facta, the claim that kinaesthetic and
organic sensations are always present in vo::litional consciousness is doubtful.

46

These sensory concomitants form no con-

etituent part of the will-act.

It is true that they are often

present as accompaniments, but certainly an internal act of
will such as acceptance or resolution may take place without
any corresponding
45

physi~logical

movements.

A generalization

"The Phenomenology of Acts of Choice•, The British journal of
Psychology, Monograph SupplemerLts. Vol.:-fV (1927), No. 11,--

46P• 135.

See above P• 169.
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such as Wells has made would seem to make these concomitants a
necessary, integral part of the volitional process.

However,

others like Wells, have emphasized the general presence of kinaesthetic elements in the volitional process.
During the period of d elibere.tion, when the subjects were
engaged in weighing their motives, emotional responses were
scarcely ever evident.

This particular stage in the process of

choice was characterized by its abstract nature, and was confined to a consideration of non-sensory principles.

But

wh~n

the subjects were confronted with difficult choices, or when
the motiTe in view obliged them to choose an unpleasant alternative, the forceful direction of energy into an undesirable
channel brought about physical reactions.

Vivid experiences,

such as were had· in difficult choices, were accompanied by
noticeable deflections in the psycho-galvanic recordings.
The experiment of Honoria Wells has not contributed much
in the way of original findings to those already presented by
Barrett, Michotte, and PrUm.

The modifications which she

introduced eliminated some of the variables which had proven to
be noticeable disadvantages in the other experiments on choice.
One of the chief values of her experiment is the confirmation
it offers for the

re~ults

found by Michotte and Prllm.

The

experiment performed by Wells, more scientific in detail and
execution than its predecessors, further substantiated the
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eYidence of the irreducible nature of volitional phenomena.
Wells has provided a worthy objective testimony of well established principles, and her experiment has proven to be a strong
defense against the mat'erialistic contentions of Wheeler and
others.
In our summarized account of the classic will experiments,
there is a noticeable fundamental agreement among the investigators.

Though each of these experiments was carried on inde-

pendently of the others, and oftentimes in different countries,
the results are remarkably similar.

In all of the experiments

we have described, both the experimenter and the subjects reported a special form of "self-awareness" in the volitional
process.

Inevitably, the consciousness of self was found tG be

indescribable and irreducible.

The consensus of opinion among

all these experimenters is a strong, concrete confirmation of
scholastic principles.

The v:ery objectivity of the evidence

does much to enhance theoretical principles which are characteristically abstract and, oftentimes, intangible and vague in
the eyes of modern philosophers and psychologists.

If the

experimentations h&ve done nothing else than produce objective
corroborations for the essential principles of volition, the
contribution may be considered well worthwhile.

CH..A.PTER V
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIAlS AND PROCEDURES

Fram the faregoing investigations on will, as well as from
our own scholastic concept of the nature of will, it is evident
that no direct measurement of will is possible.

However, the

effects of will acts are noticeable in everyday life.

For

example, det.ermination, or the will to achieve certain goals,
is decidedly influential in the actual attainment of such
goals.

In these cases., internal acts of will, whether they be

decisions, resolutions, or desires, actually direct the course
of a

person~s

actions.

Our problem was to devise certain situations in which we
might observe the change in mental processes following upon
certain voluntarily accepted sets of instructions.

For our

particular study, we decided to investigate changes introduced
by an

instruction~

calculated to make the subject exercise some

deliberate self-initiated control over processes of perception,
imagination,and thought.

In a study such as ours, objective

data. alone would be insufficient.

For this rea.son,we followed

the traditional procedure for obtaining introspective reports.
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Through the introspective reports of the subjects, together
with tabulation of their reactions to the given tasks, we were
able to compare the results, in the case of a natural spontaneous acceptance of the tasks, with those in the case o·f
deliberately self-initiated or volitionally directed activity.
Whereas it is obvious that some voluntariness entered bo·th sets
of performances, still, unless we wish to allow that the
instructions determined the subjects to act, the further
effects of volition or of self-directed a.cti vity by the
subjects themselves. become apparent in the second set of
experiments.
In the present chapter we will describe the materials
used and the procedures followed in our attempt to investigate
the relationship between volitional factors and other mental
acts.

In the following chapter we will present an analysis

~:f

the introspections and other responses given by the subjects.
The present experiment, therefore, proposed to obtain
objective and introspective data showing some effects of
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vali tional factors upon perception and the higher processes of
1-2
abstraction.
By a comparison of results obtained from tests
performed with an attitude of naive observation, with those
1 •Beobachtung ist eine aufmerksame, nach gewissen
Gesichtspunkten planmassig ausgefUhrte Sinneswahrnehmung.
1. Die gUnstigsten Bedingungen hat man bei willkurlichur
Beobachtung eines ruhenden Objektes. Die erste Forderung ist,
eine Zielvorstellung zu haben, sie festzuhalten und dadurch
die stetige Aufmer·ksamkeitsrichtung festzulegen. Es ist etwa.s
anderes, ob man ein Bild betrachtet, um moglichst viele
Einzelobjekte aufzahlen zu konnen, oder um es auf seinen Stil
zu erforschen. Durch die Zie1vorstellung wird die Beobachtung
einheitlich; das Wichtige wird dann zu gr5sserer Deutlichkeit
erhoben, die zur Deutung des Objektes n5tigen Vor·stellungen
werden angeregt. Gute Beobachter riihmen die Wichtigkeit der
Willensenergie fur den Erfolg. Eine methodische Beobachtung
wird dadurch begfrnstigt, dase man eine grosse Menge von
Gesichtspunkten bereit stehen hat. Dadurch unterscheidet sich
die Beobachtung des sachverstindigen von der des Laien."
Lehrbuch der experimentellen Psychologie,Zweiter Band,von
Joseph F~s, S. J. Ereiburg Im Breisgau: Herder & Co.
G.
M. B. H. Verlagsbuchha.ndlung. 1929, P• 127 ff.
2 "Schon
auf die Wahrnehmung kann der Wille einwirken, indem er
a.us ihr eine a.bsichtliche, nach bestimmten Zielen geordnete
Beobachtung macht. Besondere auff&llend ist die Beeinflussung
des Vorstellungsverlaufes, der dadurch zu einer geistigen
Arbei t, einer Phantasie-oder Denkleistung wird, im Gegensa.tZ:
zur Triumerei. Beim Traumen ist die Aufeinanderfolge der
Vorstellungen durch den Zufall bedingt, weshalb gewohnlich
kein vernunftiges Ziel erreicht wird. Beim absichtlichen
Sichbesinnen dagegen ist es Sache des Willens, die Aufgabe
vorzunehmen. Der Wille muss die Aufmerksamkeit auf die
Vorste1lungen richten, welche in der gewnnschten Linie liegen;
wir konnen una weiter·Wahrnehmungen verschaffen, welche die
Vorstellungen festhalten; laut sprechen oder lesen oder unsere
Gedanken niederschreiben. Unbeschrankt ist diese Macht uber
die Vorstellungen freilich nicht.• ~., p. 420.
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obtained after a specific task was assigned, we intend to
describe some of these effects.

We will attempt to observe

likewise how these effects differ in the case of sensory processes as compared with those of the rational processes.
Preliminary investigations were made with our materials on
twelve practice subjects in order to determine their validity
for the actual experimentations.

General Description of Experiment
For the sake of clarity, we will first give a rather broad
outline of the experiment as a whole; and then. present a
detailed .description of the materials used throughout and of
the pro.cedures followed in each experimental sitting.
All the materials used were mounted or printed, according
to the content,· upon large white cards.

These cards ranged

from 6 x 4 to 8 x.5 in size; and they were divided into four
sets.

The first set consisted of ambiguous figures; the second

set contained specially chosen stimulus words; the third set
included four kinds of similarities, namely pictures, words,
numbers, and geometrical designs; the fourth set contained
incomplete syllogisms.

All of these materials will be fully

described in a later discussion.
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These four sets of cards required four different tasks.
The first two sets, namely ambiguous figures and stimulus
words, composed the sensory data for our experiment.

While the

two latter sets, similarities and incomplete syllogisms,
provided material for rational acti Ti ties.
Since the purpose of our experiment was to obsene the
influence of volitienal factors on mental activities, it was
necessary to designate the performances of the subjects under
two headings; •involuntary" and

~voluntary•.

Let it be under-

stood from the outset that these designations do not indicate
a rigid line of demarcation between the two
tions.

~xperimental

condi-

That is to say, tasks performed in the "involuntary"

division were not assumed to be entirely lacking in volitional
activities.

These terms are used simply for purposes of con-

venience and clarity, and refer to the tasks as performed under
the two types of directions.

Thus, all four types of cards

were presented to the subjects; first, with directions proposing merely general observations, and these responses have been
indicated as "involuntary".

Secondly, the same four types of

cards were presented to the same subjects with directions which
would be expected to induce, on the part of the subject, special
voluntary activities.

We have designated this second group of

responses under the term •voluntary".
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It will be well to notice at this point that, wherever
possible, we chose new though similar tasks for the voluntary
trials.

This was done in order to prevent the subjects from

merely repeating the chain of imagery of the first task.

In

the case of ambiguous figures, however, since the task involTed
an attempt to see ambiguities, it was found that scores could
not be compared if different figures were used.
The experiment was divided into three sitting periods.

In

the first one, all four sets of the above mentioned cards were
presented along

~ith

certain directions.

These directions

&eked the subjects merely to observe the materials without
requiring them to make voluntary selections of specific factors.
In the second sitting period, the subjects were given the two
sets of cards dealing with sensory data, namely the ambiguous
figures and the stimulus words, with directiOn:! calling for
voluntary selection.

In the third sitting period, the experi-

menter presented the two sets of cards dea1ing with rational
processes, namely the similar,i ties and the incomplete syllogisms.

Along with this material,directions were also given

to induce will-acts from the subjects.
1'he experimenter decided upon three sitting periods for
several reasons.

First, at least two sittings would be needed

because the four tasks with two different instructions would
have been too fatiguing for the subjects.

Moreover, for all

the subjects, the tasks performed with naive attitude had to
precede those with instructions to "seek• etc.

Finally, in

order to preTent undue emphasis on one kind of material in
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preference to another, during strong volitional activity, this
three-part division enabled us to alternate the order of presentation.

Thus, the fourfold task with "attitude of seeking"

was alternated among all the subjects:

that is, sensory mate-

rial was preceded by rational material for half the subjects,
and followed by it for the other· half.
Since the secondary aim of the experiment was to obtain
whatever temporal differences in response might occur, a stopwatch was used to record the time of each performance.
The experiment was administered to ten subjects.

All the

subjects, including the twelve practice subjects used in the
preliminary investigations, were
level.

~ntelligent

adults of college

Subjects unacquainted with laboratory procedures and

untrained in fo,rmal logic were purposely chosen for the experiment.

Previous training in laboratory work or formal logic

would seem to prejudice the results.

Our purpose was to obtain

results which would be a rather representative sample of the
general population.

However, each subject was given simple

preliminary exercises in rep.orting introspective data to make
clear to him the type of data desired in the experiment.

OUr

results seem to show that intelligent subjects, though
untrained, are able and willing to report quite freely their
own introspections.
The length of time required for the administration of the
three parts of the experiment to each subject varied from person
to person, since some were more voluble than othem in reporting
their introspections.

However·, the experiment required at least

four and a half hours, and most of the time as much as six or ejght hours.
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Sp.ecific Description of the :Materials

A.

~he

Ambiguous Figures.

Five ambiguous fi'gures were
used; namely, Jastrow's duckFigure 1
Jastrow's Duck-Rabbit

rabbit, the Necker cube, the
Schroder staircase, the variable
star, and the Grecian urn.

The

above were chosen particularly because they provided a variety
in type of ambiguous figures, and also because they are figures
which have been used to great advantage in the many experiments
3
on fluctuations of attention.
Each figure was drawn in black
ink on a plain, white card.

B.

Ambiguous Terms.
Ten words, each capable of arousing two or more distinct

images because of ambiguous meanings, were chosen for this
3

J. p. Guilford, ~luctuatione of Attention,"~ American Journal of Peychol~' Vol. XXXVIII (1927), PP• 534-83.
R. W•. George, "The Significance of the
Ambiguous Figures and in Binocular Rivalry... 'rhe Journal of General Psycholm_, Vol.ll (1938}, PP• 39-61.
E. L. H. Porter, ~actors in the Fluctuation of Fifteen Ambiguous Phenamena.•
~Psychological Record, Vo~. II (1938),
PP• 231-53.

Figure 2
The Grecian Urn

209

task.

Care was taken in the

selection of these words so that
the distinct

n~anings

attached

to each might be of the same
category.
Figure 3
The Variable Star

For example, terms

which, in their double meanings,
commonly partake of both a noun

and verbal character, were mostly avoided, such as jam, lock,
bridge, etc.

The following words were used:

Part I (Involuntary):
Part II (Voluntary) t

glass, horn, joint, bond, corn.
trunk, cord, star, front, yard.

Each ward was printed in large letters on a separate, plain,
white card.

c.

Similarities.
This test was subdivided into four different parts, each

part representing a certain type of similarity.
(1)

~he

first type consisted

of a series of eight pictures mounted
on white cards, four of which belonged
to the same specific category.

Same

of these pictures represented objects
(animals, cutlery, insects, tools,
etc.); others represented Tarious

Figure 4
The Necker Cube
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activities (feeding birds,
walking, swimming, etc.}

All

the pictures used for this
task were taken from The
Meyers Mental Measure Form
Figure 5
The Schroder Staircase

No. 2.
(2)

Each of the verbal

cards contained eight words,
four of which were more similar than the others.

The verbal

similarities included the following sets of words:
Part I (Involuntary)
1.

boat, sail, motorcycle, move, horse,
row, track, train.

2.

round, ellipse, lines, triangle, draw,
cube, square, circle.

3.

razor, chop, shave, beard, knife, wood,
whittle, shear.

Part II (Voluntary)
1.

Street, speech, send, mail, pole,
messenger, hurry, telephone.

2.

fork, plate, spoon, cup, table, eat,
saucer, bowl.

3.

mean, bribe, smuggle, take, steal,
beg, lie, bad.
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(3)

The third set of cards in the similarities group

consisted of eight numbers on each card.
numbers belonged to a specific class.

Four of these

The number cards were

arranged as follows:
Part I ( Inv,o1unt ary )
1.

9

4

8

7

18

12

5

13

2.

23

7

53

5

103

9

24

43

3.

15

?

23

8

24

4

11

6

Part II (Voluntary)

(4)

1.

4

9

24

6

17

8

16

18

2.

8

63

17

81

29

18

46

45

3.

3

7

16

5

13

21

8

15

On each of the fourth set of cards was mounted a

series of eight geometrical figures; and,again, four of these
were more similar than the others.

All the geometrical figures

used in this exercise were taken from the Otis Group Intelligence Scale:

D.

Advanced Examination, Form A and Form B.

Logical Propositions.
Each of the cards used for this test contained the two

premises, maj r:rr_~ and minor, of a logical syllogism.

These

statements were chosen so as to represent the four main types
of propositions:

namely, universal affirmative, universal
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negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative.

Two

of the cards contained false premises, but the form of all of
them was correct.

The following statements were used:

Part I (Involuntary)
1.

All fruits are sweet
Spinach is not sweet

2.

Some mushrooms are po;isonous
All mushrooms are plants

3.

No cow has wings
All sparrows have wings

4.

Some trees never decay
All trees belong to plant life

Part II (Voluntary)
1.

All anima.JLe have fur·
A negro has no fur

2.

Some carnations are white
All carnations are flowers

3.

No angel has a body
All monkeys have bodies

4.

Some dogs have no feet
All dogs &re animals
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ne Procedure and Instructions
In order to make the introspections thorough, the observations were broken up into three distinct periods ordinarily
used in introspective reports:
period, and an after period.

namel.y, a fo.re period, main
Failure to thus divide observe.-

tiona have, in past f!xperiments, accounted for failure to
recount effects of volition.
Some of the earliest experimental
studies of voluntary activity
. failed to produce evidence for
the existence of will, so far as·
the immediate observations were
concerned.
Subsequent analysis of the
problem rev~a.led the source of
difficulty 'in a. fallacy that is
surprisingly common among psychologists even today. 'Experimental
conditions, it appeared, were such
as to exclude the will-act from
observation altogether, since vo1ition occurred when the subjects
accepted the proposed tasks before
observations were begun. Thus, in
order to investigate this aspect of
behavior and experience, it is
necessary to :fractionate observations, including a fore period as
well as the main and after periods. 4

4rrancis L. Harmon, Principles ,9£ Psycholosy.
Bruce Publishing Company, 1943, p. 499.

Jlilwaukee:

The
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Experimental Sitting I
Sensory a.nd

Rationa~

Process.es--Involuntary

Three simple preliminary exercises were giTen to the subject in order to clarify for him what the experimenter meant by
•introspective reports•.
card with a

co~ored

For the first exercise he was given &

design on it.

The experimenter, by means

of questions, endeavored to make the subject report his impressions, reactions, images, thoughts, physical feelings, sensations, etc.

The subject was also asked questions concerning

his impressions before and after the presentation.
In the second exercise, the experimenter presented a card
with a simple statement on it; and the same procedure followed.
In the third exercise, the subject was asked to close his
eyes, and the experimenter gave him an object to feel.

The

subject was asked again to report all introspective data.
After these exercises, the subjects seemed to understand
mo·re clearly the type of information required of him.
The subjects were then asked to iisten carefully to the
following general instructions:
I have a number of cards here
which contain different types of
material.. When I present them
to you, look at them and observe
an you can. As you look a.t the
cards, report a]oud the progress
of your thoughts. Tell all your

215

impressions and reactions to
these cards. The principal
purpose in this experiment is
the observation of your own
mental experiences rather than
the attainment of any specific
answers. When you have completed
each card, I will ask you to tell
me all the introspections you can
remember. I want you to tell me
as much as you can about your own
impressions before each card is
presented, during your observation
of the cards and after you have
finished· ea.ch card. Remember to·
report aloud while you are examining the cards.
These instructions were read as often as was necessary,
and any further questions of the subjects were answered.

It

was made clear to the subject that these instructions applied
to all the material given in this sitting.

Before each set of

materials was presented, specific instruction for each set was
al.so given.
(1)

The first test administered was the one using a.mbig-

uous figures.

The instructions were as follows:
On each of these cards a figure
has been drawn. While looking
at them you may observe that they
shift posi tiona. Do not attemp.t
to control these changes, but keep
a passive attitude. When I aay
•ready", look at the picture,
fixate on the dot, and report any
fluctuations that occur; and do
so until I say •stop". After each
you wil.l be asked to report further
observations you have made. Retain
a passive attitude throughout the
experiment.
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These directions were modeled on those given by Guilford
and Braly in their experiment.

Their purpose, likewise, was to

eliminate, in so far as was possible, specific volitional
factors.

5

The subject was permitted to observe each card for one
minute.

The time was limited and made the same for each so as

to permit more accurate comparison of results.

The experimenter

recorded the number of shifts as indicated by the subject.
(2)

Before presentation of the next set of cards, the

following instructions were given:
Each one of these cards has a
word printed on it. When I show
it to you, I want you to report
whatever images happen to come to
your mind.
No time limit was set for this test, but the time usedfor
each observation was recorded by means of a stop-watch.
(3)

The similarities were presented next, accompanied by

the following instructions:
These cards contain different
types of material. I want you
to look at them and observe all
you can; tell me all about them
while you are observing. When
you have finished,put the card
aside and we will go on to the
next one. Keep in mind that I
5 J. p. Guilfo,rd and K. W. Braly, "An Experimental Test of
McDougall •s n.eory of Introversion-Extroversion." The Journal
!!.:£ Abnormal ~ Social. Psychology, Vol. m (1930), PP• 382-89.

21'7

want you to describe your own
reactie>ns as well as the cards
before you.
Two cards of each type were,given to the aubject and the time
used for each observation wae likewise recorded.
(4)

The fourth test was the one on logical p,ropositions:
Here are some statements which I
want you to read. When you have
read them, tell me what you think
about them. I am particularly
interested to know your own thoughts
and impressions about each card.

In this test the time was recorded not only for the observation
in general, but al..so in regard to length of time taken to
arrive at a conclusion, if one was made.

Experimental Sitting II
Sensory Pro;eesses--Vol.untary
Dr. Aveling, in his experiments on the •Influence o.f Volition on Thinking", found that when a subject was to]d to· l.ook
for a given object or relation he would have to exert his volitional

pW~ers

in order to accomplish the task.

On the other

hand, instructions which required the subject merely to observe
the material before him did not have such results.
6

-

~British

6

Jour.nal of Psychology, Vol. XXII-XXIII (1931-1933)
April 1932, P• 32'7.
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In our experiments, we alf!:!O made uee of this di:t;:f'erentiation.

The general instructions regarding introspections

were much the same as those used for the previous experiment.
In the special instructions preceding each test, the subject
was now required to perform a specific operation or to l2..Q.!

!2!:

a definite relationship.
Procedure
The subject was again comfortably seated at the table.
The experimenter, by means of his instructions, endeavored tOJ
induce the subject to do his very best.

While in the previous

experiment the subject was asked merely to give his impression
on the cards presented to him, in this experiment he was told,
definitely, to seek for a certain type of objective.

In doing

so, we hoped to evoke in the subject an attitude of deter.mination.

The subject was encouraged to try as much as possibLe to

do well in performing the given tasks.

The fallowing general

instructions were given to the subjectt
In this experiment, I am going to
present to you cards similar to
the ones you had before. Again,
I want you_to observe as carefully
as possible your own mental experiences. Report a].oud the progress
of your thoughts, and after you
have completed the task I will ask
you to tell any further introspections that you can remember.
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A.

The Ambiguous Figures.
Now I am going to present to you
the ambiguous figures. This time,
however, I want you to try to
shift the figure to different
p,osi tiona, back and forth, as
fast as you can. Fixate on the
dot and report each shift by
saying "now, now", etc. I will
give you a trial on each of the
different figures and record the
number of shifts for each. After
every trial I will ask you to
describe your experiences.

Each one of the figures was presented in turn,' and the rate of
oscillation for one minute was recorded.

Immediately after-

wards, the subject was asked to repo,rt his introspections.
After a suitable rest period was had, the subject was given
Part II of this experiment.

The instructions were as follows:

Each of these cards ha.s one word
printed on it, words similar to
the ones you saw in the last test.
This time I w.ant to see how many
different kinds of things you can
picture to yourself when you see
each one. Try to do your very
best. Remember also to observe
all. your mental experiences during
this task.
As in all the other tests, the subject was asked to report his
introspections before, during, and after the presentation of
the cards.
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Experimental Sitting III
Rational

Processes--Vo~untar.y

In this final series of tests,. the same type of material
was used for the rational pr-ocesses as in the first experiment.
However, the instructions were entirely different.
the subject was asked to

~ ~

This time

the similarities in the

pictures, words, numbers, and geometrical figures, and to draw
a conclusion from the logical propositions.

The subject was

asked to direct his mind toward the achievement of a specific
goal, and the experimenter encouraged him to do as well as
possible.

The instructions for the similarities were as

follows:
I have four different_ kinds o-f
cards here. In each of the cards
I want you to look for a definite
similarity. :For exa.mpl.e, among
the series of pictures you will
find several which are more al.ike
than all the rest. Look and see
which ones they are. Try to do
your very best. Remember to
rep-o:rt al.oud the pro.gress of
your thoughts. After you have
finished, put the card aside and
we will go on to the next one.
The experimenter then presented three cards of each typ-e:
namely, pictures, words, numbers, and geometrical figures.
After each, the subject was asked to report further intro-
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specti one.

By means of a stop-watch we r,ecord ed the time taken.

to find the relationship.
After a sufficient rest period had been provided, the
subject was given the instructions for the logicai propositions.
There are two statements on each
of these cards. I want you to
read them carefully, and then
tell me what conclusion you would
draw from such statements.
Remember to report your introspections.
By directLy asking the subject to look for a conclusion, the
experimenter deliberately introduces the volitional element
into the test.

Dr. Moore reminds us, and we agree, that draw-

ing a conclusion sometimes depends on the will to do so.
"Wilhelm found that when subjects are presented with twa
premises and they are told merely to read and understand them,
they do not necessarily draw a conclusion.

Drawing a conclusion, therefore, depends on the will to do so. • 7

7
cognitive Psychology. Chicago and New York:
Company, 1939, p. 378.

J. B. Lippincott

CHA:PrER VI
INTROSPECTIVE ANALYSES AND CONCIIJSIONS

Interest in the influence of wil1 on the thought processes
has been prevalent in the works of most great philosophers.
Aristotle, and more especially St. !fhomas Aquinas, devoted many
dissertations to this widely discussed to"pic.

It is a well

established metaphysical principle that volitional factors often
inf1uence thought.

Again,

therefore~

let it be ciearly under-

stood that the purpose of our experimental investigation was
neither to question this principle nor to prove it.

We have

merely attempted to describe more fully the manner in which
these volitional effects are manifested in both the sensory
processes and in the higher thought processes.
As we stated above in the description of our experimental
procedures, we endeavored to reveal. the effects of volitional
factors principally by means of our directions.

While the

first set of cards was presented in such a way as to evoke
general observations, the second part of the experiment was
given with directions specifically designated to induce
voluntary activities.

One of the.cardinal principles of
222
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Thomistic psychology is the essential unity of man's
nature.

hylomor~

st. Thomas repeatedly insists that it is-impossible,

at any time, to observe a single human process in an isolated
fashion.

In the most insignificant of human operations, as

well as in the most complicated processee of thought, the whole
man is concerned.

However, it is evident that while man as a

whole is involved in each of hie activities, at times, one
process may dominate the pattern of hie actions.

We do not

assume, then, that volitional factors were totally lacking in
the first part of our experiment.

On the contrary, we maintain

that the very acceptance of the task is a volitional act.

In

both parte of our experiment, volition, in the form of acceptance of the task, is present.

We might state our purpose more

definitively by saying that we attempted to discover, under
controlled conditions, the qualitative aspects of the processes
of perception and of abstraction, when volitional factors
dominated the pattern of these activities.
In the first stage of our experiment, the reactions of the
subjects were principally passive, i.e., after the task was
accepted they made no positive attempts to discover· any particular aspect of the stimulus.

They observed the

materia~

in

front of them, reported numerous associations, images, etc.
However, when the same subjects were instructed to observe
certain features of the stimulus cards, both on the sensory
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level and on the intellectual, a positive dynamic element
operated which evidently was not present in the previous stage
of the experiment.

In the first part, the external stimulus

largely occupied the attention of the subject; but in the
second part, his reactions were clearly stimulated by energies
originating in the person himself.
For the sake of clarity, we will discuss each section of
the experiment separately, before making general comparisons
and conclusions.
A.

The Ambiguous Figures, Spontaneously and Voluntarily Shifted.
The most outstanding objective difference between the two

reactions to the ambiguous figures was the rate of shift; and
this proved to be a very noticeable one.

While the subjects

sometimes failed to see any change of position whatso:ever when
they were asked to maintain a passive attitude, they frequently
obtained a very high rate of shift when they were induced to do
so voluntarily.

Table I shows the rate of shift for one minute

under the two types of conditions.
Besides the vo,litiona.J. effects on rate of shift, there
were others which concerned the type of shift observed.

'fhe

oscillations noticed by the subjects in the first test consisted, for the most part, in two or three positions commonly
observed in a random observation.

In the second part of the
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Table I
Ra.te of Involuntary and Voluntary
Shifts on the Ambiguous Figures

Subjects

DuckRabbit
Inv. Vo~.

Grecian
Urn
Inv. Vol..

Variable
Star
Inv. Vol..

Necker
Cube
Inv. Vol.

Schroder
Staircase
Inv. Vol.

K.

c.

0

42

0

14

5

51

3

28

3

35

s.

R.

6

67

11

56

7

30

5

12

6

9

R. L.

0

0

l

74

3

37

5

9

3

2'1

A. D.

0

20

0

29

2

21

4

7

0

19

s.

L.

0

3

0

24

6

16

7

18
.

6

17

I. B.

0

6'1

0

24

4

80

2

4'1

3

52

}[.

H.

0

40

0

34

5

2'1

3

'1

2

43

P.

0

14

2

22

6

20

3

16

0

10

D.

c.
s.

2

7

4

10

6

25

4

10

4

11

s.

A.

0

4'7

4

44

3

33

4

22

3

19

experiment, when they definiteliy put forth volitional effort
to increase their rate of speed, the subjects also increased
the variability in the kind of shifts observed.

The fol1owing

are introspections of the same subject on the variable star
figure.
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Involuntary: •this is some kind
of e. floor pattern or ceiling ·
pattern. It 1ooks just like the
one we have in Church. Looks like
drawings I haTe seen, too. Sometimes it looks like it might be a
pile of blocks--just now they
shifted their position.•
Voluntary: ~ere were various
positions of b1ocks; first they
seemed to be at the left, then
they shifted to the right. Then
again, it looked like a star;
then in all different positions
of diamond shaped figures. Sometimes it seemed to fold up and
then assumed the position of f1&t
shaped diamonds; then back to the
blocks again."
Hence, when the mind of the subject was directed to a more
specific task, he was able to narrow his field of operation;
consequently, he obtained a. quite different result.

In the

absence of this directing influence, im&ges were abundant in
-the reports of the subjects; but they were o.f a. type which
interfered with the varied perception of the stimulus before
them.

When vo1untary effort was lacking, the figures served

more as stimuli for recall of other incidents, experiences,
objects, etc., which were irre1evant to the present task.
In a previous work on voluntary shift of attention with
ambiguous figures, it was found that persons who showed a high
rate of vo1untary shift were those who had a corresponding wide
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span of perception.

1

In our present experiment) we are con-

cerned only with these relationships within the indiTidual himself.

However, if the ability to shift a figure rapidly is

dependent upon span of perception, may we not say also, since
great differentiations of speed were evident in each individual
under differing conditions, that voluntary effort itself,
within limits, increases the span of perception for each individual.

A mere volition is not able to increase the natiTe

capacity .for breadth of perception with which the indiTidual is
endowed, but there is evidence that volitional factors tend to
actualize the existing potentialities.

The same

c~pacity

for

shifting these figures was present in both parts of the experiment.

However, under the influence of voluntary effort exerted

in the second part of this test, the subjects were activated to
perform far more efficiently;. they perceived details and
attained rates of speed, which, under a passive attitude,
remained unknown to them.

In some cases, the will to see,a1ong

with the added effort induced by the instructions, brought
about the perception of a figure. which the subject had missed
completely in the previous test.
with J&strow's Duck-Rabbit figure.

This was especially the case
Eight out of ten subjects

lsister )[aria.n DalLores, I!l!. Relationship Between Span !!!.
Perception~· Volluntary Shift of Attention.
){asters Thesis,
Loyola University, 1944.
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were unable to see the rabbit position in Test I, while in
Test II, all but one subject perceived both the duck and the
rabbit •.
The Limitations of volitional influence were manifested in
the reports of the subjects when they complained of their
failure to shift as rapidly as they desired.

At times

t~ey

found themselves helpless in spite of their greatest attempts.
On such occasions, expressions of dissatisfaction and of

irritation were numerous.

The faJLlowing are examples o.f these

experiences.

"I just felt like pushing it and
was provoked because it wouldn't
go faster.•
"I didn't think this was working
fast enough. ETen when I think
hard I couldn't make it go as
fast as I wanted it to.•

"bice I seemed to have a frustrated feeling. I cOluldn • t :make
it go back when I wanted it to
go.•
~en I saw how different the
shifts could be, I tried hard
to see now many possible kinds
there would be. I fel-t like
pushing it, yet I JLooked only
at the dot.•

•Took me a long time to change
from the diamonds to find the
cubes. I couldn't get rid of
the diamonds and it bothered me
because I couldn't find the
cubes ~ickly enough."
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fifteen different occasions, feelings of irritation and

dissatisfaction were displ.ayed by the subjects in their
attempts to shift the ambiguous figures.
While the stimulus itself and the faculty of perception
are indispensable in a task of the kind just described, we h&ve
much evidence that vo:.litional factors, because of their directive p.owers and energizing capacities, equip the subject with
the determination needed to evoke the latent responses within
him, which otherwise remain dormant.

When volitional :!act ora

dominate the process of perception, not only is the field of
perception enlarged, but the time required to perceive the
stimulus is greatly lessened.

In both parts of the test, the

subjects were aware that the figures shifted; yet only when
vol.itional factors were introduced were they able to shift the
figures quickly or to perceive the many different kinds of
posit ions in each ease.
B.

Ambiguous Words.
The particular words used for this test were chosen

because, in our preliminary work, they were found to be words
which tended to· arouse many different kinds of images in the
observer.

In the test requiring general observation only, the

reports of the subjects were characterized by typical. free
associations and revery.

The stimul.us word at once evoked some
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familiar experience, and from there on the images which occurred
followed from one association to the other.
numerous but unrelated for the most part.

The images were

While the sum total

of the images reported often reached a large number for each
individual, perhaps not more than one or two of these images
actually were related to the stimulus word itself.

The fellow-

ing introspections are typical responses to the stimulus words
in the first part of the test on ambiguous words.
Glass 1

"G]a.ss makes me think of the
glass that was broken just
today. J4y sister put her knee
through the book case; and the
broken pieces were all over and
we were all picking them up.
When my brother came the last
time, his glasses were broken
and he had them taped together.
I wonder when he will come
again. Xaybe the folks will
drive down to see me. I haven't
heard from him for a long time.
J4y brother is going to New York
to attend Cornell. He usee to
read boJoks in the moonlight and
practically ruined his eyes. He
broke his glasses so often. He
has bad eyes and hardly made the
army--he couldn't be a. pilot.•

Carnr

•I can see lots of corn growing
in fields; it's about three feet
high now. I am recalling the day
we saw those fields after a big
rain. 1'hey were flooded with
water and the green against the
blue sky was beautiful. In the
movie, •Adventure•, the fellow~
and girl stale some chickens and
ran through the cornfields and
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they got away from the far.mer
who ha.d a gun. Those far.ms
around the lake were certainly
beautiful ones.•
~l

"'Little boy blue come bl.ow your
horn•. We had a. play; and a
little neighbor boy was boy blue
and had a cute blue suit. The
little girl was 'Mary quite
contr.&rY'• A bunch of little
girls were the flowers in the
garden, and li ttl.e boy blue had
a horn, a little brass one.
'The pretty maids all in a row'
sang and I can just hear the tune
they sang. I am going through
all the parte of the play. I
know a girl ~ed Carol Horne,
but her name has an e on the end
of it. She doesn't do eo well
in school, neither does another
little boy I know. •

In the second part of the. test, the subjects were asked to
try to evo,ke as many different kinds of images as they could
when they were given each word.

Here, each subject himself was

engaged in activel.y performing the task, and was not merely
assuming a passiTe attitude to-ward the stimulus in front o.f
him.

Previously, the cognitive and a.ssociati ve processes had

dominated hie field of activity; now the subject. striving to
accomplish his task well, experienced some order in these
activities.

As a result, the images which occurred, numero:us

as they were, formed an entirely different pattern of response.
The subject did not relate incidents or recall associations,
but set out to search for all possibl.e typ,es of images related
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to the stimulus word.

Consequently, his introspective reports

were given in the for.m of enumerations, reflecting the directive and organizing powers of volition.
were

~de,

If other associations

they were brief in duration and the subject quickly

endeavored to switch his powers of imagery to a more related
field.

Although no time limit was set in either test, a great

diff"erence existed in the amount of time used for perlormanees.
The subject, in Part I, leisurely recalled and related the
imagery which £"lowed through his mind in the form of free
associations.

However, in Part II, the subjects earnestly

endeavored to report as quickly and as briefly as
images which they experienced.

po.ssib~e

the

While the introspections of the

first test were almost entire]y lacking in manifestations of
striving, those of the second test always revealed the Tolitional factors actua]ly at work.

Introspections from the

vol.untary tests:
Start

"Stars so bright over the lake,
movie star, 'star boarder', star
costume, artificial stars, 'When
you wish upon a star', star eyes-that's all I can see, there should
be more but I can't 'catch' them.
Sometimes when I try bard, things
seem to blur a bit and then stop
coming. I wish I could get more."

Cord t

•A string, a. viol.in 'chord',
cord in the nerves,_ a spinal
cord. I can see all kinds of
string for packages, shoe laces
are cords, a.nd a. scissors'
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c o rd, electric wires are called
cords, a silk cord on a lampshade.
I am trying to see if there are
cords in any other class except
in the line of strings, but I
guess not. Perhaps I can get
more if I try , though. I know
I've heard of another cord, but
I can't seem to see any others."
Stare

"Star on a cow's forehead for a
brand mark, star in the sky, star
over the crib, movie star, Starfish--kind of pinkish tan colLor,
mo,rning star, 'see stars' when
you are hit on the head, a star
pupil. Trying to see other kinds
of stars. Let's see now, the
'Star', a name of a newspaper-there should be others. I can
see a store named, 'The Star'.
Guess that's all I can get though
I a.m still trying to see others."

The ta.tal number of images reported in the test performed
under the influence of volitional factors was not much greater
than the total.. number· obtained in Part I.

However, the chief

differentiation occurred in the number of "associate" images;
i.e~,

those images immediately relevant to the stimulus word.

TablLe II shows the contrast existing between the two tests and
the

di~ferences

in number of unrelated images as campared with
'

"associate" images under the two sets of dir·ections.

Table II

also reveals the high positive correlation between the two t·ypes
of images in the voluntary and invo·luntary tests.

The number

of associate images is low for a]l words in the involuntary
tests and high for the volluntary ones.

The rand om images

Table II
Scores for "Associate" Dnages (A) and Random ~ages (R)
in the Involuntary and Voluntary Tests

lw...,..~.

Gl8S8·

Jo:_nt

Invol ·
Bond

r... +..,

Corn

Hor-n

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

R

A

v.llnntarv
I"'"'

Ya:•d

.1.

Fr.)nt

St!lr

Co~d

R

A

R A

R

A

R

A

~

A

ft'ft.fo.J:a'l

Subjects

K.

c.

13

5

8

2

12

2

9

4

10

4

69

2

8

0

5

2

7

1

7

1

6

39

s.

R.

11

3

3

2

7

2

11

2

7

2

60

2

6

2

6

1

8

0

16

3

7

51

R. L.

16

3

5

3

13

2

14

3

11

2

82

4

6

1

5

2

11

0

15

0

12

56

A. D.

7

3

5

2

5

'4

6

1

7

2

42

0

5

2

5

1

6

1

9

0

7

36

L.

13

2

7

1

8

1

10

2

11

2

57

1

7

0

5

1

8

0

4

0

6

32

I. B.

11

0

1

2

11

1

16

3

10

1

66

2

7

2

5

2

8

0

8

0

4

38

M. H.

2

2

3

2

4

2

7

2

·6

2

32

3

7

2

3

1

5

0

6

2

7

36

P.

c.

12

4

0

2

11

2

5

3

11

1

61

3

6

1

2

2

7

0

7

1

7

36

D.

s.

11

1

0

2

11

2

9

2-

10

2

60

2

4

2.

5

0

6

0

5

3

3

30

S. A.

9

3

7

1

13

2

11

2

9

3

70

0

9

2

8

1

8

0

14

0

8

50

s.

Ave. R. lo.?
Ave. A.
2.6

~.9

9.5
;1..9

Ave. R. Involuntary
Ave. R. Voluntary

1.9

9.2

9.8

2A

2.0
- 7.7
- 1.1

2J.

1.4
6.5

1.3

4.9

tw

0.2
7.4

Ave. A. Involuntary
Ave. A. Voluntary

9.l

6.7

- 2.2
- 6.9
I

Total Ave. Involuntary - 12.0

Total Ave. Voluntary - 8.1
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scored high in all words in the involuntary tests and low in
the voluntary tests.

These figures show that the effects of

volitional factors were consistent for all the given stimulus
words.

When volitional factors predominated, the associate

images likewise predominated; when they did not, the random
images greatly outweighed the associate images in

number~

From these results it would seem that volitional factors
tend to produce a twofold effect.

While they direct the search

for imagery related to the stimulus, at the same time, they
exclude images which are only remotely concerned with the presented word.

The directive activity of volition itself

operates in such a way as to suppress the many free associations which occur at random under other circumstances.
Volitional factors a1so seem to make the subjects more
conscious of the time element.

In Part I, the subjects,in

general., made no attempts t.o perform quickly, nor were they
concerned about the amount of time it took for them to report
their introspections.

In the second part of this test, they

became keenly aware of the time which elapsed between their
responses.

Though the directions did not include any reference

to time, the subjects often mentioned their desire to evoke
and enumerate the images quickly.

The subjects usually became

quite concerned if they could report only one or two images
successively.

All diligently tried to produce the different
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images as rapidly as possible, and noticeably rejected other
interfering images which came to their minds.

c.

Similarities.
Four types of similarities were selected:

pictures, and geometric designs.

numbers, words,

This material was chosen for

the purpose of evoking thought processes of a relational
nature.

Actually, however, the introspectiTe reports in the

involuntary tests show that a great deal of free association
imagery accompanied the relational thinking.

Though the sub-

jects described freely the imagery which occurred, they seemed
to be aware that these particular carda contained sa.mething
more than concrete objects.

This "awareness• was completely

lacking in the reactions to the sensory materia1.

This factor

would seem to indicate that the subjects perceived a difference
between the sensory material and the similarities, even though,
in most instances, they gained insight and perceived relationships only in the voluntary test on similarities.

The follow-

ing introspections illustrate this •awareness" of the subjects.
Involuntary
Geametrical designs& "No. 1 and
2 are in different positions; all
look alike. They are angular and
look like packages. One is like
a mirror. I feel there should be
more, but I simply don't know what
it could be .•
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Numbers: "I like to combine
numbers; is there any special
order here or what? Every 13
years I'm lucky and win something. I won a car and the
gas stove in our kitchen. Some
of these numbers have a common
denominator. I'm coaching some
children in arithmetic. I am
wondering about that card and
what the purpose of it is-there is one but I am afraid
I missed it."
Wordst "I can see the shavings
of wood because I saw the words
whittle and wood. Razor and
knife remind me of shaving a
beard. There is not much that
goes with shear. I'm thinking
of the time when I used to whittle
wood and m&ke daggers. I suppose
I could think of all kinds of
experiences I've had with these
things. I just have a feeling
of incompletion; and that if
this is all there is to these
things there should be more. I
feel like something is sort of
sllipping from me--just as if I
just about had something but
didn't quite get it. Something
else is here, I don't know what.•
Similar manifestations were made in thirty-nine other introspective reports on the similarities.
It is interesting to note that, while these subjec'ts
expressed their assurance of a missing element, they made no
actual effort to find or to look for the missing connection.
In the voluntary tests, these same subjects diligently applied
themselves in seeking out the most fundamental similarity
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contained in each card.

As a result many of them achieved a

high "insight score"; while in the involuntary tests, the subjects made no score at all.

Does this means to say tliat intel-

lectual insight is entirely dependent on will?

Decidedly not.

But in our experiments, results seem to indicate that intellectual insight, necessary for the.perception of the most
fundamental relationships in our similarity tests, was lacking
when volitional factors were in the background.

The introspec-

tions contribute a description of mental ope:r:atio:ns of the
subjects, when reacting to similar stimuli in different situa.tions:

first, when volitional factors are in the background;

secondly, when volitional factors predominate.

It would seem

that while intellect is active in both cases, the completion of
the task was accomplished only when added effort and motives
were operating.

Similan· instances occur in everyday experience.

Moreover, it would seem that in the forming of human character,
the power of intellectual processes does not suffice; over and
above knowledge, there is the necessity for the exercise of
will.

Though intellectual capcity is always present and is more

nr less unchanging, there is a certain dependence of intellect
upon will for the achievement of full knowledge.

In our tests,

the actual selection or the acceptance of a perceiTed relationship seemed to occur only when volitional factors dominated the
picture.
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In the similarities, one of the most conspicuous effects
of volitional factors was the dispersion of images.

Intro-

spections from the involuntary tests contained numerous images,
while t4ose from the voluntary tests were often entirely lacking in imagery·.

When images did occur in the latter tests, the

subjects often described them as fleeting or fragmentary; thes.e
images also were more intimately connected with the materiai
presented than the images reported in the first tests.

Acts of

striving, of looking for, of trying, so engrossed the subjects,
that, for the most part, images were unable to gain entrance
into consciousness.

'!'he more volitional facto:rs predominated,

the fewer were the conscious images which occurred.
Words
I Involuntary' "'!'here should be
some order here. That word
should be ship, not bo-at; navy
people say ship. I am imagining
myself on a trip"to Europe.
Horse, track, and train remind
me of my Father. He worked for
the railroad. There were eight
pictures on those other cards,
and now there are eight words
on each card. I wonder why. I
am wondering what the purpose of
all this is. The word, sail,
reminds me of the trip I want to
take. I have images of a ship
on the ocean, a big steamship-! can see the deck chains, and
now the docks with people thronging around • "
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Voluntary: "Speech, messenger,
telephone are all means of
communication. Send and hurry
are connected with them, but in
a different way. I got that o·ne
immediately. I could see it as
soon as I tried. I like words
better than pictures or figures.•

mai~,

II

Involunta;y: •These all have something to do with drawing. I had
a lot of these figures in Art,
especially in perspectiTe. I
have an image of my teacher, a
B.V.M. nun, also the girls. I
can see the colored pencils, our
easels, and some of the pictures
I drew. I have a notion that
there is more to these words
than I am saying. Maybe I should
do moreo"
Voluntacyr •These are all connected; they are implements for
eating. Plate, cup, saucer, and
bowl are all more alike because
they are dishes. I choose these
as being most a]ike because they
are all made of the same stuff.
I started immediately to look
for connections. Rarely do I
think of any of these objects
in a concrete fashion. I have
a desire to do more of these.
HaTe feelings of satisfaction.
Just now, the dishes reminded
me of our table at home all set."

Four types of similarities were presented to the subjects
and each type included three cards.

The subjects could achieve

a. p·ossible score of 3 in each set of analogies if they per-

ceiTed the correct relationship in each card.

Table III
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illustrates the differentiations of results under the two sets
of directions.
The results seem to show that volitional factors aid in
the perception of relationships in the type of similarities we
used.

The directions in the second part of the experiment

prop:osed a more specific objectiTe than those in the first; the
second set of directions incited volitional factors.

Since our

purpose was precisely to induce greater voluntary effort in the
second part, we think that the perception of the relations was,
at least in part, attributable to volition.
scores" were not obtained.

Perfect •insight

This might be because, while voli-

tional factors are influential in actualizing the present
potentialities, they are powerless to exceed the capacity of a
given person.

In the involuntary testa, the subjects often

made comparisons, gave descriptions of the stimuli, recognized
certain values, categorized in a more superficial manner; yet
\

arrived at no specific conclusion.

When volitional factors

intervened, the comparisons were more defined and of a far more
camplicated nature.

The subjects weighed and balanced the

various possible combinations in their quest for the specific
relationship contained in each card.

The comparisons were

always followed by evaluations, a final decision, and choice.
While the subjects recognized similarities in the first tests,
they made no effort to evaluate them or to: make any selection.
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Table III
Insight Scores for the Anaiogies

Subjects

Words

Numbers:

Geometric
Designs

Inv. Voli.

Inv. Vol.

Inv. Vol.

Pictures
Inv. Vol.

K.

c.

0

3

0

1

0

1

0

1

s.

R.

0

2

0

3

0

2

0

3

R. L.

0

3

0

2

0

2

0

1

A. D.

0

3

0

3

0

2

0

2

s. L.

0

3

0

2

0

2

0

1

I. B.

0

2

0

2

0

2

0

l

:u:.

H.

0

2

0

1

0

1

0

1

P.

0

2

0

2

0

1

0

2

D.

c.
s.

0

2

0

1

0

1

0

1

s.

A.

0

2

0

3

0

2

0

2

These operations were performed only when volitional factors
were directing the processes of thought.
Geometrical Designs
Involuntary: "These must be
patterns or designs. One of the
teachers in our school had some
on a bulletin board. These are
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all somewhat similar, some more
than others. No. 1 and No. 2
are angular. The patterns on
the bulletin board are on a
black setting. Perhaps there
is more to this card than I
have not iced."
Voluntary: "I have seen figures
like these before. I am looking
and comparing one with the other.
Some of these are like crosses-Nos. 1, 3, and 7. Now I find
that 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7--and 8
are alike. But No. 1, 4, 5, and
7 are straightline figures. I
haven't a good reason for choosing these, but I'll have to choose
them because I can't see anything
better. I don't like these
figures. I prefer something more
concrete. I know I didn't get
it, and I have a feeling of incompleteness."
D.

Logical Statements.
The results obtained in this part of our experiment are

much-the same as those described in the section on similarities.
When the logical statements were presented with directions
asking for general observations, the introspections of the
subjects showed that, while judgments were formed and reflected
upon, no attempt was made to reach a final conclusion.

Imagery

and free associations also were numerous in the reports from
the first test.
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Involuntary
statement:

Some trees never decay
All trees belong to plant life

"All trees decay--this card is
wrong because everything living
dies. I can see a rotten tree,
standing, all twisted, hardly
any branches, no twigs, and
hollowed out on one side. It
looks as if a wind would take
it out by the roots. I have
images of other trees, too. I
wonder why that statement was
put that way. tt
Vol.untary
Statement:

Some carnations are white
All carnations are flowers

"I guess you would say all
flowers are white, but that
isn't true. The other two
are right. I don't know how
that works. Something is
funny. The first two are true
and what·r said is not. All
white flowers are carnations-that's worsel But you can't
get a true conclusion from
that; I'm still trying to find
one. I think I could have said-some white carnations are flowers
or some flowers are white--that's
best. I didn't think of it
before."
Involuntary
Statement:

All fruits are sweet
Spinach is not sweet

"Spinach is not a fruit to
begin with. Tomatoes are fruits
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and are not sweet. It is difficult to say '&1~', for there
is usually an exeeptien. I
think spinach is good and I can
see some real dark green spinach.
I like all fruits; I have a
sensation of sweetness, like an
apple or orange taste. I'm
thinking now that I am not a
good reader. I stumbled over
those words when I read them,
and I can see myself reading
aloud in class. I'm wondering
if my Mother has any oranges
for my breakfast tomorrow. BY
girl friend and I used to ta1k
about food all the time."
Voluntary
Statement:

All animals ha.ve fur
A negre has no fur·

"A negra is no animal; therefore a negro has no fur. Is
that right? I really don't
think all animals ha~e fur,
but the conclusion I ha~e is
right. I had an image of a
negro, but no others. Almost
as soon ae I looked at the statements, that connection was clear
to me. I feel satisfied with
my conclusion because I know that
it's true anyway. •
These introspections seem to show the mutual. interdependence of intellectual and volitional factors for the completion
of a logical statement.

While thinking supplied material for

further thought, willing aided in the directien of thought.
Deliberations and reflections occurred in both of our

246

tests, but the actual conclusion was drawn when the subject was
told to look for it.

st. Thomas has commented on this parti-

cular function of will.

•It is quite true that it is for the

reason to draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism; and it
is

called~

decision or judgment, to be followed by choice.

And for this reason the conclusion seems to belong to the aet
2
of choice, as to that which results from it."
However, if the conclusion is perceived immediately upon
presentation of the premises, it may be an intellectual insight
without any deliberate or formal act of willo

It is quite

probable that such would often be the case with those well
versed in the skill of syllogistic reasoning.

On the other

hand, persons unacquainted with such techniques seem to require
definite volitional acts and stimulation for the completion of
reasoning processes.
One of the most noticeable effects of volitional factors
upon the subjects' reactions to our propositions was the
attempt to evaluate truth and evidence.

In the involunatry

tests, the subjects were not greatly concerned about the truth
or falsity of the statements, though they sometimes offered
their opinions on the matter.
2

But in the voluntary tests, the

The Summa Theologica (ed. Pegis) I-II, xiii, a.l, ad 2 um.
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subjects debated back and forth with themselves about the truth
of each statement.

The activities of deliberation and choice

were especially pronounced.

Introspections contain reports of

tentative acceptance, doubt, indecision, and reexamination,
back and forth, several times before the conclusion was actuaDcy
drawn.

Oftentimes, doubts persisted after the conclusion was

given, and the subject continued to battle for a more
factory conclusion.

~atis

In this part of our experiment, will fac-

tors made the subject more conscious of truth and falsity.
Furthermore, whereas in the involuntary tests, the subjects
looked upon the statements as more or less isolated sentences,
they

dil~gently

endeavored to find a relationship between the

given statements in the for.m of a proper conclusion when volitional factors were dominant.
Throughout the entire experiment, certain definite effects
of volitional factors were commonly noticeable in all the
introspective reports.

In the sensory as well as in the .

rational involuntary tests, manifestations of "strivingsn,
whether conat·ive or volitional, were very few.

Imagery was

abundant in all the tests requiring general observations only.
In the similarities and logical statements, intellectual cognitions as well as· imagery were reported frequently by the subjects in the involuntary tests.
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The most significant general effect of volitional factors
in this experiment was the awareness of self-activity which
these factors evoked in the subjects.

From time to time

throughout the different voluntary tests, the subjects manifested a keen realization of their own strivings.

This

realization was totally absent in all the introspections given
in the involuntary tests.

In the latter, our subjects were

often aware that they were •missing something" or that they had
given incomplete answers; but only in the voluntary tests do
they seem to have a cognizance of their own volitional. actions.·
This realization was evident in the tests on sensory material
a.s well as in those requiring rational processes.

Throughout

the voluntary introspective data, a consciousness of selfactivity was reported one hundred and ninety-six different
times.
.Voluntary Tests
I

Shifts on the Grecian Urn.
"Ohl I see two profiles. I
had a feeling that !-was establishing a rhythm pattern of
beats, and I was trying to
change it and make it faster·.
I concentrated on the shifting
and had no other images. I
guess I was too thoroughly
occupied with the shifting.
I think one excludes everything else during concentration."
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II

Word Similarities.
"These are all table utensils.
Perhaps some are more closely
related. Cup, bowl, eaucer,
plate are all dishes made put
of crockery; so they are more
alike. Fven when I find a
similarity I always try to see
if there are other points which
make them even more connected.
I'm thinking that I'm working
hard. One has to be more alert
now. The last time you gave me
these cards they ~re easier. I
really feel satisfied with my
choice this time. I think it
is right.•

III

Picture Similarities.
"I can't find the similaritieso
These pictures are all about
boys. Ohl there are three that
represent charity. Now I'm
looking to see if there are more.
I had no images, but I was conscious of the fact that I was
trying and looking. Now I'm
wondering if there is any method
other than my own to find these
things. I think I could do
better. I should have said four
act~ of charity. I remember-nDW
that there was another picture
in the same category and I missed
it. I'm so sorry."

Besides the realization of self activity, the subjects
experienced another effect of volitional factors in practically
all of the given tests;
dissatisfaction.

name~y,

feelings of satisfaction and

Accampanying the acts of striving, looking

for, and of penetrating the objectivity of words, pictures, or
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numbers, were feelings of satisfaction or disappointment.
These expressions seemed to be more psychological than physiological, though at times a mixture of the two might have been
present.

The subjects, intent upon the solution of their prob-

lem and the apprehension of a relationship, experienced an
intellectual delight when their goal was reached.

When the

search was abandoned, or when a selection was made because the
subject could find nothing better, the introspections were
interspersed with expressions of annoyance, keen disappointment, dissatisfaction, and the likeo

In the involuntary teats,

expressions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction rarely occurred;
most of those reported were concerned with experiences recalled
in free associations and were not precisely related to the task
at hand.

The following introspections are typical of the

responses under the two different circumstances.
Numbe~·

Similarities

Involunta;y: "Good night,
numbersl Pinball machines have
lots of numbers and you can get
a score. I notice that some of
these end in 3. These are funny.
I have images of red and green
lights that flash in those
machines and of the colored
designs inside the glass. They
remind me of my brother, a
sailor. I have images of
coins; coppers, nickels, and
dimes. Thought of a task I
have to do--make a phone call.
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Have an image of a girl and a
phone.•
Voluntary: "I don't like these
numbers, they are too intangible.
It's hard to find the connections
because they are so abstract. I
am adding some of them and now
I'm comparing them, but no luck.
It's annoying. 1, 81, and 18 all.
have an 8 in them. There really
must be something else but I
simply can't find the real relationship. I had an image of one
of my teachers. I feel very
dissatisfied and I am still
trying to find the answer."
Word Similarities
Involuntary: "Some of these
words kind of go together--there
are sails on a boat, and you have
to row some boats to move them.
The boys have a sailboat and they
are trying to get money to fix it.
I went speedboat riding. Another
time I went in a row-boat. The
.other girl did all the rowing;
Jean and I just sunned ourselves.
I was afraid to go on the motorcycles at the lake. The bus was
eo crowded; we should have gone
on the train. I still have images
of that train."
Number Similarities
Invoiuntar~:
"The only thing
here that means much to me is 23.
My brother is 23. 7 and 9 were
in the last card, too. My brother's
birthday was a little while back.
He graduated in 1943. I can see
the auditorium where he graduated,
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the diplomas, and.the kids all
dressed up. Have images of caps
and gowns. We had them, too. We
certainly had fun in high school.
We were always doing something.
I 1ike to add these numbers
together."
Voluntan: "The odd numbers
predominate, I can see that in a
glance; 63, 71, 45, 21. But there
must be something else and I'm
trying harder now. There& 63,
81, 45, 18, are all divisible by
.9 • That ' s it l Oh how good it is
to find it. These numbers remind
me of some tests we took. I'm so
happy that I found it. I have
the feeling that I found something
which had sort of slipped from me. ••
Since the

invo~untary

tests included so few manifestations of

strivings, the attitude of the subjects seem to be one of passivity or indifference.

But when volitional factors were more

strongly introduced and the subject was urged to activity,
there were always expressions of tttrying", "looking", "finding",
as well as of satisfaction or dissatisfaction following success
or failure, respectively.
The effects of volitional factors were evident in both the
sensory and rational processes; but our results indicate that
these factors were most effective in regard to the rational
material.

The differences in these effects were apparent in

the number of strivings.

(See Table IV).

Images were abundant

in the involuntary tests on both the sensory and rational
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T:a.ble IV
Objective Effects of Volitional Factors
on Sensory and Rational Processes

Involuntary
Seneory

Voluntary

Rationa1

Sensory

Images Strivings Images Strivmgs
678

26

material.

1182

47

Images Strivings
489

211

Rational
Images Strivings
82

792

However, the change in number, due to volitional

factors, was far greater on the rational level than on the
sensory.

But an even more significant difference is noticeable

in the number of strivings.

In the tests on both the senso,ry

and the rational material, the directions induced the subjects
to engage their· volitional powers as much as possible.

From

our introspective reports, we find that the rational material
required a much greater number of volitional acts than the
sensory material.

As is shown in Table IV, the subjects were

engaged in many more acts of "looking for", "trying•, •examining", "comparing•, etc., when their aim was to perceive and
abstract relation ship than when they were endeavoring to evo:ke
images.

Even in the involuntary tests, when volitional factors

were presumably in the background, acts of striving were more
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numerous in the tests on rational materials than in those on
sensory perception and imagery.
It would seem, then, that some special exercise of volition is needed or at least helpful in engaging in abstractive
and logical thinking.

Such is not the case in r-egard to the

use of our sensory faculties.

Sensory perception takes place

without any special act of will, and random images seem to
abound the more in the absence of voluntary effort.

Thus,

whe~

the subjects were asked to shift the ambiguous figures and to
evoke specific images as best they could, volitional factors
were induced but were less effective than they were in regard
to the rational processes,
for this difference.

We might suggest various reasons

Rational processes require more concen-

tration and .more volitional effort than sensory processes.

On

the other hand, volitional powers can change thought from one
object to another more readily than they can control sensory
perceptions and imagery.

A still more important reason for

these differences stems from the very nature of will which,
like intellect, is essentially rational.

A far· more intimate

relationship exists between will and the processes of thought
than between will and sensory perception.

Hence, whenever

intellect is at work, will is close at hand and readily cooperates to give finality to the thought processes.

In man it is

impossible to separate will even from sensory perception; yet
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sensory processes because of their different nature are lees
responsive to the commands of will than the rational processes
which partake of the same nature as will itself.

Summary

In general, the factors called into play in the second
situation tended to synthesize and to unify the .end results of
both perception and abstraction.

They were influential in

clearing away superfluous and interfering mental phenomena, and
they directed the cognitive powers in the shortest path towards
the attainment of the goal.

There was a rejectim of objects

which were incompatible with the intended aim, -and an acceptance
of others more in line with the task.

Volitional factors gave

a species of finality to the activities of other powers by
presenting what was sought, and thus put an end to deliberations and diminished random association.

Above all, they

produced in the subjects a keen awareness of their own selfactivity.

Before the second instructions were given, the sub-

jects remained passive and were content to relate the
spontaneous impressions to one another and to objects from their
previous individual exper-iences.

Volitional factors changed

the mental picture decidedly--from one of passivity to one of
striving and of repeated and persistent efforts and desires.
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It is not our purpose to overemphasize the influence of
volitional factors on the processes of perception and abstraction.

Since our aim was to study volitional effects in parti-

cular, we have endeavored, primarily, to describe the activities
of volitional factors as they occurred in our experiment and to
interpret the results obtained ·from them.

No attempt is made

here to generalize upon the findings we have recorded.

The

introspections, however, have clearly revealed that, in regard
to our particular subjects, volitional factors wield much
influence in the process of abstracting relationships and in
sensory perception as well.

The cognitive faculties, spurred

on by the orectic power of will, are enabled to work more
rapidly and to exercise their own potentialities to a fuller
and richer degree.
Our contribution, then, consists chiefly in the presentation of objective data:

namelly, responses and introspective

descriptions which show the positive influence of volitional
factors upon sensory perception and intellectual abstraction.
The objective data. revealed both an increase in frequency of
correct responses and a significant difference in the qualitative results when the subjects were induced to work with special
voluntary efforts.

APPENDIX

The primary purpose of our experiment was to obserTe and
describe the qualitatiTe effects of Tolitienal factors by means
of introspectiTe reports.

HoweTer, it is interesting to note,

that the quantitative data, obtained from correlations between
the scores from the Tarious tests, present a more complete
picture of these effects.

Owing to the small sample used in

the experiment, the results cannot do more than indicate a
trend.

No claim is made for predictive value in these

findings.
The Rank Differ·ence method was used and correlations were
computed as follows:

(1) between the ayerage scores obtained

in the Toluntary analogy tests and those from voluntary !3hif'ts
in ambiguous figures; (2) between average scores from the
Toluntary shifts of ambiguous figures and average scores from
the voluntary tests on images; (3) between average scores fram
the voluntary similarities and the average scores from the
voluntary tests on images; (4) between average scores on voluntary

~associate•

ities.

images and those from the voluntary similar-

Since many of the involuntary scores in the tests on
25'1
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both rational and sensory material were zero, we were unable to
use them in the correlations.

~able

V sh.-s the aTerage scores

from each of the tests used in the comparisons as well as the
co·efficient of each correlation and the probable error.
The fairly high poaitiTe correlation between the two sets
of scores obtained from the sensory tests indicates that those
subjects who haTe a high rate of voluntary shift on ambiguous
figures tend to have facility in producing images Toluntarily.
A person, then, who can shift his perceptions rapidly should be
able to produce images easily.

Since these abilities are

closely related and both on the sensory level, it is quite
probable that these results constitute a representative sample.
The low positive but unreliable correlation between voluntary shift of ambiguous figures and voluntary pereeptien of
similarities shows that little relationship exists between
these two abilities.

While a person may haTe great facility in

voluntarily shifting ambiguous figures, he may encounter difficulties in the perception of abstract relationships.

Skill

in perceiving sensory material, therefore, while it is an
extrinsic aid, does not necessarily give us an index of the
individual's intellectual ability.

This particular finding is

in close agreement with the Thomistic principle which states
that intellect is only extrinsically dependent upon the senses.
Certainly, one who is able voluntarily to shift his perceptions
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Table V
Average Scores and Correlations
Average Scores

Subjects

Voluntary
Vol. Shifts on
Voluntary
!mages
Similarities .Ambiguous Figures

Voluntary
"Aasociate" !mages

c.

1.50

34

7.8

6.6

s. R.

2.50

37

10.2

8.6

R. L.

2.00

29

11.2

9.8

A. D.

2.50

19

7.2

6.4

s. L.

2.00

16

6.4

6.0

B.

1.75

54

7.6

6.4

M. H.

1.25

30

7.2

5.6

1.75

16

7.2

5.8

D.

c.
s.

1.25

13

6.0

5.2

s.

A.

2.25

37

10.0

9.4

K.

I.

P.

Correlations
Between

Vol. Similarities Vol. !mages
Vol. Simila.rit:les \OJ. . :-...ties
Vol. Shifts on Vol. Shi:fts on
Vo1. Images Vo 1. Assooi.ate
Ambiguous Figures Ambiguous Figures
!mages

Correlatkm.

.20

.74

.37

.67

P. E.

-21

-.10

-.19

-.12
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rapidiy is not necessarily one who perceives intellectual relationships easily, since these two operations are perfor.med by
two essentialiy different faculties.
A like result is found in the correlation between voluntary similarities and voluntary production af images.

Here,

our findings are somewhat contradictory to those from other
types of tests.

It is often supposed that free associations

which contain numerous images are indicative of high intelligence.

Our results do not lead to this conclusi.n.

Subjects

who vol.unta.rily eToked a large number of images were not always
able to achieve a high insight score in the similarity testa.
Another somewhat

il~uminating

result was obtained from the

correlation between 'Voluntary similarities and Toluntary •a.aseciate" images.

In this

ca.se~

the correlation was poaitiTe and

reliable; the correlati•n between Toluntary similarities and
Toluntary random images was only a low positiTe one.

This

comparison seems to indicate that the ability to eToke •associate• images differs somewhat from the ability to produce
images at random, i.e., images of no particular class.

Is it

possible that the pro-duction of •associate" images requires
more than the exercise of sensory faculties only?

Since the

subjects had to depend, to a certain extent at least, on their
facility of recall, it is quite probable that this test contained an admixture of sensory a.nd intellectual operations, but
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with the sensory predominating.

Certainly, the task was more

difficult when the subjects were required to eToke a specific
type of image than when they were free to report all and any
images which occurred.

'l'hus, the facility to eToke, TOlun-

ta.rily, "associate• images is more closely rel.a.ted to voluntary
perception of relationships than is the ability to shift perceptions rapidly or to produce images at rand om.

1'he more

specific the task, the more likely will there be a relationship

.

with and dependency on the higher thought processes.
These correlation coefficients (See Table V) present a
pattern of gradations from a low positive to a fair1y high
positive relationship.

This pattern bears out the basie prin-

ciples already established in Thomistic psychology.

While

sensory abilities are interrelated to a fairly high degree, the
same is not true when we are comparing sensory capacities with
rational capacities.

The latter two are interdependent in

~

extrinsic manner; but sensory skills giTe little light, if any,
on the intellectual abilities of the same indiTidual.
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